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Abstract. 
 
The Thesis was inspired by a perceived need better to understand the unique description 
of unjust enrichment by the Australian courts, as a unifying legal concept.  It 
demonstrates that concepts and principles are essential features of the common law 
because they identify the character and taxonomy of rules.  The comparative study, 
encompassing Australian and English law primarily, and law of other jurisdictions, 
modern and ancient, elucidates the special characteristics of the concepts and principles 
of Anglo/Australian unjust enrichment and of concepts and principles generally. 
 
A like concept has had a place in the common law since its inception under several 
characterisations.  It bears the mark of ancient Roman jurisprudence, but relates to 
independent principles.  The jurisprudence was formed by special characteristics of its 
history.  It is distinct from modern Roman/Dutch law but the doctrinal overtones of its 
foundational case law reflect the basis of reasoning which in Continental law, is found 
in the adopted ancient codes.  It is this foundation of reasoning and the firm rejection of 
a normative general principle that makes Anglo/Australian law different in character 
and jurisprudence from unjust enrichment in USA and Canada. 
 
Stifled for centuries by quasi contract misconceptions, the law of unjust enrichment 
entered the modern law in the 20th  C through the seminal judgements of Lord Wright in 
Fibrosa Spolka Akcyjna v Fairbairn Lawson Coombe Barbour Ltd,1 and related cases 
and through the strong judicial and juristic following they inspired.  That “…any 
civilised system of law is bound to provide remedies for … unjust enrichment…”2 
became an imperative across the common law world: it has long held a place in the 
Roman Dutch jurisdictions of South Africa and Continental Europe. 
 
 
                                                 
1 [1943] AC 32. 
2 Id, 61. 
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The special character of unjust enrichment in Anglo/Australian law is focussed upon a 
unique action where-by the law imposes an obligation upon the establishment of a 
recognised ground.  The notion of breach of a primary rule does not arise: the obligation 
is therefore a primary obligation imposed by law, as distinct from a remedy for a 
breach.  Important consequences flow from the characteristic. 
 
The juristic development of unjust enrichment in the common law has long been the 
sole prerogative of the superior courts.  The place of historical features of the 
jurisprudence has however been subsumed by modern judicial methodology that is 
slowly assuming a unifying pattern of reasoning from case to case; from one ground to 
another.  This is the special characteristic of the unifying legal concept and English 
principle of unjust enrichment. 
 
The thesis draws widely based conclusions about concepts and principles of unjust 
enrichment and the actions and obligations they sponsor.  It portrays them as the 
substance of legal reasoning and analyses underlying theory.  to this end, it addresses 
counter juristic and historical arguments.  Its central conclusion are that there are sound 
jurisprudential arguments for actions based upon a unifying legal concept and English 
principle of unjust enrichment, and that the explanation of the unjust enrichment 
concept as the foundation of an independent branch of the common law and taxonomy 
is theoretically sustainable.  In this manner concepts and principles of the common law 
are demonstrated as critical characteristics of the common law at large. 
 
 
****** 
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Chapter 1: Introduction. 
The Thesis 
Concepts and principles are essential elements of the common law because 
they identify the foundations and taxonomy of rules of law and explain their 
characteristics. This thesis will demonstrate this claim in the context of rules of 
unjust enrichment, an independent branch of the law. 
 
The pertinence of concepts and principles is universal in the common law, but 
they have an especial importance in unjust enrichment. Unlike rules in contract 
and tort, rules in unjust enrichment impose a primary obligation that is not 
founded upon a breach of a right or a duty. Rules in contract and tort impose 
duties as remedies that are conceptually, secondary rules. A primary obligation 
is one imposed by law, as distinct from a duty or obligation arising from a breach 
of a contract, or enforced as a consequence of a tortious act, also characterised 
as a breach. Important consequences flow from the special characteristics of the 
unjust enrichment obligation. 
 
Concepts and principles of unjust enrichment assist in defining the 
circumstances, ultimately defined by a rule, in which an obligation to make 
restitution for unjust enrichment will arise. They provide the explanations of 
liability and therefore they unify the variety of grounds of unjust enrichment 
actions. They define the jurisprudential character of the actions, set the limits of 
jurisdiction, and define the independent purpose of unjust enrichment law. Like 
principles of equity they seek to rectify rather than remedy; unlike equity, they 
characterise the circumstances of a case, and the benefit gained rather than the 
action or omission of a party and the advantage taken.  
 
In this context, the thesis sets out to explain what was meant by Justice Deane’s 
dictum,  
 
…unjust enrichment is a unifying legal concept which explains why 
the law recognises, in a variety of distinct categories of case, an 
 John B Donnelly. 95312086 
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obligation on the part of a defendant to make fair and just 
restitution for a benefit derived at the expense of a plaintiff and 
which assists in the determination, by ordinary processes of legal 
reasoning, of the question whether the law should, in justice, 
recognise such an obligation in a new or developing category of 
case.1 
 
I will demonstrate these premises. I will argue that, they remain valid despite 
pressures and tendencies to follow a trend evident in some other jurisdictions 
toward more loosely structured actions and more general concepts of what may 
be deemed equitable at a philosophical level.  
 
The analysis of concepts, principles and rules and of obligations and actions, will 
demonstrate that the basis of modern law in Australia and England is 
theoretically sound and this soundness is an essential pre-requisite to 
development of the law of unjust enrichment. Importantly, it follows that if there 
is to be change, there must be a sound understanding of the merits of what 
exists and of the theoretical imperatives that must govern change. 
 
The future of unjust enrichment may well be concerned with broader definitions 
and some degree of exchange of concepts in common law and equity: as the 
exploration of this possibility is itself a major study, its treatment in this work is 
confined to necessary comparative observations.  
 
The motivation for this work began with Professor Winfield’s Province of the Law 
of Tort2.  The clarity of  Winfield’s treatment of the elements of the law of tort, 
concepts, principles and rules, suggests that study of concepts and principles in  
                                            
 
1 Pavey and Matthews Pty Ltd v Paul (1986) 162 CLR 221, 256-57. 
2 Sir Percy H Winfield, Province of the Law of Tort. 
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other heads or specialities of the law will be conducive to greater facility in 
understanding complexities in many areas. Unjust enrichment has been the 
focus of considerably less scholarship than contract tort and equity. Professors 
Birks and Burrows are two of the jurists tjay have made outstanding 
contributions to that scholarship; their works citied in these pages, have inspired 
investigation and laid foundations for exploratory research. 
 
The thesis introduces significantly novel findings and observations about 
the law of unjust enrichment. 
 
The treatment of concepts and principles in this work is novel in several 
important aspects. Firstly, I show that the jurisprudence of unjust enrichment has 
a long history in our common law. I do not assert continuity, but I demonstrate 
that throughout the long history of the common law, there is a significant 
influence of a concept of unjust enrichment that helps to shape actions and 
rules. It will be seen that several writers, and especially H K Lucke,3 have 
argued the durability of concepts in the history of the common law. It is very 
much because of their contributions that it is possible to assert that modern 
unjust enrichment has much in common with principles and actions that are 
found in many centuries since the foundation of the common law in Norman 
English times.4 The novelty here is in demonstratingmore completely than has 
been attempted in other works, that the foundations of common law unjust 
enrichment are to be found in historical concepts and principles. 
  
                                            
 
3 Horst K Lucke, Senior Lecturer in Law, University of Adelaide, later Emeritus Professor, University of 
Adelaide School of Law. 
4 The ‘Norman’ Kings were the Norman (of Normandy region, N.W. modern France) invaders of England 
who established the Kingdom in 1066. They laid down a centralised system of law originally intended 
to govern the legal relations between the king and his vassals, which became in time, the common law 
of England. 
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Secondly, the work explains concepts and principles in relation to the law and 
demonstrates their place in the law. This has rarely been dealt with in legal 
literature in a purposeful way and it is believed to be the first time that the nature 
of concepts and principles has been examined extensively in relation to actions 
in unjust enrichment. Especially, the importance of the character of the 
obligation imposed by law is analysed in the context of unjust enrichment, 
explaining the important contributions of Lord Wright that have been accorded 
too little attention and appreciation.5 The contributions of Professor Birks are 
also especially acknowledged, and the theoretical treatises of Professors Hart 
and Dworkin which affect unjust enrichment in common with other branches of 
the law, are studied, in company with others, for their ability to clarify the 
theoretical basis of concept principle and rule and the obligation created by an 
unjust enrichment rule. 
 
Thirdly, the working of concepts and principles in unjust enrichment is an 
especially elucidating study when done in a comparative way against concepts 
and principles of other areas of the law. This provides a unique insight into the, 
manner in which the development of the law is tied to foundational concepts and 
principles which, essentially, describe the limits of jurisdiction and the means of 
its development. 
 
Fourthly, the thesis describes the notion of ‘legal unjustness’ in an historical and 
a modern practical context and finds a specific legal meaning of the notion of 
unjust, which has been a central juristic feature in the law of unjust enrichment, 
historically and in modern law. The legal meaning of unjustness is defended 
against theories that deny special meaning of the language of the common law. 
The notion of that which is unjust has been stated in leading texts on unjust 
                                            
 
5 Esp. sub-ch. 6.3, and pp 171ff, 216-19 and 250ff 
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enrichment, but the thesis explains the characteristic as a defining characteristic 
of actions and explores its relevance to the obligation in unjust enrichment.6 
 
Fifthly, the work engages in a comparative study between the working of 
principles in the law of negligence and in unjust enrichment. The exercise is 
particularly elucidating and it demonstrates the essentiality of clear, principled 
separation of rules and the manner in which this contributes to an orderly 
taxonomy. In particular, the thesis compares the basis of reasoning between 
unjust enrichment cases and delict and attributes the commonality to the action 
on the case.7 From this association of the modern actions in unjust enrichment 
and delict with the ancient parent action, it is possible to explain more clearly the 
characteristics of modern actions. There does not appear to have been a 
comparative study of this kind in the past. 
 
Unjust enrichment involves concepts and principles that have proven much 
more difficult to define than concepts and principles in other areas of the law.  
There are issues that are seen to be unresolved, as to meaning and scope of 
this branch of the law. This thesis makes an original contribution to achievement 
of a principled approach to the underlying jurisprudence.8 
 
The special character of obligation plays an important part in unjust enrichment. 
The obligation is imposed by the unjust enrichment rule. The law recognizes 
certain specific obligations arising from the juridical character of the ground of an 
action. This is inherent in legal philosophy and is found also in equity. The thesis 
makes a novel suggestion that the obligation imposed by law is an expression of 
the juridical character of the action and derives from the fundamental principle   
                                            
 
6 See especially Sub-ch. 6.5 and Ch 13. 
7 Explained at pp 22-31. 
8 Especially in Chs 10, 11 and 13. 
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that every civilized system of law will mandate the restitution of unjust 
enrichments, rather than an arbitrary standard that cannot be explained in a 
unifying sense.9  
 
Finally, the meaning of the dictum of Justice Deane, ‘…unjust enrichment is a 
unifying legal concept…,10 is of crucial significance in Australian law. This work 
analyses and explains the meaning of that dictum, a first in legal literature, and it 
assays the relationship of the unifying concept in Australian law and English 
‘general principle’ of unjust enrichment which has a comparable role.11 It is 
shown that the Australian and English law on this point is significantly different to 
North American case law. This is crucial to the interpretation and application of 
case law across several common law jurisdictions. An explanation of the 
unifying legal concept of unjust enrichment does not appear to have been 
attempted in other legal literature. 
 
 
 
 
                                            
 
9  A related obligation is imposed by some equitable doctrines. Chapter 7.5 is important to this aspect of 
the work.  Throughout, this work, the word ‘juridical’ is used to describe concepts, principle, rules and 
doctrines in the manner that they have a unique or at least special legal character that has been 
attributed to them uniformly and which can be expected to characterise associated statements of 
principle.  See ‘legally conclusive proposition’ p107.  The ‘corrective’ character of the unjust 
enrichment obligation, p 84, is an example.  See Professor Birks’ essay entitled ‘Juridical 
Classification of Obligations’ in Peter Birks ed The Classification of Obligations, 37, especially pp 37-
39, for an exhibition of ‘juridical’ categorisation.  Ernst Weinrib’s notion of ‘juridical’ characteristics, 
fn 192, carries the notion that legal usages have meaning determined by their use in a legal 
philosophical environment which may vary according to the particular legal philosophical views of the 
exponent.  My use of the term ‘juridical’ involves that concepts, principles, rules and doctrines have 
meaning that is wholly to be found by studying cases in jurisdictions over a period of time that might 
be correctly described as ‘contemporary’.  Another similar word, ‘juristic’, has a related meaning but 
may take account of the usages and uses of an element of law in a predictive sense in writings of 
leading jurists in the particular speciality. 
10 Fn 1. 
11 Esp. pp 91-98, 108-110, 136, 164 and 176-79. 
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Structure of the Thesis. 
 
I will pursue the objectives of the work in a five-part approach: 
1. An historical appreciation designed to explain that historical roots 
contribute definitively to modern perceptions of what is meant by unjust 
enrichment, and of taxonomy and doctrine. 
2. An analysis of the importance of concepts and principles as they describe 
the content and purpose of rules. 
3. An elucidating comparative study of law in modern jurisdictions, and to a 
limited extent, comparison with ancient law. This comparative approach 
will be seen to have several aspects. 
4. A theoretical study designed to augment the description of the role and 
purpose of principles in modern law of unjust enrichment. 
5. Drawing upon each of the above, a study of definition of the key concepts 
and the parameters of unjust enrichment, that is of benefit, subtractive 
enrichment, obligation and the definitive nature of unjust as a central 
feature of the unjust enrichment action.  
 
Some of these approaches have dedicated chapters, but all permeate the work 
as a whole. Each will contribute to the achievement of the major premises stated 
above. 
 
Observations concerning objectives. 
 
Modern judges and jurists do not universally treat unjust enrichment as an 
independent branch of the law.                Certainly, it is no longer an off-shoot 
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 of contract, but might it not be subsumed into equity and contract by making it 
merely a remedy? And is it not susceptible to the introduction of new grounds 
founded upon notions similar to those that underlie the unfair contracts 
legislation in the Australian states? Perhaps that ‘unfairness’ notion could be 
extended to include unconscionability. This is the way things have gone in the 
North American jurisdictions and a recent decision in the Australian High Court12 
provides substantial grounds for believing that some Australian judges are 
leaning toward this kind of outcome, albeit, not in any defined or scientific way at 
this stage. The thesis therefore sets out to show that unjust enrichment has a 
strong jurisprudence of its own and to demonstrate how this has developed.  
 
Conclusions reached in the work may have broader application, but unjust 
enrichment is a special case: its principles and rules are at a crossroads and this 
has been so for the greater part of the past two centuries. There are issues that 
are seen to be unresolved, as to meaning and scope of this branch of the law. 
Issues of the kind have proven perplexing throughout the long history of unjust 
enrichment. 
 
Principles and rules of contract and tort do not exemplify this developmental 
state. They are continually being reassessed and reaffirmed in incisive 
judgments, but they are more firmly established, a factor that might be attributed 
to their much older genre as integral chapters of the law.  Few judgments in 
modern times can be seen to address their principles and rules in the manner of 
questioning their modern application.13 Unjust enrichment however, involves 
concepts and principles that have proven much more difficult to define and this 
fact underlies the anomalous ‘quasi contract’ nomenclature that Justinian 
                                            
 
12 Roxbourough v Rothmans of Pall Mall Australia Limited (2001) 208 CLR 516. 
13 Cf, Trident General Insurance Co. Ltd v  McNeice Bros Pty Ltd  (1988) 165 CLR 107. 
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employed.14 The same anomaly has plagued neo-modern jurists. This is another 
aspect of the comparative study. Unjust enrichment is a complex of concepts, 
principles and rules that challenges lawyers to justify development in terms of 
legal theory and to avoid the pitfalls of unprincipled notions of unfairness and ill 
defined extensions of notions of unconscionable conduct found in equity.  
 
It is impossible to assess fully, a field of jurisprudential theory in the context of a 
thesis that sets out to examine specific aspects of unjust enrichment law, that is, 
the concepts and principles that are its structure. Several theoretical approaches 
demand and suggest answers to particular problems perceived to be relevant to 
practical unjust enrichment law and it is possible to study the way that unjust 
enrichment is elucidated by their study. It is not proposed however that any 
particular approach to jurisprudence exclusively defines the analytical approach 
of the thesis. Especially, the scope of the work is confined to the inter-action of 
the elements of rules, concepts, principles and notions of obligation: it does not 
purport to addess purpose of law in terms of control and behavior in a legal 
philosophical sense as a jurisprudential study, in the manner of Austin, Kelsen 
and others.15 
 
A final observation on objectives of the work concerns the relevance of the 
issues to the practice of law in modern courts. What elements of a decision of 
the superior courts are binding upon lower courts? A jurisprudence that prefers a 
definition of law as a system of rules does not readily answer how the reasoning 
that underlies rules is dealt with by the doctrine of precedent: is Justice Deane’s  
 
                                            
 
14 In Roman Law, The Institutes of Justinian, an important early codification of the law. 
15 Lord Lloyd of Hamstead and MDA Freeman, Lloyd’s Introduction to Jurisprudence 17-18; John 
Austin, The Province of Jurisprudence Determined: Hans Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State.  
See however p 202 and fnn 280 and 492 below where a brief contrast is made between Kelsen’s 
characterisation of rules and the explanation of rules by professor H L A Hart, Concept of Law, which 
is designed to demonstrate my perception of Hart’s concept of rule.  The contrast concerns the function 
of the rule of relative to other elements of law and the working of precedent in the cases. 
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notion of ‘unifying legal concept’16 an aspect of a rule or is it reasoning? I believe 
the study must assist in answering questions of this kind and assist in 
addressing the associated issue that Lloyd raises, that is, when and how is 
justification for departing from an established rule justified?17 The answer as 
applied to unjust enrichment in common with many other areas of law, must take 
a wider view than simply a capacity to apply rule: such an answer differs from 
justification in reason that concerns the logic and legal reasoning underlying a 
curial decision. It is the latter that characterizes the Justice Deane dictum. 
 
Unjust Enrichment’ or ‘Restitution’? 
 
I do not propose to dwell long on the issue encapsulated in this heading for it 
has been the subject of a treatise by Professor Birks.18 Suffice to say that the 
branch of the law here dealt with is commonly described as ‘restitution’. It is 
necessary to be precise, however: the work deals with restitution for unjust 
enrichment and the terminology to describe this branch of the law is described 
throughout, as unjust enrichment. It will be necessary at times to discuss it in the 
context of its restitutionary ‘neighbours’ in common law and equity, but this is 
ancillary to the main task. In the United Kingdom, the judgments and the legal 
literature refer most frequently to restitution denominating a branch of the law in 
                                            
 
16 Above, fn 1. See below pp as to the meaning of the ‘unifying legal concept’ pp 91-98, 108-110, 136, 
164 and 176-79. 
17 Lloyd’s Introduction to Jurisprudence, above fn 15, 1377-84, esp. 1382, ‘…basic flexibility of the 
system is preserved, not so much by the formal limitations on the rule of stare decisis, but by the 
relative freedom with which the courts may and often do determine the scope and limits of  past 
precedents and whether to apply them to fresh circumstances … or to distinguish them…’.  
18 Peter Birks, ‘The Independence of Restitutionary Causes of Actions’ (1991) 16, No 2, UQLJ, 1. See 
also, Peter Birks ‘Misnomer’ in W.R. Cornish et al (ed), Restitution Past Present and Future, 1, 4 ff, 
arguing that socio/political considerations played a part at the time of the first edition of The 
Restatement in the choice of restitution nomenclature in preference to unjust enrichment.  In modern 
times too, it is essential that the law defines carefully the actions it will allow. The issues are discussed 
in a brief comparison with the foundations of the Continental codes in Chapters 10 and 13. 
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which restitution for unjust enrichment is a central and essential part. There is no 
firm rule, but the practice in Australia to date has been to refer to unjust 
enrichment as a branch of the law, restitution being the broad category that 
encompasses remedies for wrong as well as the taxonomic category of 
restitution for unjust enrichment. In this work, the focus is exclusively unjust 
enrichment as a taxonomic category and restitution for unjust enrichment as the 
juristic outcome of the actions.  
 
Scope of the comparative study. 
 
It is fashionable and comfortable to use the term ‘Anglo/Australian’ in reference 
to common features of our law rather than ‘Australian/English’. It is not meant to 
imply that the work is more concerned with English law than with Australian law 
however much the size and extensive history of the Anglo jurisdiction would 
suggest otherwise. The development of unjust enrichment in Australian law has 
been something of a joint venture. Australian courts have relied very much upon 
the experience, wider and substantially longer, of the English jurisdiction. It will 
emerge that the modern approaches in each are not, in the final analysis, greatly 
different and the work of the courts in each is demonstrably complementary. 
 
Although there is fundamental similarity between rules applied across many 
jurisdictions, the courts in North American jurisdictions have followed different 
paths to that followed under the Anglo/Australian model, in extending the law 
and allowing new actions in unjust enrichment. There are competing and 
conflicting influences at work. This work will demonstrate that the Australian law 
is and should remain similar to English common law of unjust enrichment, 
subject to some important conceptual problems. These latter affect the nature of 
the restitutionary action based upon unjust enrichment and may hinder, or assist 
its growth in Australian law, depending upon the manner of their resolution.  The 
comparative analysis will address these areas of apparent theoretical  
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dissimilarity and come to some conclusions within the confines of the work. 
 
The comparisons across jurisdictions nevertheless help to support an argument 
favouring a conservative approach to the future expansion of unjust enrichment 
jurisdiction in Anglo/Australian law which is demonstrably in the interests of a 
lucid taxonomy and principled development of the law in our circumstances. 
 
Comparisons with civilian jurisdictions are made sparingly because the depth of 
that comparison is a substantial work in its own right and cannot be attempted 
without consideration of common historical influences which have helped to 
shape civilian Continental (European) and South African law and our own 
common law/equity traditions. 
 
The learned exponents of the common law begin, in so many reasoned 
passages, by setting up the philosophical stance of the Roman law and 
addressing it, even when their purpose is to expound and defend a different rule 
from that which might come down from Roman jurists. This is found frequently in 
judicial reasoning in respect of unjust enrichment. Lord Mansfield’s famous 
dictum in Moses v Macferlan19 is rich in nuances that may derive from Roman 
praetorian concepts of equity and the method of reasoning whereby rules were 
formulated in actions allowed by the praetorian edict.20 The ex aequo et bono 
(out of justice and expediency)21 principle was at the centre of enrichment  
 
                                            
 
19 (1760) 2 Burr. 1005: 97 ER 676. See fn 127 below; the scholarly transfer of wisdom, rather than doctrine and rules, 
was the Roman legacy to the common law. 
20 The praetor, a Roman superior court official empowered to publish a periodic list of allowable actions, including, in 
his sole discretion, new actions. The judges (iudex) enforced the actions so allowed. The praetor pereginus (as 
distinct from the praetor, properly so called) was the significant office for this was the official who presided over 
actions allowable between citizens and non citizens or between non citizens inter se, and the law developed in this 
jurisdiction, typically Roman Byzantine law, the law of Justinian, as distinct from derivative classical law reserved 
for citizen and citizen where the praetor (the title reserved for this jurisdiction) presided. 
21 W.A.Hunter, Roman Law, 34-36: see also Hector L MacQueen and W. David Sellar, ‘Unjust Enrichment in Scots 
Law’, in Elto J.H. Schrage ed, Unjust Enrichment, 291. The ‘equity and expediency’ is found in Kames Principles 
of Equity , 1788, and Sir James Dalrymple, Viscount of  Stair, Institutions, 1.1.16. See fn 267 below where a too 
literal interpretation of ‘expediency’ is questioned. 
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condictio in Byzantine Roman law but this must not be taken as being of direct 
importance. It is the influence of Roman jurisprudence that is of importance in 
this comparative study. Comparison of actual rules and the legal context in 
which they are found is of lesser significance. We could spend much time 
comparing Roman concepts of equity with English rules relating to unjust 
enrichment, but little would be gained from that, for present purposes at least. 
The comparative study cannot however, ignore the origins of our jurisprudence if 
the relationship of principle and precedent is to be explored fruitfully.  
 
The absence of Roman principles in the early common law does not mean that 
there has been no cross fertilization. In the history of western jurisprudence, 
there have been only two substantial systems of unwritten law, they being the 
Classical Roman Law and the Common Law. The lessons of the former in its 
transition to a law of universal application were not lost on those whose 
scholarship and juristic experience has modernised the common law over the 
centuries since Matthew Hale began his organization of the common law.22 The 
experience of Roman law provides a foil that assists, at many points, in 
understanding developments in our own law. It is especially significant that 
influences of Roman jurisprudence are to be found in the reasoning in the courts 
in developing a concept of unjust enrichment despite the early strictures of the 
formulary system, (and paradoxically, to an extent, because of this restrictive 
environment). Later in the work it will be demonstrated that principle in our law is 
inseparable from the concept of an action, a feature which has a distinct 
relationship to Roman experience.23 
 
 
                                            
 
22 See Peter Stein, The Character and Influence of the Roman Civil Law: Historical Essays, 154 ff. 
23 Below, pp 179 and 246. 
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In the context of this work, it does not assist reasoning, I believe, to argue the 
source of rights beyond asserting that they are recognised by law. This is so 
whether the right is one to enjoy unimpeded possession of land and chattels; to 
have one’s agreement with another performed when legal prerequisites have 
been satisfied; or, to have restitution in circumstances where the law recognises 
a ground for an action in unjust enrichment. Issues concerned with the question, 
why the law recognises a right which gives rise to a remedy, or a right that 
underlies a finding of unjust enrichment, are at another level which ought not to 
be pursued in the present context. This means that questions concerned with 
why the law recognises that a particular proposed cause of action is a ground for 
restitution involve two lines of enquiry. 
 
• Firstly, is it a moral question or a question concerned with communal 
values, or some other philosophical, or value reasoning? 
• Secondly, does the law regard this ground as just one more ground that 
is linked or explained by a unifying concept/principle of unjust 
enrichment? 
 
With one reservation, the present study does not seek to answer the first 
question. The second question is ultimately, answered by the superior court of 
the jurisdiction by resort to legal reasoning. The student of theory and the 
practitioner may attempt to suggest new grounds because of relationship to the 
purpose perceived to underlie all existing grounds, or one that is found by the 
superior court to underlie an existing ground in a decided case. It is with this 
kind of enquiry that the consideration of concepts, principles and actions is 
concerned. It will emerge that there are sound theoretical and practical reasons 
why the recognition of new grounds will be extremely rare. 
 
I have suggested a single reservation concerned with the first question. That 
reservation is probably no reservation at all; it is signalled here because the law 
determines the juridical meaning of unjustness as the foundation of an action in 
unjust enrichment. Treatment of this issue in chapter 7 seeks to identify the 
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character of a key subordinate principle in unjust enrichment actions: that 
concerns the character of ‘unjust’.24 
 
Finally, there has been considerable academic discussion on the issue of unjust 
enrichment quadrating with restitution, as two sides of the same coin. This is a 
complex issue that need not affect the way unjust enrichment is studied in this 
work. The focus is unjust enrichment: restitution, which may have relevance also 
as a remedy under other heads of law is not the primary concern in these pages. 
As an article of Andrew Burrows shows, ‘in restitution for wrongs, the wrong is 
the cause of action’25  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
 
24 The character of ‘unjust’, it will be seen, rests upon the obligation created by law; it may seem 
tautologous to insist that the obligation created by law is a legal obligation, but I must ask whether the 
law responds to another kind of obligation. To the extent that such an obligation is an expression of 
communal values and morality, then it is of the same character as the issues envisaged in the first 
enquiry. As to obligation in modern law, see pp 169 ff and Chapter 13 below. A comment on J.C. 
Smith’s analysis of legal obligation below, Ch. 7.5, explains the issues involved.  
25  ‘Quadrating Resitution and Unjust Enrichment: A matter of Principle’. [2000] RLR, 257, 260. This is a 
more limited enquiry than that which may concern the jurisprudential character of a right and  wrong. 
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Chapter 2: Historical Introduction.  
Part A: Summary Exposition of the History of Unjust Enrichment.  
  
2.1.1. Explanatory Note. 
 
There are two parts to this chapter. Part A is a summary overview of the legal 
history of unjust enrichment like concepts and jurisprudence. Part B, which is a 
detailed explanation of important historical issues concerning the background to 
modern law of unjust enrichment, is self contained. It is unavoidably complex. It 
endeavours to approach the task as a scholarly treatise whilst it seeks to unravel 
the legal history from the history of the forms of action and the idiosyncrasies of 
Norman and medieval English law. It also seeks to separate the real law from 
fictions and misconceptions that were abundant in the early common law. Part A 
therefore endeavours to make it possible for the reader to use Part B simply as 
an historical resource by referring to sections of Part B when detail may be 
required. To facilitate this, footnotes are primarily contained in Part B. 
 
 
2.1.2. Introduction. 
 
History and reason have forged the structure and the taxonomy of the body of 
laws about unjust enrichment in English law. It will be very important for the 
future, to understand the foundations of unjust enrichment as an independent 
branch or speciality of the law along-side contract and delict. Without such an 
understanding, unjust enrichment will be attached to equity which will be 
mutually detrimental: its principles and     rules will continue their clumsy  
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progress without contribution to reasoned development of the wider ‘law of 
obligations’. That ‘law of obligations’ nomenclature will itself persist without 
understanding that there are important nuances that affect the primary kind of 
obligation in unjust enrichment, distinguishing it from most other obligations. 
 
Obligations to desist from interference with another’s rights, and property and to 
refrain from damaging another’s good name, and to perform one’s contract are 
also primary obligations that are the foundation of rights and duties that arise in 
the context of breach. The unjust enrichment primary obligation is imposed by 
law and along with some obligations in equity, it has a special quality because it 
is the imposing of this kind of primary obligation that is the response of the law 
to the particular facts that are in law, an unjust enrichment or that justify an order 
such as injunction or specific performance. The legal response to tort is also 
imposed by law; unjust enrichment and tort are by-products of the action on the 
case. In tort however, the action is a response to a breach.  
 
The underlying jurisprudence of the indebitatus type of action concerns the 
creation of obligations by process of legal reasoning, a direct consequence of 
action on the case jurisprudence. This does not mean that the actions were 
either delictual or equitable even though there may have been an early 
jurisprudential association with each. The relationship with early delictual cases 
was only in the judicial method of recognising actionable cases. As the law 
developed from the 17thC, unjust enrichment jurisprudence has been distinct 
from equity. This is attributable to the manner in which the independent courts 
and their jurisdictions developed, as much as to the isolation of the indebitatus 
common counts as creatures of the common law with a supposed contract 
association.  
 
The influences of history are absorbed into the common law through the 
practice, indeed doctrinal imperative, of observing rules of precedent. Many old 
cases, from the forms of actions era (that persisted to the last quarter of the 
19thC), still provide the foundation of rules applied in modern cases. Modern 
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cases create structure, taxonomy and theoretical science at least partly, by 
applying these long standing judgments.  
 
An understanding of the unjust enrichment actions as a distinct branch of legal 
taxonomy is essential to the integrity and predictability of decisions in an 
important field of common law. Indeed, the conceptual confusion that has 
clouded modern actions stemming from miss-interpretation of procedural 
devices in the era of the common counts, had frustrated the development of 
principled foundations of neo modern unjust enrichment until prominent judges 
of the mid-to-later 20thC intervened to contribute principled definition of actions.  
 
The brief historical study will account for the manner in which an independent 
jurisprudence developed. It does not attempt a study of deeper historical 
philosophical influences apparently shared by continental jurisdictions, for which 
anecdotal evidence is noted in chapter 10 and 13, beyond noting opinion the 
possibility that such influences may have existed.26 
 
2.2. The Historical Summary. 
 
The consequences of history that are noticed in the historical study will provide 
essential background to conclusions to be reached in the work as a whole. The 
purpose of the chapter is to demonstrate that the concepts and jurisprudence of 
modern unjust enrichment are as old as the common law itself and that its 
jurisprudence, especially the method of the law finding what is unjust on the 
facts of the case, is almost as old in the common law and reflects much older  
 
                                            
 
26 There is a lack of hard evidence for such influence and it is likely that the medium, in the 11th and 12th 
C’s was the Canon law, which was in any event, repressed by the Norman Kings.  From 1066, the 
invasion of Britain by the Normans (of Normandy) established a unique administration and a system of 
law that was reduced initially, to a system of writs that enabled actions to settle disputes between the 
barons of the royal court.  The Crown was disposed to suppress communal and ecclesiastical/canon 
law. 
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judicial methodology. It is therefore possible to assert that the rules in modern 
cases are neither unrelated nor incapable of being explained by unifying 
concepts and principles that have characterised the law over the course of a 
millennium.  
 
The detailed exposition in Part B, beginning with Chapter 2.3, argues the above 
premises. Those arguments are presented here in summary form. 
 
(i) Elementary Common Law. 
There was an elementary jurisprudence in the earliest common law of the 
Norman Kings. It comes from the earliest actions of debt and account that 
preceded development of contract.27 This jurisprudence was not contractual and, 
as this treatment of history will demonstrate, unjust enrichment law was not an 
off-shoot of contract (one of the enduring myths of English legal history). Under 
the foundational royal writ of right that lay for claims of title to land between the 
Norman Barons, the central notion of the plaint was that ‘…he deforceth me…’. 
Other writs and especially the writs of debt and account, took their form from the 
parent writ of right, underscoring a strongly proprietorial jurisprudence. Debt and 
account came to be the manner of claiming, first a specific sum, and later, the 
(mixed) sum covered by an averment of accounting. There was no writ for 
informal contracts. 
 
(ii) Adoption of New Jurisprudential Characteristics: (a) quid pro quo. 
The Norman common law actions of debt and account were built around a 
doctrine called quid pro quo. The quid pro quo was the essence of the 
unjustness of the retention of the benefit (something was given for which a 
return was expected). Account determined the issue of what was owed. The 
bailiffs, were obliged to perform proper accounting under pain of forfeiture or 
                                            
 
27 Explained in Chapter 2.3.  
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imprisonment. Here we can see a lack of clear distinction between the civil 
action and the 'offence' and this is important to the development of the action on 
the case in non delictual actions that will be mentioned again shortly. Holdsworth 
says of account that it was the instrument by which the common lawyers applied 
the ‘…equitable principle which lies at the foundation of the great bulk of quasi 
contracts, that one person shall not enrich himself at the expense of another.’28 
Sir Henry Maine also found the jurisprudence of this kind of action ‘equity like’ at 
this stage in the development of the law;29 Holdsworth was endorsing Ames’ 
conclusion that account was the origin of the principle underlying the actions 
derived from the action on the case in the common law, which will be introduced 
in the next sub-chapter, as distinct from civilian influence.30 
 
Whilst this version of the history of concepts and principles developing apart 
from civilian influence is demonstrably sound, it cannot be denied that there was 
a deeper philosophical meaning and a more credible account of the origin of the 
concept of unjust enrichment which Jan Hallebeek finds had its origins in canon  
 
                                            
 
28 Holdsworth, History of English Law, v. III, 427, citing Ames, Lectures, 162. The reference to ‘equitable 
principle’ cannot be read in terms of modern equity: see below, p 26 and 38 and Chapter 13. ‘Quasi 
contract’ refers to the actions that later became indebitatus and ‘the common counts’. It appears to be 
an adoption of the manner in which actions of this kind were described in the Institutes of Justinian 
(Roman). It was an inappropriate term even in Roman law where it had nothing to do with contract. 
The terminology will be explained below.  
29 Ancient Law 15 and ch. III. See notes at fnn 44 and 106-110 below. Equity had a larger role in the 
‘account’ type of action in the middle ages, partly because it had the power of discovery that the 
common law courts did not, and partly because its procedures were a great deal more flexible. See 
Gareth Jones, ‘The Role of Equity in the English Law of Restitution’ in Eltjo J H Schrage ed Unjust 
Enrichment: The Comparative Legal History of the Law of Restitution, 159 at 168-9. 
30 Holdsworth connects indebitatus with assumpsit rather than with debt. This might explain his 
unwillingness to go one step further and acknowledge that it was just this ‘principle’ in the mixed 
account and debt action which was, in truth, the foundation of indebitatus assumpsit and hence of 
more modern concepts. The quasi contract appellation is an adoption of the manner in which actions of 
this kind were described in the Institutes of Justinian (Roman). It was an inappropriate term even in 
Roman law where it had nothing to do with contract. See fnn 118-126 below and references therein. 
There are several points at which the study points-up issues with the views of important historians. 
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law.31 In the common law the concepts were, nevertheless, what English history 
and unfolding jurisprudence made of them. 
  
A rationalisation of these perceptions is offered by Jeffrey Hackney who 
explained that in the 14th C, there was a marked turning away from the Roman 
law as a foundation of the common law principles, after which common law 
assumed an independent character and resemblances in common law to 
Roman law and Canon law were superficial. Hackney suggested that the new 
concern with the ‘top end’ of legal relations was very largely associated with 
commercial needs and in consequence, the common law actions became 
directed to rapid outcomes and lost touch with notions of conscience, trust, 
loyalty and good faith: in consequence, the clerical Chancellors rejuvenated 
these lost characteristics in equity, the foundations of the Chancellors’ 
jurisdiction.32 
 
(iii) Adoption of New Jurisprudential Characteristics: (b) Case. 
A distinction is made in the practice of pleading between a plaintiff in debt on the 
one hand, and a plaintiff who complains of an injury or wrong. The former 
demands what is his/her own whilst the latter claims relief and pleads in a  
 
 
                                            
 
31  Jan Hallebeek ‘Unjust Enrichment as a Source of Obligation: the Genesis of a Legal Concept in the 
European Ius Commune. [2002] RLR 92, 93-95. Hallebeek finds that in the 12C, the separation of 
canon law and theology was complete and the former became an independent discipline. He relates 
that Saint Thomas Aquinas was the first to separate unjust enrichment from restitution in Summa 
Theologica 11-11.962 art. 6, where he proposed two quite different concepts; restitution resembled 
redress for a past performance without consideration; the unjust enrichment doctrine was closely akin 
to its modern concept. But it was Grotius (1583-1645) who transformed it into a discipline of law. The 
time-line offers persuasive evidence of influence of these developments upon common law 
jurisprudence although it will have been anathema to the Norman Kings. It is a credible proposition 
that the education of contemporary lawyers and philosophers encompassed the legal philosophy of 
France and Italy and the German Barronies. See also Chapter 13 below, concerning the influence of 
the Natural law. 
32 ‘More than a Trace of the Old Philosophy’ in Peter Birks ed. The Classification of Obligations, 123, 
135-139. 
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complaining way’.33 Delictual actions were of course, a separate field of 
development centred upon the writ of trespass. There were many situations 
however that were neither debt nor trespass related, and the courts developed 
an action, built upon a Roman model, that they allowed for a case of injustice 
where no other action lay. This was originally a trespass kind of action 
developed within the scope allowed by parliament to find a new writ where none 
existed even though the case is similar to another for which a writ lay (in 
consimili casu). Like the modern action in unjust enrichment, it came to be 
allowed on the facts of the case. Thus, it came to be called action on the case. 
This demonstrates the influence of Roman jurisprudence.  In practical terms 
however, it was adapted to the circumstance of the exception to the general 
prohibition upon the issuing of new common law writs. There is a coincidence 
here that suited the beleaguered justices, tied as they were to the limited 
number of writs on the register. Under the Roman methodology, the Praetor was 
empowered to allow a new action in the interests of justice: in the English courts 
a finding in consimili casu, (where they found that an issue of justice demanded 
a case) resembled the Roman precedent. What was just was a legal question 
and it might have been conceptually related to the notion of offence to the 
‘commonweal’. All civil wrongs were an offence to the king who might originally 
have taken a personal interest beyond the pecuniary interest in later times. The 
coincidence of civil wrong and regnal control provided the means for 
development of the new action on the case. The plain effect of the developing 
jurisprudence was that the law recognised the circumstances in which, in the 
interests of justice, an action should be allowed.34 
 
 
                                            
 
33 Below, p 33 and fn 65. 
34 See below, pp 70-71; and see also p 250 and fn 658 where it is argued that the law minimises its impact 
on ordinary relations, a perception that has nothing to say about those other principles of law that deal 
with equitable, unconscionable or tortious issues that are separate and should remain so. 
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(iv) Rudiments of a Restitutionary Action. 
The rudiments of the restitutionary action are apparent. What was the reasoning 
that made it available? The courts of the later middle ages were not troubled by 
such a question because the reasoning was well recognised, if not defined in 
objective terms. The notion of a dispute between the King’s subjects breaching 
the royal peace was sufficient, even if the motivation was, in truth, the 
perception of justice of the case.  This analysis suggests the effect noted at p 
257 below, where-by all instances of non contractual acquisition of money or 
money’s worth were acceptable if legal, except those that the law reasoned as 
instances of that which was technically ‘unjust’. 
 
(v) Emergence of Assumpsit. 
There had been no action on an informal contract. Gentlemen should put their 
undertakings in writing! Where a benefit was given in return for a promise, the 
new action of assumpsit was allowed as a special case, on the same premise as 
the action for a benefit governed by debt and quid pro quo. I shall not traverse 
the history of assumpsit. The action which also grew from delictual origins (the 
action on the case with its early association with the King’s peace), evolved to 
serve a new and quite separate purpose. It lay where debt did not lie, upon a 
promise to perform an obligation which was neither given under seal nor nudum 
pactum.  But an obligation might also arise independently of a promise where 
the important doctrine of quid pro quo could be invoked, that is, pro quo (in 
return for) quid (a benefit).35  
 
The quid pro quo was evidence of the existence of an obligation and is the 
foundation of common law obligations. After some vacillation, the courts would 
allow an action for a benefit given in the absence of a friend to protect his crop 
or other property. This was not an assumpsit action because there was no 
                                            
 
35 See pp 35 ff below. Writ of covenant lay for agreements under seal. 
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promise, but it could not be a debt action either, because debt could not lie for a 
past benefit nor upon a promise. So the law created a fiction of promise.36 In the 
indebitatus assumpsit actions that developed after Slade’s Case, the promise 
was always a fiction.37 By that means, the action in debt, with its clumsy and 
probably corrupt procedures and its ‘swearing of witnesses’ as the modus of 
proof, was avoided. But the courts allowed the pleading of the benefit given. If 
the action were brought in the King's Bench where general pleadings were being 
accepted, the debt need not be specially pleaded; several debts might be 
involved. The tediousness and precariousness of the special pleading was 
avoided. The action, extended doctrinally, encompassed the debt as a benefit 
conferred without specially pleading the content of the debt. After Slade’s case, 
the court of Common Pleas, the other great common law court, also allowed 
actions of this kind.  
 
The plaintiff would plead evidence of the debt by averment of accounting (but 
would not plead the debt itself) to establish that the defendant ‘…just must have 
promised’ and this became the general issue and went to the jury in that form. 
The debt was established in this complex manner and became the essence of 
an obligation. 
 
In such a circumstance, the curious practices in the pleadings (which were now 
written) and the important evidentiary doctrine of quid pro quo, provided the 
necessary elements for the reasoning of the action now called, simply, case. In 
fact before Slades Case, the action was case. One of the findings in Slade’s 
 
                                            
 
36 Fictions were important devices, not only in the common law, but in other systems where the regnal 
control was over-bearing: see below sub-ch’s 2.7 and 2.8. Sir Henry Maine described fictions arising 
in Roman law  as ‘…properly a term of pleading…and properly signifies a false averment on the part 
of the plaintiff which the defendant was not allowed to traverse.’ Ancient Law 15 and ch. III. The 
similarity found in the indebitatus action is striking. 
37Slades case (1602) 4 Co. Rep 92(b); 76 ER 1072, and the fictitious promise are further explained at p 
 50 and sub-ch. 2.9 below. 
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 Case was that the plaintiff, in actions for a benefit given, could have debt or 
case at its election. The action, because of the fictitious promise, came to be 
called indebitatus assumpsit.38 Its only resemblance to the main-stream 
assumpsit action was the (fictitious) promise.  This point has not been well 
understood.  Fictions, especially in the Court of King’s Bench, were frequently 
the resort of the judges whose hands were otherwise tied by the all pervading 
forms of actions. 
 
Observed from an analytical point of view, the existence of the debt asserted by 
the averment of accounting, is relevant as evidence of an enrichment, the giving 
of quid pro quo; and the promise, whatever form or ephemeral shape it took, 
was an implicit acknowledgment that the enrichment would be unjustly held if 
not disgorged to the benefit of the plaintiff. It seems very likely that 17thC judges 
of the King’s Bench, were conscious of the essential ‘justice of the case’ issue.  
 
(vi) The Importance of quid pro quo. 
The quid pro quo doctrine did not assert ownership; it asserted obligation to 
restore in fact or in kind. Quid pro quo was fundamentally important in its 
influence upon the developing law where it also established the early concept 
that later became consideration. But it sprang from debt and was the 
jurisprudential basis of a concept that we now describe as ‘benefit’. It was 
coupled with, and inseparable from the obligation that was claimed in debt. It 
was not an obligation to pay damages, but to give over the benefit.39 
 
The same jurisprudential influences may also explain why writs of debt and 
account became something more than actions for ‘the sum or the thing’. They  
 
                                            
 
38 Slades Case, fn 37.  Indebitatus assumpsit grew out of the permissible election of debt or case as the 
action pursued by litigants that was allowed after Slade. 
39 See sub-ch’s 2.5, 2.7. 
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reflected reciprocity, or justice of the case jurisprudence rather than a 
preoccupation simply with a right. The  ancient legal notion that ‘… you have 
what in justice ought to be mine…’ has its modern equivalent: but it has a very 
long history in many legal systems, a fact that would prompt Lord Wright’s 
dictum in the middle 20thC,  ‘…every civilised system of law…’ will have rules for 
recovery of such benefits.40  
 
(vii) ‘Just’, a Judicially Reasoned Foundation of Cases. 
When the action on the case was reasoned into existence (the only way of 
describing adequately, such a response to a jurisprudential imperative), there 
emerged another element that becomes profound as a jurisprudential concept. 
This is the concept that in the action on the case the law reasoned in terms of 
what is just, the basis of actions. In case, the law selectively allowed actions 
where it found that the circumstances warranted it, as an issue of justice.41 
 
(viii) Principle of Justice. 
Lord Mansfield, in his several pertinent judgments42 was speaking, not about 
equity of ‘justice between man and man’,43 but about equity in the ancient and 
enduring sense of ‘the equitable’. That is a jurisprudential concept closely linked 
to the judicial method of establishing principles of law concerning the meaning of  
 
 
                                            
 
40 Fibrosa Spolka Arcynja v Fairbair, Lawson, Coombe Barbour Ltd [1943] AC 32; see text 
accompanying fn 276 below. 
41 See pp 35, and sub-ch. 2.8 below.  
42 Especially, Moses v Macferlan (1760) 2 Burr. 1005: 97 ER 676. 
43 Baylis v Bishop of London [1913] 1 Ch 127, 140 pr Hamilton LJ. It is significant that the antipathy 
toward Lord Mansfield’s statements of principle in ‘quasi contract’, reflected the strident opposition he 
encountered 150 years previously, over his stated principles raising the spectre of a promise satisfying 
the need for consideration, in Pillans v Van Mierop (1765) 3 Burr 1663; 97 ER 1035 (consideration 
was only one form of evidence) and Hawkes v Saunders (1782) 1 Cowp 289 at p 290; 98 ER 1091, 
(…ties of conscience upon an upright mind are a sufficient consideration.’). 
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‘unjust’ and, importantly, the foundation of an ‘obligation imposed by law’ in 
cases which we would now describe as unjust enrichment.44 
  
(ix) The Nature of Principle. 
The history of law and equity provides the student with a window upon 
relationship between law and the expectations of communities in which it 
developed, encompassing cultural, moral and constitutional disposition. Despite 
the limitations imposed by the particular environment, including by the forms of 
actions, English common law and equity had, in common with other civilised 
societies, a culture that responded, amongst other things, to obligations that 
went to the root of communal notions of integrity that is to be found in any 
civilized system of law.45 
 
(x) The History and the Modern Law. 
The significant out-come of the study of the legal history of unjust enrichment is 
not that there has been demonstrable continuity so much as that the 
jurisprudence that is as old as the Roman law and the Norman English law, has 
worked with rudimentary concepts to create the roots of modern concepts. That 
jurisprudence underlay the recognition of the jurisdiction to allow an action upon 
the just principle of the case, a jurisdiction recognised in other systems, 
especially Roman law. “Just” is what the law, guided by its internal concepts and 
rules, says it is.46 
                                            
 
44 The jurisprudence comes from the ancient action on the case, as to which see pp 31-45 below. It was augmented by 
the evidentiary role of the doctrine of quid pro quo; see sub-chapters 2.4 and 2.5 below, noting its significance to 
justice of the case. See also Blackstone’s (in Blackstone’s Commentaries) important conclusion at p 56 below, that 
such rules arise from ‘…natural reason and just construction of the law.’ As to the meaning of ‘equity’ in the dicta 
of Lord Mansfield, Chapter 13 demonstrates that equity has a very much older and wider history than that which 
we associate with common law.  
45 See pp 116 and 148ff below, as to promise and communal expectations.  The culture and the law also responded to 
the needs of commerce: see Jeffrey Hackney’s conclusions, above p 21 and fn 32. 
46 See fn 249 and accompanying text. There is an interesting foreshadowing of the way in which modern law has 
developed in a manuscript by Sir William Evans, dated 1802, entitled ‘An Essay on the Action for Money Had 
and Received’, reprinted in [1998] RLR 1-33. Evans addresses the basis of the law  applied by Lord Mansfield in 
Moses, fn 42 above, and describes the contemporary law in actions where one must give an account of money 
received, actions for mistaken payment, for failed contract, for duress and where the plaintiff waives tort. In his 
introduction, he explains that the basis of the action was that one who receives money to which another is entitled 
holds it to the latter’s use; thus, ‘…I may, in point of form consider him as my agent …having received money for 
my use and made a promise to pay…’, for which the receiver might be compelled to account: at p 3. 
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Conclusions. 
The early judges who reasoned into being the action on the case, were not 
allowing an action as a matter of discretion, where no other action (under the 
rigid forms of actions) applied. They found, by judicial reasoninga basis for a 
finding that case was available on the facts of special cases. There is no 
discretion, not even in the restricted sense that there may have been in equity. 
The role of the court was confined to principle and the courts demonstrated a 
capacity to follow principle. Modern law and equity is also confined or described 
by principle.47 
 
It is quite unnecessary to assert continuity from the 11thC to modern times, but 
the notions and concepts, principles and jurisprudential methodology observed 
in the early middle ages, have had typical phenomena in every decade of the 
subsequent history of the common law. It may be that it is most accurate to 
describe the influence upon later law in terms of ‘lessons of jurisprudence 
regarding obligations in the common law’. Meanwhile, notions of ‘implied 
contract’ and quasi contract, based upon a so called ‘promise to pay’ are 
demonstrated as being unworthy of serious attention. 
 
The observations of the commentators, especially those of Professor Birks, 
assist in understanding the significance of the developments outlined above.  
 
                                            
 
47 There never was an open ended discretion in equitable jurisdictions. It was always governed by 
principles and rules, and this is true of equity in other ancient jurisdictions. See the discussion of 
ancient equity in Ch. 13. In ‘equity’ of this broader kind, there is found a strong resemblance to the 
methodology of the early action on the case and to its successor actions for a benefit, including neo 
modern and modern unjust enrichment. 
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They are surveyed in sub-chapter 2.9 below. That completes the summary. The 
following sub-chapters in Part B constitute the reasoned historical text that is 
capable of being treated solely as reference supporting the observations made 
thus far in this chapter. 
 
Historical Introduction:  Part B: Important Phases in the Development of 
Unjust Enrichment. 
 
2.3. Early Conceptual Development: The Rudiments of an Independent 
Jurisprudence. 
 
In Bracton's time (d.1268), a universally honoured maxim,48 meant the rejection 
of a place in the English common law of the Roman Law principle ‘causa’ which 
was at the root of contractual types of actions49 (extending, in Roman law, to 
actions on a bare promise.).50  Contrasting with the early common law, Roman 
law contractual rules were soundly developed and the concept of unjust 
enrichment also, was part of the codes along-side the law of contract and delict, 
though not equivalent in terms of developed principle. The influence of Roman 
 
  
 
                                            
 
48 ‘nudum pactum non parit actionem’.  No action where agreement has not been made under seal. 
Bracton’s two volume work was amongst the earliest records of the common law. 
49 In Roman law, ‘causa’. see Holdsworth, History of English Law, v,  III, 16. The terminology has its 
origins in the Institutes of Justinian Book III, Title XXVII, Pl.1. See Moyle, The Institutes of Justinian, 
153 et seq. and Fifoot, History and  Sources  of the Common Law, Tort and Contract, 364. In the 
Roman law, it was stated plainly that many relationships, described as ‘causa’, simply were not 
contracts at all, certainly so in common law terms. 
50 A party who gains a benefit at its request should not retain it unjustly, Godwin's  case, (1219) Notebook, 
Plea 36, extracted in Fifoot, History and  Sources  of the Common Law, Tort and Contract, 260. See 
below sub-ch’s 2.8 and 2.9; the evidence of consciousness of legal unjustness in the courts, unfolds 
over several centuries. 
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taxonomy and Roman rules upon developing continental European law, has 
been significant.51 
 
A marked effect of the spasmodic development of the early common law was 
that for several centuries, the common law was to be without a law of promise 
where-by an executory promise might be enforced, unless it be under seal.52 In 
former times the ecclesiastical courts had administered rules of conscience, 
probably based upon Roman law and Canon law. The absence of a general 
promissory jurisprudential principle was to some extent ameliorated by, and 
again to some extent explicable in terms of a strongly proprietorial character in 
early English jurisprudence, concerned as it was with feudal relationships under 
the Norman kings.53 Barons might be expected to put their agreements under 
seal for which the writ of covenant might be invoked for non performance, 
effectively bringing the issues before the king or his justices.  
 
The common law revolved around a small number of writs. What part these writs 
played in the law depended upon the inventive capacity of the courts to justify 
new purposes, for which they might be employed, a phenomenon that became 
increasingly significant.54 For several centuries, the judiciary engaged in a 
jealous contest for jurisdiction which meant power and income. Major points of  
 
                                            
 
51 See for example, Hand Muss Hand Wahren, Pollock and Maitland, vol II, 155.  See Chapters 10, 12 and 
13 where underlying relationship of common law jurisprudence and Continental jurisprudence is 
discussed. 
52 Passages from Glanville X and Bracton, Notebook, g 99-100b especially the passage “Quid sit 
obligatio....” where the author referred to several Roman Law aspects of ‘contract’. The inference from 
this and from Glanville , X, is that  learned persons of their time shared a considerable knowledge and 
respect for the Roman law. See also Jackson, History of Quasi Contract in English Law, 28. 
53  Maitland, Constitutional History of England, 105-106. 
54 Disputes were an affront to the king’s peace and therefore to be dealt with in the king’s courts. 
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conflict of legal principle between the two royal courts (King’s Bench and 
Common Pleas) created a significant difference in potential outcomes.55  
 
The means whereby the King’s Bench wrenched jurisdiction away from the 
Common Pleas involved many fictions and devices which were more or less 
effective. In time, jurisdiction became similar in each. This unseemly competition 
between the courts was not finally resolved however, until the era following Lord 
Coke’s decision in Slade’s Case56 in the first decade of the 17thC. It was out of 
this rationalisation of the judicial approaches to the actions available to the 
courts that the pseudo writs that came to be known as ‘common counts’ began 
to emerge This heralded the beginnings of the formal recognition of a branch of 
the ‘law of obligations’ based neither upon contract nor delict, and the law of 
restitution began in a formal sense. 
 
The action on the case, which came to be called, simply, ‘case’, was an 
ingenious invention upon a Roman model which seems to have been allowed to 
exist on equal footing with a ‘formed action’.57 In the early 17C, the assembled 
judges of the Exchequer Chamber who met to resolve insuperable 
contradictions in the law,58 found that case was as much a ‘formed’ action (like 
the forms of actions) as debt and account. By then however, the courts had 
                                            
 
55 The arrest of a defendant for a fictitious felony against the Crown was one device used for getting a 
defendant into the King’s prison where the King’s Bench had jurisdiction. The history of fictions in the 
King’s Bench makes entertaining reading: see Marjorie Blatcher, The Court of King’s Bench 1550 – 
1650. 
56 (1602) 4 Co. Rep. 92(b); 76 ER 1072. 
57 The parliament had imposed strict limits upon the issue of new writs by the Crown, but an exception 
was made where cases were thought to be similar to those for which a writ was allowed, in consimili 
casu. Some historians have insisted upon a distinction between the action on the case and case. 
Whether there is a distinction or not is not presently relevant because I am concerned with the ‘quasi 
delictual’ work of the action rather than its delictual significance for which the distinction, if there is 
one,  may have some relevance. The action was distinct from ‘formed actions’ which must identify 
with an originating royal writ. 
58 Slade’s Case, fn 37.  The basis of the decision of this case, promoted by Lord Coke, was agreed by the 
assembly of judges.  The Exchequer Chamber had a jurisdiction to review decisions of the King’s 
Bench; see below, fn 125 
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invented assumpsit from which modern contract flows, and in that century, 
indebitatus assumpsit also. Indebitatus became the vehicle for principles of 
unjust enrichment which had erstwhile resided in a clumsy assimilation of debt 
and account in a single action.  
 
A more detailed treatment of some aspects of these writs will follow, but only to 
the extent necessary to demonstrate the rudiments of an unjust enrichment 
jurisprudence. 
 
2.4. The Early Development of the Writ of Debt. 
 
The following is a point-by-point account of significant details. 
1. Preliminary observations:  
• English courts would seek to fill gaps by ingenious curial extension of the 
writs, albeit in halting steps, widening the scope and meaning of the writs. 
Case was the most obvious example. All civil wrongs were also an 
offence59 and therefore within the cognisance of the royal courts; thus, it 
will be seen that an avenue for the prosecution of an action upon an 
informal debt and an informal agreement emerged in a quasi-delictual 
context. 
• Glanville60  tells us that the writ of debt had the characteristics of a writ 
of right under which a plaintiff demanded the return of land occupied by 
another.61 A procedure whereby the defendant confesses the debt and 
promises to pay on a certain day is noted.62  
                                            
 
59 Offence to the King’s peace, which was the theoretical basis of all Norman laws. 
60 A treatise on rules and customs, courts and substantive law, was compiled under this name in late 12C. 
61 Glanville X. In Cap. I, in Fifoot, History and  Sources  of the Common Law, Tort and Contract, 233-6.  Glanville explains that the 
plea belongs to the Crown; what was at issue was the "dignity of the king", a feature strongly reminiscent of the writ of right. 
The wording of Cap 2 very closely follows the style of the writ of right.  
62 Pollock & Maitland, History of English Law, v. II, 204. From Glanville, x, 2. A practice of obtaining 'judgment' or at least a 
recognisance even before the loan is made is also noted by Pollock & Maitland, History of English Law, V ii, 204. Apparently, 
actions were rare, because of the cost of the writ (as much as 25% of the debt for a man of substance).  More frequently, an entry 
was made on the Chancellor's Roll confessing that one owes a certain sum (thus creating a 'contract of record') a practice 
consistent with the suggestion that the Chancellor's officers were frequently moneylenders. 
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• The writ consisted of a command to the sheriff to bid the debtor pay 
because the defendant 'unjustly deforces' the plaintiff (a notion borrowed 
from the parent writ) of a sum of money.63   
• The idea of a sum was artificially equated to land or goods in order to 
preserve the character of the writ of right.  
• The Plaintiff claimed what was 'his/her own':64 thus a distinction is made 
in the practice of pleading between a plaintiff in debt on the one hand, 
and on the other, a plaintiff who complains of an injury or wrong. The 
former demands what is his/her definitive right whilst the latter claims 
relief and pleads in a 'complaining way':65  
• The action of Debt would not lie on a partial completion of the task or 
partial delivery of the property or sum,66 nor upon a quantum meruit (and 
there was no separate writ for quantum meruit).67  
• The action was for recovery of that which is owed, originally for a whole 
sum: as it was said in Bladwell v Sleggein (1562)68 ‘...one cannot sue for 
a horse when one is owed a cow...’ emphasising the difference for 
example, between a liquidated sum and the proceeds of a promise.  
• One could not bring an action for debt upon a promise.  
 
 
 
                                            
 
63 Ibid. 
64 ibid.  
65 Pollock & Maitland, History of English Law, v. ii, 572 and see Bracton's Notebook , pl. 52, 177, 325, 
381. Until the 14C, pleadings were oral: see Peter Stein, The Character and Influence of the Roman 
Civil Law: Historical Essays, 108, citing Sir Matthew Hale, and see J.H. Baker, An Introduction to 
English Legal History, 74. 
66 A curious resemblance to the 20C cases based upon total failure of consideration, notably, Fibrosa 
Spolka Akcynja v Fairbairn Lawson Combe Barber [1943] AC 32. 
67 See Fifoot, History & Sources of English Law…., 251. 
68 In Simpson, History of the Common Law of Contract, 63. 
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• It was essential that the obligation be supported by quid pro quo, as 
evidence of the obligation: that is, pro quo (in return for) quid (a benefit).69 
 
 
2. Jurisprudence: 
 
Holdsworth says that the essence of debt was that ‘...the defendant was 
conceived of as having in … possession something belonging to the 
plaintiff...’..,70   
•  The main premise of debt was that a person had received a benefit that 
‘belonged to’ another.71  
• The reason of an obligation to render or give up what belonged to a 
plaintiff in debt was that value had been given: it was a matter of 
reciprocity, but because it originally related to a sum of money, the 
proprietary aspect of the writ of right was not to be found.72  
The actions must not be understood in the language of later common law, 
however: the lack of clear, principled definition of the actions was the norm 
amongst early common law writs.73  
 
 
 
                                            
 
69  An informative background to the doctrine is to be found in O.W. Holmes, Common Law, 200 ff. It 
was not evidentiary in the modern sense but it was essential to the existence of an obligation and 
hence, it being established that quid pro quo was given (by sufficient oath swearers in earliest Norman 
times, and by verdict of the court in later medieval times), the law imposed an obligation. 
70 History of English Law, vol. iii, 420. Holdsworth cites Ames in Harvard Law Review, vol. vi, 260. 
71 Id. at 221. 
72 See Simpson, A History of the English Law of Contract, 193. It was decidedly not a proprietary action 
of the Roman vindicatio type, even though it might resemble the incidents of such an action. Roman 
law, apparently, was anathema to the Crown an d common law distinctly differed from it, even though 
the reasoning closely resembled that underlying Roman law actions at many points. The vindicatio is 
more fully explained in another context, below; see p 56 below. 
73 In the case of debt, the anomalous lack of clarity as to its underlying theoretical basis would remain 
until the advent of the common counts when its essential characteristics would undergo radical change.   
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2.5. Quid Pro Quo, Debt and Assumpsit. 
 
In this section, I will show that in the context of the dominance of formal actions 
with fixed purposes, a doctrine of many parts, quid pro quo, emerged as a 
product of reasoning and of civilian influence;74 the doctrine becomes the 
embodiment of the notion of unjust enrichment. 
 
The influence of Roman jurisprudence is especially evident in the development 
of case where the Roman development of the concept that held ‘no injury 
without an action’, originating form classical Roman Statutes,75 provides the 
model.  
 
• Case played an important part in development of modern common 
law doctrines including unjust enrichment.  
• The same jurisprudential influences may also explain why writs of 
debt and account became something more than actions for the 
sum or the thing, reflecting reciprocity, or justice of the case 
jurisprudence rather than a preoccupation simply with a right which 
the Romans would have called ‘proprietary’.76 
                                            
 
74 Following the Roman, especially the Justinian precedent. 
75 Lex Aquilia: damnum sine injuria datum; approximately, ‘no injury without an action’. The Roman 
classical law preceded the great codifications of which Justinian’s was the most prominent. The 
classical law was an unwritten law, but statutes came to be the practice to extend or define certain 
points. 
76 See Peter Stein, The Character and Influence of the Roman Civil Law: Historical Essays, 159 et seq., 
arguing that the experience of Roman jurists in developing principles of law from the intent of a 
classical rule, referring to the classical unwritten Roman law which preceded the Institutes, has a 
significance for the development of the common law. 
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• Debt had a preclusive role. Where this writ lay, no other lay.  
• Assumpsit, which grew from delictual origins (the action on the 
case), evolved to serve a new and quite separate purpose. It lay 
where debt did not lie, upon a promise to perform an obligation 
which was neither given under seal nor nudum pactum.77   
• Where an obligation arose by virtue of a duty to give what was 
owed, pro quo (in return for) quid (a benefit), debt lay and ipso 
facto, no other action lay.78 
 
 
Forming the elements of doctrine: 
 
• Quid pro quo was influential in the development of the doctrine of 
consideration in the law of contract. It also played a unifying role in the 
assimilation of the actions of debt and account, and in the transition which 
brought into being the actions at the root of modern unjust enrichment, 
the common counts, that I have called ‘quasi writs’ because they were 
invented upon the model of debt.  
 
• The quid pro quo doctrine underlay the early recognition by the law of an 
obligation arising from a promise supported by a 'charge' and where a 
benefit (quid) was received upon a request: the request assumed the 
character of pro quo, like the other end of the bargain. 
 
 
                                            
 
77 A bare promise is nudum pactum (no agreement). 
78 This statement is based upon the association with the doctrine of quid pro quo. The concepts suggest 
that the doctrine recognised an obligation founded upon community expectations that one should give 
value for what one received, unless of course, it was manifestly a gift. It is early evidence of the kind 
of ‘obligation’ associated with unjust enrichment throughout this work. Ch 7.5 concerns, this kind of 
obligation. 
 John B Donnelly. 95312086 
37
In this way the doctrine of quid pro quo resembled a muted concept of unjust 
enrichment. 
 
Procedural issues: 
• The action of debt was tried by wager of law.79 The oath swearing was, 
originally, conclusive of the case; no verdict was required.  
• This foreshadows the strong evidentiary role of quid pro quo.80 It was the 
benefit given and it explained the injustice, by reason of which the law 
imposed an obligation.  
• The notion of the law imposing an obligation arises from the nature of the 
case; there is no action or default of the defendant (no breach, to use a 
concept of a much later time) to which it can be attributed.81  A similar 
notion of obligation also endures to modern times as a central element of 
unjust enrichment. 
 
2.6. Account: ‘Equitable principle’ of Unjust Enrichment.  
 
Re-formulating actions, so that they contributed to a single purpose, coincided 
with the beginnings of unjust enrichment theory. Principles that were developing 
in equity, especially ‘discovery’, had an influence, but the early common law 
                                            
 
79 See Oliver Wendell Holmes The Common Law, 15. The method of trial probably had an Anglo Saxon 
origin. It required that the plaintiff find a number of reputable persons who would swear to the veracity 
of a claim. They waited around the court and took a fee for services. They were nevertheless, swearing 
an oath in the King’s courts and might have had good reason for being satisfying about the justice of 
the case. 
80  Ibid . 
81 Obligation flows from the primary rule in unjust enrichment. The modern jurisprudence concerned with 
obligation is studied in several chapters below: see sub-ch’s 7.4 and 7.5, and ch 11, esp. pp191-93.  It 
might be noted that it has a very long history and modern jurisprudence might be enriched by a 
consciousness of this fact. 
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courts were not overtly influenced by equitable doctrine.82 It was good for 
business, nevertheless, to keep a step ahead of the Chancellor’s court. 
 
• Account was another variant of the writ of right,83 a fact which underlies 
the non-promissory character which it shared with that writ and with debt. 
• Account determined the issue of what is owed. The bailiffs, and later, 
other receivers, were obliged to perform proper accounting under pain of 
forfeiture or imprisonment.84 Here we can see a lack of clear distinction 
between the civil action and the 'offence' and this is important to the 
development of the action on the case in non delictual actions.  
 
The writ of account came to be adapted to the purpose of allowing recovery 
of composite sums and together with debt, began to fill the void of available 
actions for ordinary commerce.  
• The writ became a step in a process, at first definitive, in which the action 
of debt and later of indebitatus assumpsit was the end-point.85  
• Later, it became a device of pleading. Account made a 'debt' out of 
'debts', including unlike obligations so that it satisfied the pre-requisite of 
a fixed sum, as in The Bishop of Chichester's case (1338),86 Anon,87 
Repps v Repps (1315)88 and Babbe v Inge (1315).89 These cases plainly 
illustrate the process of achieving a fixed sum, even where debts of 
                                            
 
82 Equity was administered by the Chancellor and progressively, by the Chancellor’s court. The 
jurisdiction was always separate from and, until the 19C, aloof from the common law. 
83 C H S Fifoot , History and  Sources  of the Common Law, Tort and Contract, 268. 
84  Cf. Statute of Marlborough (1267). 
85 Account, as an independent action, disappeared about the 15C, probably because equity allowed 
recovery and had the capacity also, to order discovery. It was more cumbersome than the equitable 
procedure: See Gareth Jones, ‘The Role of Equity in the English Law of Restitution’, in Eltjo J.H. 
Schrage ed, Unjust Enrichment: The Comparative Legal History of the Law of Restitution, 149, 168-9. 
86 (1338) Y.B. 11 & 12 Ed. III, R.S. 489. 
87 Y.B. Pasch. 41 Ed. III, f.10, pl. 5. 
88 Y.B. 9 Ed. II, Selden Society, Vol. 45, 71. 
89 Y.B. 8 Ed. II, 66, and see Fifoot, History and  Sources  of the Common Law, Tort and Contract,  281. 
 John B Donnelly. 95312086 
39
different kinds were involved (grain and cash), or where part of the debt 
was traversed.90  
• Account lay for diverse sums and for arrears of payments (a particular 
sum).91 'Accounting' determined the nature of the debt overcoming the 
problem that debt lay only for a fixed sum,92 and that a plaintiff in debt 
could only have the fixed sum, not the loss of profits of trading.93  
 
In these paragraphs, I have shown the existence of a rudimentary jurisprudence 
in which the modern restitution lawyer might recognise the roots of modern 
concepts and even the formative character of principles like those underlying the 
modern law. It is unnecessary to assert continuity, but it will emerge that the 
principles of modern law resemble in many ways, these ancient formulae for 
determining rights and duties. Methods of resolving claims differ immensely, but 
the underlying character of the rules bears certain similarity to modern elements 
of unjust enrichment. Especially, the ancient legal notion that ‘… you have what 
in justice ought to be mine…’ has its modern equivalent.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
 
90 If there was a sum certain, it might have been better to sue in debt in the first place, and this was a 
permissible election: see Anon Y.B. 1&2 Pasch. 41 Ed. III, f.10, pl.5, in Fifoot, History and  Sources  
of the Common Law, Tort and Contract, 85. 
91 A.W. Simpson, A History of the English Law of Contract; 181. Simpson cites Rastell, Entries, 147b. It  
also seems that there is some interesting background here to the modern day law of estoppel. 
92 A.W. Simpson, A History of the English Law of Contract , 173ff and 178-182. See also Jackson, History 
of Quasi Contract in English Law, 28. 
93 Core’s case, (1630) 1 Dyer, 20a, 73 ER 42. Professor Simpson says that a declaration wherein 
accounting was averred though no formal action of account had taken place, was an 'insumil 
computaverunt' implying a process of professional accounting in arriving at a sum. Simpson indicates 
a developed system of arbitration associated with accounting in the 16C. 
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2.7. Debt and Assumpsit: the Enduring Significance of the Pleadings. 
 
Here I shall develop a theme: debt established by account, and quid pro quo, 
are the essential elements of unjustness of retention. This is implicit in the 
nature of quid pro quo: it need only be associated with what was given in 
reasonable expectation that it was not given as a gift or other gratuitous act, but 
in circumstances where an expectation arose that the giver had a corresponding 
entitlement. 
• An unsuccessful plaintiff in an action of debt committed an 'offence' which 
was punishable by imprisonment (usually a fine) or amercement 
(forfeiture).94 The regnal control is ever present and underscores the 
consistency of the character of a debt with property in land. The matter of 
interest to the King is the debt (probably as a revenue source by way of a 
proportional levy).95   
• Assumpsit, was conceptually linked to covenant; it was founded upon the 
idea of consent, yet borrowing from debt the doctrine of quid pro quo 
which was formed into the rudiments of consideration.  
• In assumpsit, the quid pro quo performs a somewhat similar evidentiary 
function to that of the deed in covenant96 though it was not treated as 
evidence in any modern sense.97  
                                            
 
94 Bracton's Notebook, Pl. 185, and Pollock & Maitland, V ii., 519 fn.1. 
95 Glanville  X. 8. “... the King is not want to protect or warrant private agreements for the delivery and 
receipt of things ...if they are made outside the court...”  
96 Covenant lay for agreement under seal. Only contracts that were in writing were recognised by the 
king’s courts. 
97 See Holmes, The Common Law, 15. 
 John B Donnelly. 95312086 
41
• In debt, the quid pro quo was the essence of the unjustness of the 
retention of the benefit (something was given for which a return was 
expected). 
 
It is not my intention here to pursue the development of assumpsit, but it is 
necessary to observe that it was to escape the limitations of debt that lawyers 
sought, and courts allowed a preferential action in assumpsit.  
• Debt presented litigants with great obstacles. 
• Debt was not a promissory action, but if one promised marriage it could 
be a quid pro quo even for a debt owed by a third party.98The courts 
accepted this and rationalised that it involved no essential change of 
principle.  
• This rule and the rule against past benefits were important to the way 
the common counts were developed. Debt did not lie where there was a 
past consideration (a past benefit was no quid pro quo). This was 
implicit in the strict correspondence of the benefit and the obligation 
noticed above.99  
• It was this rule which wrought the defeat of an action brought by a 
plaintiff who had payed bail moneys to a court to bail his absent 
colleague's servant to ensure that the servant’s work was not left 
undone. In Hunt v Bate,100 the rule against past benefits was applied 
rigidly despite the apparent willingness of the defendant to accept the 
benefit.101  
 
  
                                            
 
98 See  Holdsworth, History of English Law, V III 422. The case referred to was untitled, referenced Hy. 
VI Mich.pl.18. Convoluted reasoning reflects the efforts to a assimilate actions and to open new 
jurisprudential avenues.  
99 Above, fn 50, and see pp 34-37 above. 
100 (1568) 3 Dyer 272a; 73 ER 605, 606. 
101 Lucke H.K. ‘Slade's Case and the Origin of the Common Counts’, Part 1, (1965) 81 LQR  427,  at p 
436: Part 2, (1965) 81 LQR, 539 at p 539; Part 3, (1966)82 LQR 81, at p 91-93. 
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Hunt v Bate was decided at the onset of the great struggle for jurisdiction 
in civil matters in the last decades of the 16C. Lucke records that the case was 
followed in Dyer's reports by an anonymous case which he dubs 'the Cousins 
case'. In that case, a marriage was held quid pro quo for a later promise to pay a 
sum of money.102 It was different to Hunt v Bate because, as Lucke points out, 
the marriage was perceived to have created a lasting relationship with a relative 
of the defendant, and also because it had taken place at the defendant's 
request.  
• In the comparison of the two cases we have two emergent principles: 
firstly, in Hunt, there was, apparently, an acceptance of the benefit by the 
defendant, though this was not considered to be of persuasive 
importance by the court.  
• Secondly, in the Cousins case, there was the element of 'request' which 
had long been influential in the minds of the English judges in actions of 
debt.103  
• The cases exhibit the central concern with the correspondence of 
obligation and debt.  
• If no such correspondence were to be shown, there was no case because 
it was not seen as unjust that the defendant retains what was given it: 
(therefore the rule in Hunt’s case.)104  
• A request though, might make quid pro quo of what was otherwise a gift.  
 
Lucke's and Simpson's analyses of the pleading, point to the importance of 
'general pleadings' in assumpsit in the Court of King's Bench at the end of the 
                                            
 
102 Id. Part 1, 486. 
103 Id.  Part 1, at pp435-36. Lucke notes that the request factor was present in a case otherwise identical to 
Hunt; Sydenham v Worlington (1585) 2 Leo.244; 74 ER 497, 498. 
104 fn 100 above; and see fn 81 as to the long history of the ‘unjust’ concept.  The relationship between the 
debt and the obligation is a fore-taste of the study of obligation in Ch 7.5. 
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16C. Lucke suggests that the significance of this is that a single issue was 
pleaded. 105  
 
These cases were brought in assumpsit because debt was blocked by the past 
benefit rule, and there were many devices used to defeat a plea of demurrer if 
the defendant sought to show assumpsit was not the proper action.  
In modern law, we find a fundamental concern to separate a claim for what is 
owed from damages for non performance of an obligation. This was the tension 
underlying the development of actions in the middle ages. The fictions and 
implied promises employed were ingenious devices to give life to the principles 
which the actions were meant to serve. The notion of an underlying issue of 
justice being developed into rules of law has been seen as an ‘equity like’ 
jurisdiction. Sir Henry Maine has suggested that this search for rules based on 
underlying principles, including the devices necessary to facilitate the process 
has been a common place development in the progression of ancient legal 
systems to reasoned rule based systems.106 This progression to equity like 
jurisprudence conforms to Maine’s analysis.107The perception that indebitatus 
was solely a common law action prevailed, but not without leaving the evidence 
of relationship to contemporary equity in its wake.108 
 
 
 
 
                                            
 
105 Lucke H.K. fn 101, Part 3’ 82 LQR at pp 91 ff. 
106  ‘…[a] general proposition of some value may be advanced with respect to the agencies by which the 
law is brought into harmony with society. …Legal Fictions, Equity, and Legislation. Their historical 
order is that in which I have placed them.’ Sir Henry Maine, Ancient Law, 15. 
107 Ibid. The observation does not refer to formal equity. 
108 A significant number of cases demonstrate that the Chancery had become a court of choice for 
‘imperfect actions’, meaning those without a writ. At the end of the 16thC, the common law courts 
determined to cleave back jurisdiction that the Chancellor had been able to develop because of the 
procedural difficulties of the common law; see David Ibbetson, ‘Unjust Enrichment in England before 
1600’ in E Schrage, Unjust Enrichment, 121, at 130. See also, Gareth Jones, above fn 85. 
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2.8. The Pleading of a Promise to Pay. 
 
In the last section it was shown that the procedure observed in relation to the 
non contractual assumpsit cases relied upon the defendant being unable to do 
anything than traverse the implied promise so that the jury were asked to 
assume a promise to pay where the facts disclosed a debt. In this section I will 
show how the ‘implied promise’, which was long thought to be a central 
characteristic of the common counts, came into being, and I will show that it was 
nothing more than a device. In consequence, attempts to clothe it in principle 
were unsoundly based. 
 
Some of the theatrical quality of the action of debt must have been lost when, in 
the 14C, written pleadings became the norm.109 In this era, the substance of 
what might be pleaded came to be important, as distinct from facts orally 
pleaded. It was to be expected that a debtor might promise to pay and such a 
promise was institutionalised in oral pleadings in the time of Bracton: it became 
the practice in regard to the Chancery Roll.110  
 
In the period proceeding the time of Lord Coke,111 the action of debt was 
modified significantly for a variety of reasons. It would be fanciful to assume 
some design, some master plan in this, but pragmatic changes also wrought 
new jurisprudential characteristics; and the action became somewhat more 
theoretically based. The point-by-point summary outlines the progress. 
• The King’s Bench devised a means of allowing actions that satisfied 
the strictures of formalism and yet were effectively actions for that 
                                            
 
109 A.K. R. Kiralfy, Potter’s Historical Introduction to English Law, 335. 
110 Some evidence of the practice of assuming a promise to pay comes to us from Lombardy in the 8th C. 
See fn31 above Fifoot, History and Sources, 221-2, suggests that evidence of this kind of influence in 
Britain is to be found in Bracton’s Notebook. 
111 Circa 1600. 
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group of plaints for which no other action lay, and therefore case 
lay.112  
• These causes for which case was the ultimate resort, were a grouping 
of cases that were conceptually  ‘justice of the case’ plaints; these 
were not debt cases but probably cases in which there had been a 
bare promise or a request, but the formalities of quid pro quo were not 
evident.  
• The court adopted procedural devices to satisfy a need for this kind of 
action. By implying a promise, debt was avoided, but because the 
elements of quid pro quo were not complete (or were not pleaded), an 
action on the case was presented as necessary to do justice. The 
‘implied promise’ explanation of the jurisprudence that was given 
credence in courts into the early 20C has been a ‘red herring’ of 
surprising resilience: it was a mere procedural fiction from the 
beginning. 
 
The detailed reasoning behind the group of cases was this: 
• The action of debt did not lie upon an executory promise for which no 
quid pro quo had been given.113  
• But if the declaration averred ‘…not only was a debt owed but also, 
the defendant had promised to pay…,’ the writ of debt would not lie 
upon the executory promise unsupported by quid pro quo, but an 
action on the case might lie because no other action lay (the central 
character of case: no injury without a remedy).114 
• If the plaintiff's declaration included an averment of undertaking, 
remembering that the pleadings were at this time written, and  
                                            
 
112 Above, p 21-22. 
113 Cf. Jordan's case, (1525) Y.B. 19 Hen VIII, f 24, “... in many cases, one might have an action sur son 
cas where he could have some other remedy, and so, for this matter, it is good enough.” 
114 Ibid. Jordan’s case, provides an illustration of the way in which case filled this void. 
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remembering too the King's Bench penchant for theatre, did it really 
matter that the promise was not a real one, that is, that it was simply a 
fictional device?  
• All the defendant could do was traverse the plea of 'undertaking'.  This 
meant that the question of whether a promise was made would be 
decided by the jury and it would be invited to decide upon the 
evidence (including an averment of accounting). But the details of the 
debt were not specially traversable because the action was brought, 
not upon the debt but upon the alleged promise. It had become 
accepted procedure to assume a promise to pay if an averment of 
accounting was made and the jury would have taken this as given. 
 
If the action were brought in the King's Bench in assumpsit where general 
pleadings were being accepted, the debt need not be specially pleaded; several 
debts might be involved. The tediousness and precariousness of the special 
pleading was avoided. These advantages were to be had in addition to the 
avoidance of wager of law (calling of paid witnesses). The action, extended 
doctrinally, encompassed the debt as a benefit conferred without specially 
pleading the content of the debt.  
 
Was past consideration 'good consideration' in assumpsit?  In Sydenham v 
Worlington (1585)115 it was held that it was where performance had been at the 
request of the promisee. 
  
The law, despite its state of disarray, was seeking explanation for liability in 
neither contract nor delict, but in the ancient category of unexplained actions 
which were grouped under case. Jordan’s case demonstrated a way in which 
                                            
 
115 (1585) 2 Leo.244; 74 ER 497, 498 , and see Lucke, fn 101, Part 1, (1961) 81 LQR  436.   
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the law would impose an obligation.116The law selectively allowed actions where 
it found that the circumstances warranted it, as an issue of justice. 
 
There are two significant conclusions: 
1. The modern search for juristic extensions of the unjustness factor in 
unjust enrichment is centuries old.  
2. The development of bases for liability in the succeeding centuries is 
the true history of unjust enrichment, but its origins are recognised in 
the shackled jurisprudence of the middle ages.  
Meanwhile, the implied contract notion based upon a so called ‘promise to pay’ 
is demonstrated as being unworthy of serious attention. 
 
In Lampliegh v Brathwaite (1616)117 it was held ‘...the promise though it follows is 
not naked but couples itself with the suit [request] before....’  The plaintiff must 
prove his act was done in response to the request, ‘...the act must pursue the 
request, for it is like a case of commission for the purpose....’118 The courts may 
be seen to be enforcing payment for a benefit because of an obligation imposed 
by law. In Bosden v Thinn,119 P was compelled to pay as surety and sought 
reimbursement from D on basis of D's subsequent promise of reimbursement. 
The majority held that assumpsit would not lie upon the undertaking to act as 
surety, it being a nude promise, but the promise to reimburse, coming later, 
related back to the request and therefore the action lay on the later promise.120  
 
                                            
 
116 Jordan’s case, fn 113, and see fn 114 
117 (1585) 2 Leo.244; 74 ER 497, 498. 
118 See Lucke, fn 101 Part 1, (1961) 81 LQR at pp 438-39, arguing that Holdsworth's view (A History of 
English Law, vol. 8, 15 et ff, & 38 et ff) that the subsequent promise to pay was evidence of a pre-
existing contract, cannot be correct, because the bare request in Lampliegh created no legal 
relationship: the assumpsit was on the promise to pay which was held to relate back to the request. 
119 Cro. Jac.,19, also reported in Yelv. 40.; 79 ER 16. 
120 Yelv, 41;79 ER 16: Lucke, fn 101, Part 1, 81 LQR at 439-440, arguing, convincingly, that the decision 
evidenced the contemporary theories of consideration; see also Beaucamp v Neggin (1592) 1 Cro. Eliz 
282, pl. 3; 78 ER 536.   
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As early as 1537, Dyer C.J. and Weston J. held in Lord Grey's case121 that one 
who discharges another at request of the defendant and upon an assurance, will 
have a good action in case on the surety, for ‘...this is good consideration to 
charge [the defendant], for what [the plaintiff] did for benefit of my friend is to my 
ease and benefit also.’122  In Lord Grey’s case though, the action was in case, 
demonstrating once again the richness of that action as a source of 
development. The development of principle is becoming clearer and becomes 
capable of being stated in terms that are inconsistent both with contract and 
delict.123  
 
Audacious procedural fictions made possible by the advent of written pleadings, 
had served well the purpose of tearing lucrative jurisdiction away from the 
Common Pleas and the Chancery. They continued to have a special 
significance for the development of indebitatus assumpsit. The fiction that a 
debtor had promised to pay was most useful because the moment the debtor 
denied promising, the promise and not the debt became the general issue: the 
plaintiff would plead evidence of the debt by averment of accounting (but would 
not plead the debt itself) to establish that the defendant ‘…just must have 
promised’. 
                                            
 
121 3 Dyer, 374a, 73 ER 612, 613. 
122 In this study, it is of considerable importance to recognise that the contemporary doctrine of 
consideration did not reflect the later rules and characteristics which make it the completion of an 
agreement; nor for that matter were all ‘contracts’ consensual relationships in the early 17C. 
123 The emphasis put upon the doctrine of consideration in this era by some commentators has led to a 
misconception of the basis of many of these actions. 'Consideration', at this point in time, is difficult to 
separate from quid pro quo.  Holdsworth argues in terms of later theory of consideration. Cf. Lucke, Pt 
1, at 437 & fnn 28 and 70 above, citing Ames Lectures. Lucke is not alone in accusing Holdsworth  
 of applying the rules of a later century in an endeavour to give meaning to the law of the Slade’s case 
era; see Fifoot, History and Sources, 396, and see Brett's case  (1600) Croke, Eliz., 755; 74 ER 859-
860; The Lady Shandois v Simpson (1602) Cro. Eliz., 880, pl. 11.  
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2.9. Indebitatus Assumpsit: Recognition of the Jurisdiction for Recovery of 
a ‘Benefit’: 
In Slade’s Case,124 the Exchequer Chamber,125 made certain important findings 
which settled the law on several points. Two are important presently:  
i) although debt was available, the plaintiff may have the action on the 
case, or debt at election; 
ii) case is as much a ‘...formed action and contained in the register, as an 
action in debt...’ 
 
Following this case, the courts began to allow a novel kind of action called 
indebitatus assumpsit. The new action is superficially, an assumpsit action for it 
involves a promise. The technicality of development of indebitatus is a 
demanding study, controversial amongst historians. It need not concern us here. 
In Simpson's analysis, all depended upon the (written) pleadings and this has 
been shown above. The simple distinction is made by reference to the pleading 
in Edwards v Burre126 an assumpsit pleading in which the declaration read  
Counted that the testator, in consideration that the plaintiff lent the 
testator 40s, the said testator undertook to pay him 40s.  
A count in indebitatus, on the other hand, would have read 
…the testator, being indebted to the plaintiff in a sum of 40s in 
consideration thereof promised to pay the debt.127 
 
The fact of a promise was alleged before Slade’s case, to avoid the action of 
debt because debt would not lie upon a bare promise. After Slade, detailed 
pleading could be avoided by alleging a promise to pay. Indebitatus was an 
action on a promise to pay (by this time invariably fictitious) in which it had to be 
                                            
 
124 (1604) 4 Coke, 91a; 80 ER 15. 
125  Exchequer Chamber heard writs of error from the King’s Bench: see Lucke, Part 1, 429. 
126 Edwards v Burre (1573) Dalison 104. See Fifoot , History and Sources, 359. 
127 Simpson, History of the Common Law of Contract, 306. 
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demonstrated that there was a sufficient basis for the implied promise, thereby 
proving the debt.128 But the main reason why the pleading of the promise 
survived after Slade’s case, when the earlier theoretical need for it had 
disappeared was that, since the action was upon the promise, the simpler 
general pleading was possible, encompassing the debt plus damages or interest 
for example, and the procedural rule was that the alleged promise could not be 
specially traversed. The effect of this was as has been outlined above, the debt 
became the general issue for decision by the jury.  
 
Lucke says that the debt was ‘...the material reason for the defendant's duty to 
pay.’129 The promise rests upon the duty: it is, to use Lucke's words, ‘... the 
recognition of an existing duty rather than in the nature of the foundation of an 
independent or added duty’.130 It is sterile, except in relation to the procedural 
consequences.131   
 
Astley v Reynolds132 offers clear evidence of the developing jurisprudence. This 
was an action for money had and received in the King's Bench. The plaintiff had 
paid excessive interest on a loan given on the pawning of a plate and claimed 
back a part of the interest which he had been forced to pay in order to recover 
his property. The court held that in actions founded upon mistake or deceit, the 
                                            
 
128 The practice of pleading a subsequent promise originally arose because, if the action was on the debt 
and a benefit had been conferred simultaneously with the making of an undertaking, debt lay:  
Edwards v Burre (1573) Dalison 104. 
129 Lucke, fn 101, Part 2, 81 LQR, 539, at p 552 
130 ibid. 
131 What would be established in evidence would be the existence of a debt and the action turned upon its 
existence; this is ultimately true even if one regards the promise as giving rise to a 'contract implied by 
law': Martin v Sittwell, (1690) 1 Shower, 156; 89 ER 509, per Holt C.J.  Holt held that money given as 
insurance for goods supposed to be on a vessel but left behind, was money ‘...received without any 
reason occasion or consideration...’. Indebitatus lay in Holt's judgment for it was as though the money 
had been given for a wager that had never taken place. A curious but meaningful analogy probably 
inspired by the origins of insurance contracts, which were in effect, wagers on the safe voyage of a 
vessel. Evidence of an unjustness principle was undeniably in the minds of at least some judges: see 
fnn 44 above and 193 below.  
132  (1731) 2 Strange, 95.  
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action (indebitatus) would lie, and so too for this circumstance where the plaintiff 
paid by duress ‘...relying on his legal remedy to get it back again.’  
 
Again, in Lampleigh v Brathwait:133 Lord Hobart's own report of the case contains 
a clear distinction between a promise executory which ‘...need not aver 
performance...’ and one which is executed where the performance is ‘...past and 
incorporated with the promise... .’ The idea of a promise (or obligation) is 
necessarily implied in the existence of the debt.134 This analysis makes 
considerable sense of a consideration ‘...passed and incorporated and coupled 
with the promise...’135 
 
In these few cases, we begin to see the emergence of the grounds of 
indebitatus actions. The practice of general pleading was unpopular after 
Slade's case because it lacked essential definition of the nature of the individual 
actions (whether real, or for debts of a testator etc). It also carried with it a major 
jurisprudential shortcoming: it did not disclose the source of injustice! Injustice 
sprang from the fact of the plaintiff being 'deforced' of what was its own, or 
his/her entitlement, and that concept has a very long history. Looked at 
analytically, the existence of the debt is relevant as evidence of an enrichment, 
the giving of quid pro quo;  and the promise, whatever form or ephemeral shape 
it took, was an implicit acknowledgment that the enrichment would be unjustly 
held if not disgorged to the benefit of the plaintiff. It seems very likely that 17C 
judges were conscious of the essential ‘justice of the case’ issue in first 
opposing and then modifying the practice of general pleading. Indeed, we 
                                            
 
133 (1619) 1 Brn. 7; (1615) Hobart, 105: 80 ER 255.  
134 ibid  555, and  Edwards v Burre (1573) Dalison 104. See Fifoot , History and Sources, 359. ‘...every 
consideration executory implies a promise...’. The reasoning appears to be consistent with reading 
‘promise’ as ‘obligation’. 
135 Lampleigh v Brathwait (1615) Hobart, 105: 80 ER 255. 
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occasionally see modern verbiage of restitution occurring in the courts136 and in 
the analysis of the historians.137  
 
It is not without significance, I believe, that after the judges in the Exchequer 
Chamber (in which the elements of the decision in Slade's case138 were agreed) 
had dispensed with the need to pretend that the action before them was not one 
in which debt lay, yet persisted with the 'implied promise' practice in indebitatus. 
It had a continuing function beyond the fiction by which debt had formerly been 
ousted. It was the criterion by reference to which the courts found that an 
obligation existed which the law ought to enforce, much simplified if the 
defendant actually acknowledged it (by making an actual promise), but implicit in 
the circumstances of the case whether it was acknowledged or not. There was 
no other necessity for implying a promise after Slade’s case. 
 
In this analysis, we see the ongoing manifestation of a conceptual unity that 
underlay, over the centuries,   
• firstly, the requirement for proving quid pro quo to establish that 
the action was being brought to recover a benefit conferred; 
• secondly, for selectively allowing case for non feasance to provide 
an action where, in justice, one ought be held to one's obligation;139 
and; 
• thirdly, in developing indebitaus as a composite action of  
assumpsit, debt,  and account to simplify the identification and 
enforcement of a duty imposed by law.  
There was only the necessity of utilising pleading practices which bore the 
consequences that the executed (past) benefit had been given in such 
                                            
 
136 Astley v Reynolds, fn 133, and Anon Y.B. 7 Hen VI, 15 Pl. 9. 
137 Fifoot, fn 84, 25  and 225-6; Winfield, The Law of Quasi Contract, 8-9. 
138 Above fn 37 
139  See Simpson, History of the Common Law of Contract , 344. 
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circumstances as the courts would impose a duty upon the obligation and the 
obligation was not specially traversable. 
 
The development of indebitatus marked a significant step forward in the 
common law because it firmly secured jurisdiction which might have developed 
solely as equitable remedies. Indeed, until the end of the 15C, remedies in 
equity existed for petitions which would later reflect grounds for unjust 
enrichment in common law actions.140 This was another aspect to the struggle 
for jurisdiction, not addressed in this historical analysis.  
 
2.10. The Commentators. 
  
Despite the appearance of principle underlying these common law actions, it 
was never articulated. It is in this connection that the work of commentators 
becomes important: they have sought to explain and characterise elements of 
the law. They have not changed the law, but they have given us ideas of 
structure and terminology that have assisted ongoing analysis. Professor Baker 
holds that there was no development of legal theory that would explain actions 
in the centuries in which the forms of action dominated and characterised 
English law of obligations.141 Professor Birks sees this as a lack of system, a  
                                            
 
140 The petition in Appilgarth v Sergeantson, (1438) 1 Cal Chanc xli, a case of payment in contemplation 
of a marriage that never took place, illustrates the role the Chancellors had assumed. David Ibbetson 
found that such petitions were most commonly to be found in cases involving transfers of land, but not 
exclusively so: ‘Unjust Enrichment in England before 1600’ in Eltjo J. H. Schrage (ed) Unjust 
Enrichment: The Comparative Legal History of the Law of Restitution, 121, 129-130. Sir William 
Evans’ description of the law illustrates this inter-relationship of common law jurisprudence and 
equitable notions of use: one who received what another was entitled to was thought of as having 
received to the use of the latter as though an agent, and must give an account: above fn 46. 
141 JH Baker, ‘The History of quasi Contract in English Law’ in W.R. Cornish et al, Restitution, Past 
present and Future, 53. I have used the term ‘law of obligations’ as it is widely used in legal literature 
to denote, usually, contract and tort. The terminology has the potential to confuse an obligation freely 
assumed, such as to perform one’s contract, with the special case of obligation imposed by law.  The 
development of a pratice of referring to the latter as ‘primary obligations’ would augment the clear 
articulation of taxonomy. 
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failure by the common law to organise its categories of thought, exacerbated by 
failure to adopt the Roman law as its foundation.142 Birks does not suggest an 
absence of jurisprudence, but rather an absence of system and taxonomy such 
as would have encouraged judges and jurists to explain decisions in theoretical 
terms.143  
  
Birks’ approach seems consistent with the fact of a constant and unifying theme 
in the common law; that is the obvious concern in the cases for personal 
remedies that have no basis in covenant in the generic sense. It is impossible to 
ignore the influence of concepts that had a presence in the minds of the jurists 
and the judges. Professor Peter Stein observes that whilst Roman law is not 
particularly obvious in the common law as a set of rules, as it is in the Pandects 
and the Germanic law, the Roman jurisprudence is. The scholarly ‘transfer of 
wisdom’, is what ultimately gave the common law its basis of reason.   
 
English scholars of the Roman law, particularly Bracton and Hale, contrived to 
use Justinian’s structure to shape the common law into scientific and orderly 
rules,144 but reasoning from principle to rule was an art and a science which 
developed under a more liberal regime of actions, just as the praetors were 
responsible for developing new principles of Roman law. The importance of 
Roman law for the comparative study is, therefore, the precedent to be found in 
post classical Roman law of the relationship between principle and action. When 
actions were essentially procedural as they were in Roman Classical Law and in 
the common law in the forms of actions era, principle was non-existent. Principle 
flourished under the Praetors, as recorded in Justinian’s Institutes, when the 
influence of the praetorian notions of equity modified and moulded the rules of 
                                            
 
142 Peter Birks, ‘Equity in the Modern law’, (1996) 26 Western Australian Law Review, 5, 68. 
143  Ibid. 
144 Peter Stein, The Character and Influence of The Roman Civil Law, 150 ff. 
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law.  This is an appropriate way of describing also, Lord Mansfield’s foundational 
contribution to unjust enrichment.145The juristic reason underlying the writs of 
debt and account was tantamount to expressions of justice of the case, and this 
is so even though resort to archaic methods of trial made a mockery of their 
jurisprudential pretensions. From these writs, other writs were to develop and 
other concepts were to intrude so that the writs were the foundation upon which 
legal doctrines were forged despite the rigid formalism and the constitutional and 
jurisdictional obstacles which for long periods, inhibited development.  
 
The concept of unjust enrichment, rarely articulated (probably because the 
intrusion of ‘Roman’ doctrines was anathema to the Crown) was ever present in 
this sometimes tortuous process as a rationalising force, and gave life to more 
than one branch of the common law. That I might claim what is mine from which 
another 'deforces' me is a constant theme throughout more than half the 
millennium. The cases show a concern for benefits conferred involuntarily, 
benefits requested, and benefits accepted where one withholds from another 
(deforces) payment for a benefit received, provided that quid pro quo was given. 
Moreover, in such a right of action lies a concept that has a quite different 
purpose from Roman vindicatio which resembles a pure proprietary action of the 
English law sort.146 The underlying purpose of writs of debt and account 
resembled modern personal actions, (whatever may be said of the parent writ of 
right), displaying a conceptual similarity to modern unjust enrichment.  
 
 
 
                                            
 
145 Cf Professor A.W. Simpson, History of the Common Law of Contract, 489 ff, arguing that there is a 
lack of contemporary evidence of consciousness of the principle of unjust enrichment in the case law 
of the developing English common law. Godwin’s case, above fn 50, and Astley, fn 132, suggest that 
there is reason to query this assertion.  
146 Moyle, Institutes 1v, 1, 19.  My own tentative view is that the writ of detinue constituted one reason 
why a vindicatio was not found necessary by early common lawyers: detinue filled the void to some 
extent. However that may be, it could not be said with any assurance either that it came into being to 
accommodate that need or that it was intentionally a device to mirror the Roman action. 
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The ingenious invention of procedure which would effectively broaden actions 
and vest them with an entirely new scope such as has been noticed above, 
strongly suggests the influence of principles of law of which the courts had 
cognisance and which under-lay the gradual development of the law. This was 
particularly evident in the protracted process leading to development of 
indebitatus assumpsit. The part played in this tortuous development by the 
action on the case is particularly significant.147 
 
Blackstone148 begins to draw together the threads of these actions, describing 
the non contractual assumpsit actions as  
 
...such as do not arise from the express determination of any court...but 
from natural reason and the just construction of law. [These actions] 
...constantly arise from this general implication and intendment of the 
courts of judicature that every man hath engaged to perform what his 
duty or justice requires...149  
 
Reinhard Zimmermann attributes to Blackstone the quasi contract                        
‘heresy’ which Blackstone borrowed from the Institutes.150  
 
 
 
                                            
 
147 Judicially developed from a Roman law precedent, its status was never challenged. It was recognised 
by ‘judicial legislation’ in Slade’s case (1604) 4 Coke, 91a; 80 ER 15. 
148 Commentaries, Ch.9. pl. 3, reproduced in C.H.S. Fifoot, fn 84, 389 ff. 
149 Blackstone Commentaries, Ch 9. It is not without significance that Blackstone’s work was to some 
degree, a reflection upon the law which gave birth to the action on the case which was the beginnings 
of lasting jurisprudence affecting more than one branch of the law of obligations. The law had begun 
to reason its own development and this was significant to the development of the indebitatus counts. 
150 The Law of Obligations: Roman Foundations of the Civilian Tradition, 837. See generally Peter Birks 
and Grant McLeod, ‘The Implied Contract Theory of Quasi Contract: Civilian Opinion Current in the 
Century Before Blackstone’, (1986) 6 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 46 ff. 
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Guest describes these actions as ‘empirical’ until the rationale of unjust 
enrichment emerged.151 It is implicit in the quotation from Blackstone however, 
that the law was beginning to articulate a rationale that had long been mutely 
accepted. Fifoot describes it well, ‘...[t]he single strand running through all these 
decisions was the unfair advantage secured by the defendant at the plaintiff's 
expense...’.152 
 
Fifoot rejects any idea that the judges might have been unaware of this principle 
though he was of the opinion that it had not been recognised openly as an a 
priori concept in English law.153 Guest maintains that the rationale that one 
should not be enriched at the expense of another was increasingly apparent in 
cases sued on the common counts and the advent of a forceful judicial 
personality such as Lord Mansfield, was all that was necessary in the second 
half of the 18C to draw the underlying theme of the cases together.154  
 
Guest’s ‘rationale’ is particularly relevant to quid pro quo. The doctrine of quid 
pro quo was influential in the development of the doctrine of consideration in the 
law of contract. It played a unifying role in the assimilation of the actions of debt 
and account, and in the transition which brought into being the common counts. 
It underlay the early recognition by the law of an obligation arising from a 
                                            
 
151 A.G. Guest, Anson's Law of Contract, 617. 
152 C.H.S. Fifoot, fn 82, 366. The resemblance of Blackstone’s reasoning to The Institutes of Justinian, 
Book I, Title I, is strong. See also Reinhard Zimmermann, The Law of Obligations: Roman 
Foundations of the Civilian Tradition, 837, attributing to Blackstone the quasi contract ‘heresy’ which 
Blackstone borrowed from the Institutes; and see generally Peter Birks and Grant McLeod, ‘The 
Implied Contract Theory of Quasi Contract: Civilian Opinion Current in the Century Before 
Blackstone’, (1986) 6 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 46 ff. 
153 Fifoot fn 82, 366. 
154 A.G. Guest, Anson's Law of Contract. Lord Mansfield’s method had much in common with the notions 
of equity administered by Roman praetors in the post Classical era of Roman law; see Peter Birks, The 
Character and Influence of the Roman Civil Law, 20-21, and 150 ff, suggesting that whilst Roman 
rules and doctrine are not particularly obvious in the common law, Roman jurisprudence is.  See also 
Chapter 13 below. 
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promise supported by a 'charge' and where a benefit was received upon a 
request. It reflected in its characteristics, a muted concept of unjust enrichment. 
 
2.11. Conclusion. 
 
It is evident in the historical treatment that the devices employed by the English 
courts served several purposes. They were undoubtedly the tactics in a struggle 
for jurisdiction between the Common Pleas and the Kings Bench. They were 
focussed too upon the avoidance of the archaic appurtenances of the action of 
debt. They became the means whereby a genuine promissory jurisprudence 
was allowed to develop whilst the central, separate, mission of debt and 
account, was nurtured to survival as an unjust enrichment concept, freed of the 
procedural limitations. 
 
Chapter 3: Modern Law and its Antecedents. 
 
3.1. Contributions of the Past. 
 
In this chapter I will argue that concepts, principles and rules of unjust 
enrichment deriving from the historical characteristics of the law, have produced 
reasoned structure, methodology and tools of modern law.  These historical 
characteristics might have been different in a different constitutional context 
such as where unwritten law is not recognised.  I will argue that the law of unjust 
enrichment developed in a context of social and constitutional history which left 
its stamp upon the law as we know it today.  I will conclude that these 
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characteristics are the product of reasoned development in the particular 
environment and this has a special relevance for the nature of unjust enrichment 
in our law and its characteristic interpretation of what has been called the inner 
certainties of the law.155 I will propose that this must be understood by all who 
seek to take a part in understanding and developing the law.  
 
3.2. Reasoned Historical Development of Principles Defining the Law. 
 
It would be simplistic to dismiss the legal foundations of unjust enrichment as 
being irrelevant. The legal foundations of contract could not be said to be 
irrelevant to the modern law of contract. Contract lawyers could not concur if 
administrators contemplated that courts and legislatures might recognise a bare 
promise as a basis of contract such as it might have been in ancient law.156 Why 
shouldn’t such a change be contemplated? One answer is surely, that it ought 
not be simply because contract and commerce have developed side by side 
over many centuries and consequently, the rules of contract are tried and 
proven and well understood.  
 
The point of the contract analogy is that unjust enrichment, if well understood, is 
also tied, in a compelling way, to the concepts, principles and rules that have 
developed over a very long period. They have a special place in the law and 
their relationship to other branches of law is well defined.  This much is  
 
 
 
                                            
 
155 Lord Radcliffe, The Law and its Compass, 38. Lord Radcliffe’s notion used in another context, refers 
to a kind of ‘inner conviction’ of judges in successive decisions which determined when a significant 
new factor would be allowed.  See also Jefferson White and Dennis Patterson, Introduction to the 
Philosophy of Law, vi., ‘…[I]nherently eclectic as it is, adjudication is far from arbitrary.  What blocks 
arbitrariness is the presence of normative thought, that is, articulation of priorities and principles of 
value capable of binding law and fact together in a coordinated way.’ 
156 Institutes of Justinian. IV.VI.9.  
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frequently recognised; and yet some would ask why modern law should not so 
develop as to achieve the greatest measure of simplification, allowing equitable 
and common law principles to work side by side. Why, they may ask, should not 
‘unconscientiousness’ be a ground for an action in unjust enrichment? One 
answer is that it should not be because there is no developed jurisprudence; no 
established concepts and principles; no legal rules, which assist us to say what 
unconscientiousness is except in the specialised aspect of equity where it 
characterises behaviour in the context of equity’s special rules.157 Unjust 
enrichment characterises a benefit. It will take a complex course of development 
for it to be re-focused upon a defendant’s conduct. Failure to deliver up a 
benefit, (the conduct of a defendant) is a concern of unjust enrichment only in a 
consequential way: the developed principles of unjust enrichment do not pretend 
to compete with equity. Were it otherwise, there would be a significant risk that 
the division of the law into conceptually and functionally discrete branches would 
be compromised.  
 
The division and definition of branches and taxonomy in the law has been the 
consequence of centuries of legal reasoning in the courts and amongst 
commentators. This is why change ought to be the product of a significant 
process of logical legal reasoning. Lord Radcliffe’s extra-judicial observation in 
regard to change in the law is pertinent here; he wrote, 
…respect for [the law] will be the greater, the more imperceptible its 
development.158 
 
Thus far, I have argued that the history of the law is an account of sustained 
legal development characterised by processes of legal reason and logic. Two 
recognisable outcomes have been suggested. The history of inter-related  
 
                                            
 
157 Commercial Bank of Australia v Amadio  (1983) 151 CLR 447. 
158 The Law and Its Compass, 39. 
 John B Donnelly. 95312086 
61
 
 
 
principles that we now call unjust enrichment principles, sets before the modern 
jurist a compelling case for recognising, firstly, consistency in taxonomy which 
affects the several areas of the ‘law of obligations’, and, secondly, that principles 
and rules of an unjust enrichment character constitute a branch of the law. I 
shall now examine these two compelling cases. 
 
3.3. Consistency in taxonomy: Independent/Complementary Branches of 
the Law. 
 
The first of these recognisable out-comes of legal history has a broader 
significance. It is this:-  
• Not only has unjust enrichment retained its independence, but other 
branches of the law of obligations exist side-by-side with unjust 
enrichment in the manner of complementing each other.  
• Furthermore, just as subjective fairness has no place in unjust 
enrichment, rules in those other branches of law are not dependent upon 
a judgment as to whether a transaction or legal relationship is 
subjectively fair and reasonable. That is to say, the principles of contract 
and tort do not defer to a standard of fairness under the auspices of some 
‘unjustness’ doctrine.  
 
These characteristics are attributable, in part at least, to the fact that notions of 
fairness are not a part of any field of the common law: the law does not invest 
the common law courts with discretion to apply idiosyncratic standards, nor in  
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equity where principles of unconscionability and undue influence are closely 
defined by the cases.159 
 
These observations become very important when the courts come to consider 
whether unjust enrichment ought to be found in a new case. Any new instance 
of an unjust enrichment is likely to have consequences for the other branches of 
the law.160 A new case will not operate as a new form of equity to yield a ‘just’ 
outcome where tort and contract and existing rules of unjust enrichment are 
seen not to provide adequate relief. The potential for new cases and the 
problems they pose will be considered in a later chapter.161 For the present, it is 
important to observe that the basis of any such development of new cases has 
to be found in legal reasoning; otherwise it is purely a whim. Such legal 
reasoning is to be found in legal concepts and principles. In part at least, this is 
a consequence of the fac that the common law is an unwritten law, a 
characteristic not shared with contemporary systems in the developed world. 
 
 
                                            
 
159 Commercial Bank of Australia v Amadio fn  157, at p 461, per Mason CJ and  474-5 per Deane J: 
unconscionability looks at the  conduct of a stronger party in  enforcing or retaining a benefit, whilst  
in an undue influence case, the court looks at the quality of assent; see also Blomley v Ryan (1956) 99 
CLR 362, 401-2 per Fullagar J; and see  I. J. Hardingham ‘Unconscionable Dealing’ in P.D. Finn (ed) 
Essays in Equity, 3, ‘The gist of the jurisdiction is ...abuse of superior bargaining position.’;  cf. 
Johnson v Buttress  (1936) 56 CLR 113, 134-5 per Dixon J;  (1948) 76 CLR 646; 655 per Rich J 
(where actions of victim, though voluntary, where performed under influence of another, the 
circumstances created inequality, taken advantage of); Blomley v Ryan (1956) 99 CLR 362, 405 per 
Fullagar J (sickness, drunkenness etc placing one party to a bargain at a serious disadvantage); Lord 
Denning’s attempt to state a general principle governing over bearing and incapacity in Lloyd’s Bank 
Ltd v Bundy, [1975] QB 326, p 339, where His Lordship attempted to frame a general principle of 
unconscionability, cannot contribute to understanding of the narrow focus on unconscionability in our 
law. 
160 It is not contemplated however, that this will involve reconciliation of conflicting principles in the 
instant case; conflicting rulings are ulikely to be so readily resolved. Consciouness of taxonomy is an 
ever present requirement: see Raimo Siltala, A Theory of Precedent, 45, foreshadowing difficulty 
where conflicting principles are regarded as immutable, as rules may be; and see below, pp 73 and 76 
where interaction with other fields of law and juristic experience is considered. 
161 Sub-Ch’s 7.5. 
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Principles and rules of the common law that are enshrined in the reports by 
virtue of the doctrine of precedent, are the common law and the process by 
which these decisions have been handed down in the context of a developing 
law is the legal history of the common law. It is true that it is of no concern for 
modern law that there were inhibitions or obstacles, including the forms of 
actions, which held back the development of the law. It is crucial however, to an 
understanding of some areas of modern common law, and especially to unjust 
enrichment, to recognise that new techniques of pleading and even an entirely 
new action, the action on the case, were developed specifically to further the 
development of the law in spite of obstacles, and that these developments have 
had a lasting influence.   
 
Quite simply, the constitutional and social environments in which law has 
developed have had a very significant influence upon the character and 
structure of the law. It would be futile to contemplate what English law might 
have been without the early feudal structure of society. And whilst feudalism is 
irrelevant to modern law, the changes to accommodate the needs of a modern 
democratic state have been the product of reasoned and tested development, 
informed by logic and legal scholarship, progressing from one framework of 
norms to a new one. Were it otherwise, there must be a significant risk of chaos: 
a condition which might have been found in the laws of totalitarian states of 
recent centuries. 
 
The legal history of unjust enrichment has consequences that must be well 
understood before ambitious attempts are made to expand the modern law by 
establishing new grounds of actions, or by introducing grounds that properly 
belong to other branches of the law. The consequence of this history may be 
shortly stated thus: 
  
• If a new development is to occur in the law of unjust enrichment, it needs 
to occur only in the context of an overview of the total relationship of the 
several branches of the law,  
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• Such a development, were it to happen in a ‘piece-meal’ fashion, as a 
response to perceptions of immediate need, or in response to concepts of 
‘justice’ or ‘fairness’ which have no true foundation and meaning in the 
law, will not conform to the established norms of the law.  
 
3.4. Independence of Purpose of the Law: 
 
That said, it is time to turn to the second recognisable outcome of legal history 
mentioned above. It is expressed in this conclusion, and it strongly suggests 
another:- 
 
• Principles and rules of unjust enrichment are neither the out-come of, nor 
the off-shoot of, contract and tort, nor of equity, but exist as a body of law 
which has a discernible and independent purpose.  
• Modern preoccupation with fusion of law and equity must be examined in 
this perspective.  
 
A plaintiff may choose one or another branch of the law alternatively, to prove 
different kinds of liability, giving rise to different rights and obligations. 
Nevertheless, the development of law by processes of legal reasoning, 
deduction and induction imposes certain characteristics upon which a perception 
that it is a ‘good law’ depends.  It must be capable of being explained, in terms 
not merely of a remedy or a restitutionary outcome in the case at bar, but in 
terms of uniformly applied criteria such as will give consistency and predictability 
to the law as a whole.162 These are elementary ideas, but the development of a  
                                            
 
162 Predictability of decisions is discussed below at several points, especially pp 168-70 discussing 
uniformly applied criteria such as will give consistency and predictability to the law as a whole, and 
see fn 457 citing Justice Windeyer’s dictum in Hargrave v Goldman (1963) 110 CLR 40, 63, 
‘…concepts, pre-requisite to a finding of liability, embedded in the law, by compulsive 
pronouncements of the highest authority, and which give the law symmetry, consistency and the 
defined bounds essential to reasonable predictability.’ 
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new branch of the law must conform to them if that new branch is to conform to 
the kind of reasoned relationship of principles and rules that is typical of contract 
and tort, remembering the special primary characteristic of common law, vis, 
that it is an unwritten law. 
 
The modern interest in unjust enrichment has witnessed a unique spectacle of 
taxonomy and principle working together. Without the consciousness of the 
issues that such a spectacle enlivens, there is a risk that unprincipled 
development of unjust enrichment may expose it to confusion of taxonomy and 
principle, and that judges and legislators will seek to unify the principles and 
rules in the various jurisdictions, by a plethora of inconsistent, irreconcilable, and 
probably adventurous judgments or legislative enactments. It is crucial therefore, 
that common lawyers understand what unjust enrichment is and what its place is 
in the law as a whole. This is where common understanding of the lessons of 
the past, and in particular, common understanding of unifying characteristics 
which have developed in the law, will be of immense service to the law. This will 
be achieved if it is acknowledged that developments in the law have deeper 
conceptual foundations than may at first appear, and especially that several 
important characteristics have contributed to the formation of modern doctrine.  
 
A key characteristic of unjust enrichment is that it defers to some other liability 
rules. This is not an absolute proposition, but the explanation provides evidence 
of the notion of concepts supporting taxonomic divisions in the law. This 
characteristic has particular significance for the issues that have been raised in 
the immediately preceding paragraphs. Unjust enrichment will not be found 
where an action in contract exists. Where there is a ground in tort or equity, 
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complex considerations apply to waiving tort or in choosing between an action in 
unjust enrichment or equity. In general, it may not advantage the plaintiff to bring 
an action preferably in unjust enrichment where an equitable action, or one in 
tort for damages, may be available on the facts.163 It is a characteristic that must 
be remembered when it is explained that undefined notions of fairness and 
communal perceptions of justice are put forward as potential for development of 
the law.164 Grantham and Rickets explain that ‘…unjust enrichment does not 
seek to articulate an independent basis for restitution, one that appeals to some 
over-riding conception of fairness…’.165 This will be seen to have consequences 
for doctrinal aspects of unjust enrichment. 
 
The formative, unifying characteristics are, firstly, the lasting influence upon 
taxonomy of common law writs beginning in ancient times and extending to the 
more recent history of actions in English law. Importantly, it is the taxonomy that  
                                            
 
163 See Lord Robert Goff and Gareth Jones, The Law of Restitution, 714 ff.  Whatever the modern 
theoretical reasons for exclusion of an action in unjust enrichment where a contractual remedy is 
available, the fact of debt deferring to assumpsit is an underlying cause. The action on the case also lay 
only where no other action lay, above pp 36 and see sub-ch. 2.9:  tortious liability could be expected to 
take precedence if a similar historical influence prevailed. The situation as regards modern actions in 
tort and equity is however, more in the nature of practical limitations. Shades of old liability rules 
survived into the later history of the law however: as late as 1941, Viscount Simon over-ruled the 
finding in Aris & Aris v Stuckley (1677) 2 Mod 260, 262, that by pleading the implied contract a party 
effectively elects that its case is governed by contractual rules to the exclusion of tort, United Australia 
Bank Ltd v Barclays Bank Ltd [1941] AC 1, 11. In general, there are at least two separate issues. 
Firstly, a claim in unjust enrichment may well lie on the circumstances of a failed contract where the 
plaintiff may need to prove the elements of the failed contract, as in the case of Fibrosa, fn 40 above, 
or in tort where waiver of tort might still leave the plaintiff in need of proving the circumstances of a 
tort to establish a right to restitution. Secondly, where actions in defamation and libel might not yield 
an adequate remedy in damages, where the defendant has profited from its act, presumably, there 
might be circumstances where waiver of tort will allow an action for unjust enrichment. There are 
apparently no cases and it could be expected that establishing the benefit might be difficult in the 
extreme. Finally, in most instances of possible action for unjust enrichment in the circumstances of tort 
or an equitable claim, the establishment of benefit and subtractive enrichment will prove difficult. This 
does not affect the award of a restitutionary remedy for breach of tort or for equitable liability in the 
unusual case, but that is a separate issue from the concepts and principles of unust enrichment per se.  
164  See p 125 below. 
  165  Ross Grantham and Charles Rickett, ‘On the Subsidiarity of Unjust Enrichment’ (2001) 171 LQR, 273, 
276; and see Pavey fn 1 above and Lipkin Gorman v Karpnale Ltd [1991] 2 AC 548, 559, per Lord 
Templeman and 578, per Lord Goff. 
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is enduring, not the writ. The writ is long dead. But this means that the law is not 
a haphazard collection of unrelated rules, each set of rules, and each branch 
which is constituted by rules and supporting principles, has a definitive place in 
the whole. That is what is meant by enduring taxonomy.166 If modern judges and 
law-makers are to redefine the content and context of unjust enrichment, they 
have to be prepared to assess the consequence for other branches. That is 
something that the judges cannot do, except by obiter dicta that might be at risk 
of being incoherent. 
 
Secondly, the characteristics which I have dubbed ‘formative’, encompass the 
significant roles of writs such as debt, account and case which had characteristic 
concepts and characteristic purposes that have survived in modern rules. These 
characteristics are peculiar to a living unwritten law such as the common law 
is.167  
 
Common law unjust enrichment is not unaffected by commercial realities. Its 
development is nevertheless demonstrably a case by case development of legal 
rules by courts applying the specific legal principles that are essential to 
reaching individual decisions. 
 
A significant example of the phenomenon outlined in the preceding paragraphs 
is to be seen in the lasting influence upon modern jurisprudence of the ancient 
action on the case. It effected a profound characterisation of actions in our law. 
The action for unjust enrichment was not without jurisprudential precedent, as I  
                                            
 
166 See below, p 71 ff, where the durability of taxonomy, from Roman times, is related to modern law. 
167 A codified law might not display these key historical characteristics. It might draw upon the past for its 
jurisprudence, but the development of concepts and principles in such a system has been the creature of 
the legislative process. Furthermore, it may have experienced interventions of a non-legal sort that will 
have broken the chain of legal reasoning. Typical of this is modern anti-trust and restrictive trade practices 
legislation which responds at least as much to economic theory as it does to legal principle. Modern 
enactments, covering a range of social and commercial laws might borrow from both fields.  
 
 John B Donnelly. 95312086 
68
have noticed. The theoretical foundation is that which underlies actions through 
which the law imposes an obligation based upon identified criteria which the law 
holds to justify redress. The writ of action on the case, is dead and seldom 
contemplated, but it has played a formative role in the development of the notion 
that there are circumstances, defined by law, which will not be allowed to pass 
without redress. The action on the case was by no means a universal cure-all. It 
did, however, provide rules governing circumstances which the law would not 
allow to go without remedy. It is the legal science, including method or technique 
which has survived, rather than the ancient writ and rule. 
 
Thirdly, amongst the characteristics I have called ‘formative’ is another, closely 
linked to the jurisprudence which gave common lawyers the action on the case, 
which is more precisely a phenomenon: it is the persistence of an enduring 
jurisprudence of very long standing which has preserved central notions of 
unjust enrichment and is found in ancient and modern legal systems. This is the 
same basis of reasoning engaged in – 
• by the ancient Roman praetor, empowered to admit a new cause of 
action;  
• by the judges assembled in the Exchequer Chamber to deliberate upon 
Lord Coke’s eloquent exposition of the law in Slade’s Case,168 and,  
• by the judges in the Australian High Court in their deliberation upon the 
merits of an action for mistake of law,169 and the House of Lords judging a 
quite novel set of overlapping and inconsistent claims in the swaps 
cases.170 
 
 
                                            
 
168 Slade’s Case, fn 37. 
169 David Securities Pty Ltd v Commonwealth Bank of Australia (1992) 175 CLR 353. 370 ff. 
170 The judgements in Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v Council of the London Borough of 
Islington [1996] AC 699, and Woolwich Equitable Building Society v Inland Revenue Commissioners 
[1993] AC 70, are of this kind. 
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These personages, jurists and judges, separated by many centuries, have in 
common a role that has significance for the jurisprudence of unjust enrichment: 
that is the work of defining what the law will regard as actionable. It is a role 
which recalls Sir Henry Maine’s observations that ancient conceptions of the law 
will correspond to several modern conceptions, and in the next stage of 
jurisprudence, ‘…the older subordinate conceptions have gradually disengaged 
themselves and …the old general names are giving way to special 
appellations.’171  
 
These observations by renowned legal philosophers lend support to the point 
being made here: only the jurisprudence of unjust enrichment; not some 
communal standard of fairness, will guide the decision. This is an important area 
for later discussion, but I suggest that the judicial technique and the duty are 
akin to those which apply in equity when a judge holds that a contract ought to 
be avoided because of circumstances which the law holds to be grounds for 
upsetting the contract.172 In that circumstance too, the inner certainties of the law 
are the guide rather than a communal standard of fairness. I do not suggest that 
there is a necessary connection here between unjust enrichment and equity, 
only that the judicial technique of unjust enrichment does not stand alone. A 
serious attempt to understand the reasoning process is a prime pre-requisite for 
the student of unjust enrichment, the judge and the jurist alike.  
 
 
 
 
                                            
 
171 Ancient Law, p 186. See also Lord Radcliffes’ conclusions about inner certainties of the law that would seem to 
correlate to the foundational principles that stand behind several modern conceptions; The Law and its 
Compass, 38. Lord Radcliffe’s notions are described in the fashion that they are enduring guides to 
development of the law.  Maine too suggests that the ancient conception may survive but only to 
describe one aspect, perhaps a central one, of the modern law; Ancient Law,186-7. 
172 See below, pp 188 ff, where the basis of several important decisions is discussed. 
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3.5. Four Short Concluding Propositions. 
 
To capture the significance of what has been said above, I shall attempt to state 
the relevance of the history in four short propositions. These propositions seek 
to draw out specific points of significance linking the historical study to modern 
law.  
 
Firstly: The Ancient Common Law Writs and their Legacy.  
 
Perhaps the strongest legacy of the ancient writs has been the shape they have 
given to modern actions that has survived in spite of the abolition of the writs. In 
the special focus of unjust enrichment actions, the writs of debt and account 
ameliorated the absence in the law administered by the King’s courts, of laws 
regulating parole agreements, but they were the essence of a jurisdiction 
separate from covenant and assumpsit from the beginning. They provided the 
conceptual continuum which facilitated the development of the common counts.  
 
The forces that formed case are an important aspect of the developmental 
process. They are not readily identifiable but they repose in ‘that something else 
which the legal mind regards as unjust!’ 
 
Secondly: Unjust Enrichment, and Enduring Jurisprudence. 
 
A law, if it is to be uniform and well understood must have an underlying 
philosophical basis in conformity with developed jurisprudence. That is to say, it 
needs to be capable of being explained by judges and jurists in terms of 
accepted jurisprudential criteria. Putative concepts of ‘the unjust’ and ‘benefit’ 
and ‘the law imposing a duty’ that are to be seen in the early common law, had a 
need of a recognised jurisprudence independent of delict and contract; a 
jurisprudence concerned with benefits gained at the expense of another which 
fall outside the scope of contract and delict. This was the product of a concern  
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amongst judges, even those who were in past centuries constrained by the 
forms of actions, to provide relief for the unintended transfer of money and 
money’s worth. 
 
The history of the writs of debt and account is clear evidence that the recovery 
of what was owed or what was transferred unintentionally was a significant 
feature of the earliest common law jurisprudence. As the jurisprudence 
emerged, it was as surely explained by the character of debt and of quid pro 
quo, as contract is explained by the jurisprudence of bargain.  
 
Roman law had a similar need of a jurisprudence of benefit and obligation; 
Justinian unfortunately dubbed the area of law quasi ex contractu.173 The 
appellation in Justinian’s law was no more appropriate than it has been in the 
neo-modern common law.174 Rather, the absence or failure of contract was a 
starting point for the reasoning underlying sections of the Institutes. We find, for 
example, that a person who receives what is not owed is ‘…bound by the 
dissolution rather than the existence of a contract’.175 Resemblances between 
the Institutes and indebitatus assumpsit cases are readily identifiable.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
 
173 Institutes, fn 156,  III: xxvii: see Reinhard Zimmermann, The law of Obligation: Roman Foundations 
of the Civilian Traditions, 837-8.  
174 Institutes, fn156. In the context of Institutes, Book III: xiii-xxvii, it may have been more appropriately 
styled ‘exceptions to contract’; ‘… let us now examine those obligations also which do not originate, 
properly speaking, in contact, but which, as they do not arise from a delict, seem to be quasi-
contractual.’ vide III: xxvii. J. B. Moyle, The Institutes of Justinian, 153. 
175 Id, III.xxvii vi. 
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The survival of elements of the Roman law and adoption into our own law is not 
universal, nor is it particularly important. What has been important is the survival 
of the method of ordering the law and of unjust enrichment elementary principles 
that have kept alive the place of this separate body of principles and rules and 
motivated its gradual development. 176 The Roman precedent is either an 
undisclosed blue-print, or evidence that, as Lord Wright put it, ‘..in any civilised 
system of law…,’ there will be a need of principles governing recovery of unjust 
benefits.177 I suspect that this influential dictum was framed with such a blue-print 
in mind.178 
 
It has been the jurisprudence of unjust enrichment that has kept the body of 
principles alive in the common law because it seems to be an inescapable need 
of a modern society and of modern commerce; and this need is to be recognised 
in the history of the law from and including the earliest actions for debt. That, 
essentially, is the proposition.  
 
 
Thirdly: Sustained Juristic Experience. 
 
Development of more sophisticated actions, over several centuries, when judges 
must employ extraordinary devices to avoid procedural limitations of the forms of 
actions, was the product of ongoing juristic experience. It might well have been 
thought of in terms of unjust enrichment throughout the middle ages when 
Judges recognised this conceptual phenomenon and endeavoured to give life to 
it in the common law. In later centuries, the technical jurisprudence of the time 
made it sufficient to style them amongst, or along-side forms of actions, as the 
                                            
 
176 Roman influence was not overtly acknowledged because apparently, Roman Law was unacceptable to 
the Crown. It had a secondary vehicle of influence in the Ecclesiastical law which had an historical 
place in the early English law, though, likewise, not acceptable to the Crown. 
177 Fibrosa Spolka Akcynja v. Fairbairn Lawson Combe Barber [1943] AC 32, 61-2, H of L. 
178 Indeed, obligations akin to those which our law imposes upon fiduciaries such as guardians, partners 
and administrators, are governed by the Institutes Book III, xxvii. 
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common counts. This is the basis of asserting an empirical character in the 
common law reflected in this very old legal concept, as unjust enrichment is. 
Asserting the role of sustained juristic experience is consistent with the fact that 
such a juristic concept has endured through the centuries from the early the 
middle ages. This does not mean however, that there was a sustained 
interaction with all other areas of the law, and a lack of such a sustained 
interaction with equity may be a relevant factor in relation to the characteristics 
of modern unjust enrichment.179 
 
Fourthly: Renovating the Taxonomy. 
 
Finally, when the law adopts and builds a new, or a neglected field of doctrine, it 
is necessarily amending or renovating its taxonomy.180 This becomes an 
important field of legal activity and legal thought. In the case of unjust 
enrichment in the common law, the phrase ‘the law adopts and builds’ is not 
historically appropriate. It is more accurate to describe it as something 
reluctantly admitted because it would not go away. It would not go away, 
however, because of the convictions and the clear-sightedness of a relatively 
small group of judges and jurists. Of these lawyers, it must be said that not only 
did they recognise that every civilised system of law ought to have such rules as 
unjust enrichment,181 but also, that they have had a keen sense of its relationship 
to other fields of law.  
                                            
 
179 Development of this theme is beyond the scope of the present work. Whilst it is interesting to consider 
what might have been, and whilst it is possible that the courts may, in future, create stronger 
relationship between unjust enrichment and equity, it is not easy to predict how this would occur in a 
structured or analytical legal environment. It is certain that bold initiatives will create more problems 
than they could possibly resolve: see Chapters 12 and 13. 
180 Professor Birks’ works have enlivened interest in taxonomy and its significance in our law: Peter 
Birks, ‘Equity in the Modern Law: An Exercise in Taxonomy’, (1996) 26 WALR 1. The conclusions I 
have reached in this chapter and elsewhere in the work are consistent with the approach Birks 
recommends. 
181 Paraphrasing Lord Wright’s Fibrosa dictum, above fn 177. 
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Chapter 4.  Development of Key Characteristics of the Modern Law. 
 
Arising from the consideration of sustained juristic experience and the lessons of 
ancient jurisprudence that were summarised at the end of the preceding 
chapter, it is possible to remark upon a matter of considerable and lasting 
significance. This involves an appreciation of the difference between, on the one 
hand, what is equity in the formal sense, and on the other, what conduct and 
rules are tantamount to ‘the equitable’ as understood by lawyers steeped in 
jurisprudence of broader concern than the common law. Lord Mansfield was one 
such lawyer and his famous dicta182concern the latter, but they have been 
ignored because they were believed to concern the former. This has been so 
despite the context of general notions, aequo et bono, and comparison with 
Roman rules of unjust enrichment which indicate clearly that formal equity was 
not the basis of his rule. The point here made, necessitates a short background 
and analysis of some conclusions reached by a modern student of civil law of 
Europe and South Africa. 
 
 
 
                                            
 
182 Moses v Macferlane, fn 42. Cf, Rothmans above fn 12: the judgment of Gummow J addresses, at  
 length, the meaning of Lord Mansfield’s judgments and attributes to them equitable notions rather than 
any concept of jurisprudence of unjust enrichment: see pp 175 ff and 244 below, where it is argued that 
Lord Mansfield’s judgments contained specific unjust enrichment nuances as he compared common 
law to Roman rules of unjust enrichment. Justice Gummow’s dicta are difficult to reconcile with these 
foundations of rules that were in any event, spelled out in a practical application of the ground of 
duress of goods in Exall v Partridge (1799) 8 Term Rep 308; 101 ER 1405, a contemporary case. See 
also Chapter 13 where Lord Mansfield’s notions of  Equity are explained in terms of broad 
jurisprudential concepts compatible with all western systems of law rather than just English common 
law. Lord Wright’s ‘…any civilised system of law…’, above fn 177, may be seen as similarly focused 
on a significant overview of law in western society.  See also fn 203 where I discuss the very much 
wider interests of a plaintiff affected by a ground of an equitable cause of action than might be classed 
as unjust enrichment. 
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In post-classical Roman law, two apparently incompatible trends in the law were 
evident. The first was the actions developed from the action stricti iuris (strict 
liability) of which the early Roman classical actions were typical. They allowed 
for no judicial discretion and no issue for judgment. The second trend is seen in 
the various emanations of a ‘fairness and justice’ type of ‘principle’. Many 
scholars believed the bases of these two types of actions to be irreconcilable. 
Reinhard Zimmermann183 reconciles them in the following way.  
  
If the Roman praetor was willing to grant a new action in his promulgation of a 
periodic edict detailing allowable actions (though he rarely did so), then a judge 
had no discretion; it must be allowed. In Zimmermann’s view, the issue for 
judgment arose as to what the plaintiff must prove to satisfy the right to an 
action: we might call them ‘grounds’. In this way Zimmermann says, the concept 
of aequitas helped to form the restitutionary condictio actions.184 These actions 
combined the strict liability concept with the apparent flexibility to develop new 
actions where circumstances demanded; i.e., new grounds. The historical study 
above, offers credible support for the proposition that a concept of unjust 
enrichment helped to form the rudimentary elements of the English law of 
restitution for unjust enrichment, a conceptual journey that has certain 
similarities to the Roman experience.  
 
This is not merely of historical interest. I propose that the difference between 
broad discretionary justice on the one hand and the utility of strict liability in 
cases where the grounds are defined by precedent, yet capable of being 
expanded by the highest authority, is an important feature of unjust enrichment  
                                            
 
183 The Law of Obligations: Roman Foundations of the Civilian Tradition, 852 ff. 
184 W A Hunter, Roman Law, 34-36: aequitas – ‘equity’ in the sense of the equitable, which was the basis 
of the Jus Gentium, the law affecting relations between persons other than between citizen and citizen, 
where Jus Civile pertained.  Condictio - the procedural device whereby the wagers (which established 
what the winner would take) commenced. 
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as an independent branch of the modern law. It involves taxonomy and it 
involves the separate identity of principles, rules and actions, a feature of the 
law that will be studied in later chapters.185 
 
The English experience has resembled that of the Roman post classical law to 
such an extent that it might be said that the consciousness of Roman 
jurisprudence amongst generations of English lawyers and judges has left its 
distinct imprint upon our law. (Any similarity of actual principles is not presently 
of much importance). Such a conclusion is inescapable in the light of the 
historical study above. An influence upon our jurisprudence of this degree of 
significance is suggested in the dictum of Lord Mansfield in Moses v Macferlan186 
which might be taken as an articulation of theoretical basis of certain common 
law actions. 
 
...[t]his kind of equitable187 action, to recover back money which ought not in 
justice to be kept is very beneficial...[i]t lies only for money which ex aequo 
et bono the defendant ought to refund....[t]he gist of this kind of action is that 
the defendant, upon the circumstances of the case, is obliged by ties of 
natural justice and equity to refund the money.188 
 
In this dictum is seen the notion of an 'obligation imposed by law'. It also has a 
strong flavour of Roman jurisprudence. It was from that which was equitable and 
expedient (aequo et bono) that the Roman rules were drawn and refined (as 
Zimmermann has suggested), which were the source of the gradual 
development of Roman quasi contract in the jus gentium, the law which applied 
 
                                            
 
185 See below, Chs. 6-8. 
186 (1760) 2 Burr. 1005. 
187 The word seems to have been used in a generic rather than a technical sense; see fn 182 and Guest, fn 
151 above. 
188 (1760) 2 Burr. 1005, 1012. 
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between citizen and alien and between alien and alien (which came to be the 
material of Justinian’s Institutes). Importantly, they were not, like modern equity, 
rules standing apart from common law, but were new rules, probably introduced 
by praetorian edict, permanently incorporated into the jus gentium to provide for 
the case where existing rules were judged inadequate.189 Seen in this way, Lord 
Mansfield’s dictum has a quite different meaning from either English equity or 
vapid perceptions of justice and fairness. It was recommending simply, the 
development of the law where judicial reasoning established a need for 
recognition of new standards or norms. 
 
Zimmermann’s insight is a useful one because it recognises in ancient law the 
compatibility of strict liability with a principle that identifies instances of 
unjustness. The issue for judgment was not a discretion to find injustice: it was a 
capacity vested in the highest legal authority to recognise a new case as an 
instance of the unjust.190 Lord Mansfield’s reasoning, steeped as it was in the 
science of jurisprudence and judicial method, reflects this ancient Roman 
jurisprudence.  
 
The conceptual reasoning evident in the Roman jurisprudence has come to be 
of significance in modern law which makes a distinction between the action 
being sued upon, and the principle and rule of law being applied. In our modern 
law, a plaintiff’s case in unjust enrichment does not seek the judgment of the 
court that the defendant has been unjust in its dealings; nor did it seek restitution 
as compensation for some unjustness; rather, the plaintiff is asserting facts 
which give rise to a duty imposed by the law and arguing that those facts 
                                            
 
189 Hunter, fn 21 and 184 above, 36 ff. 
190 Discussed below in Ch 7.3, where it is argued that the obligations imposed by law in unjust enrichment 
are a reflection of insistent communal standards rather than a collection of instances of arbitrary and 
unconnected curial decisions. See also Ch 13 where it is argued that the Fibrosa principle, fn 177 
above, is an imperative, and that instances of particular grounds are of the nature of exceptions to the 
general validity of transactions freely entered into. 
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constitute a ground for a court to impose such an obligation.191 This too, is an 
instance of a strict liability imposed in those circumstances in which the law 
defines, or perhaps more accurately, recognises an unjust enrichment192 
 
The jurisprudence of unjust enrichment has a very long history. The conceptual 
characteristics and taxonomy have been enduring. In consequence, it is 
possible to recognise similarities between modern law of unjust enrichment in 
many jurisdictions and to attribute to them a common origin. 
 
Chapter 5. Concept, Principle and Cause of Action in Modern Unjust 
Enrichment: Distinct parts of the Law. 
 
Concepts and principles and rules are to be studied extensively in later 
chapters. At this point, it will augment clarity if the separation of concept and 
principles from notions of actions is observed briefly. This is necessary because 
in some common law jurisdictions, there is no perceptible or consistent 
separation. Unless this is understood, it will be difficult to describe the role of 
concept and principle with any clarity. It is also a salutary warning to understand 
the territory before making comparisons. 
 
In many modern systems of law, including some common law jurisdictions, 
unjust enrichment is an action.193 That contrasts markedly with Anglo/Australian 
                                            
 
191 Ibid. See also Sub-Ch. 6.5 below, where these issues are analyzed in greater detail. 
192 The method belongs to the common law but it holds a strong resemblance to the methodology of the 
courts in areas of equity as has been noticed above in sub-chapter where the common law and 
equitable principles are compared for their defining capacity for jurisdiction: See Fry v Lane (1888) 40 
Ch. D 312; Blomley v Ryan (1956) 99 CLR 362. 
193 Unjust enrichment actions in systems of law that have Roman/Dutch origin usually legislated in civil 
Codes eg, Netherlands: A statutory general obligation for redress of unjust enrichment: Civil Code: 
Book 6; Title 4; Section 2, Arts6:203 – 6:211: Switzerland: A like provision Code des Obligations 62  
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law in which unjust enrichment is an informative concept and/or principle giving 
unity to the actions that the law allows. In these jurisdictions, unjust enrichment 
is a branch of the ‘law of obligations’; at it’s foundational level, it describes the 
basis of reasoning that judges employ to inform the scope of actions in that 
branch of the law. Contract and tort are similar to this extent. It is important to 
understand the etymology of these areas of the law, because the nomenclature 
is informative if the background is understood. 
 
                                                                                                                                 
 
II and 63 I., and Austria: Civil Code: Art 1431 ff., Quebec Civil Code, 1991, Title 1 Obligations in 
General; Chapter IV; Section II, Reception of a thing not due Art 1491-2; Section III, Unjust 
Enrichment Art 1493-6., South Africa; Roman condictiones (based upon Justinianic actions), plus 
person of limited capacity; quantum meruit type action; and enrichment actions of a negotorium gestor 
(the interferer without authority) Willes Principles of South African Law (1991) Ch  XXXVIII., Scots 
law: Includes actions based upon Justinianic restitutionary actions: principlly condictio indebiti 
(money); condictio indebitii (property); condictio causa data non secuta (money and property).  
Germany and France, see fn 551 below. 
Source: Niall Whitty, ‘Rationality, Nationality and Taxonomy’, in David Johnston and Reinhard 
Zimmermann ed. Unjustified Enrichment: Key Issues in Comparative Perspective, 682 ff. 
In Pettkus v Becker [1980] 2 SCR 834:117 DLR (3d) 257, the modern foundation of actions in restitution in 
Canadian law was established on ‘...the general, equitable nature of restitution and its foundation in the  
idea of unjust enrichment ..’. Fridman says the Canadian courts have been ‘..more receptive than those in 
England to the “equitable” features of the law of restitution or unjust enrichment...’ G.H.L.Fridman, 
Restitution, 16. and he illustrates the point by demonstrating the close link between the law of restitution  
and the constructive trust, at p 17. ‘As a matter of principle, the court will not allow any man unjustly to 
appropriate to himself the value earned by the labours of another...but for the principle to succeed, the  
facts must display an enrichment, a corresponding deprivation, and the absence of any juristic reason for  
the enrichment.’ per Dickson J in Rathwell v Rathwell  (1978) 83 DLR (3d) 289, 298, approved by the 
Supreme Court in Sorochan v Sorochan [1986] 2 SCR 38. 
United States: Law is founded upon the Restatement of Restitution 1937, Paragraph 1. A person who has 
been unjustly enriched at the expense of another is required to make restitution to the other: 2d ‘A 
person who receives a benefit by reason of an infringement of another person’s interest, or of loss 
suffered by the other, owes restitution to him in the manner and amount necessary to prevent unjust 
enrichment.’  
In North American jurisdictions, unjust enrichment is increasingly regarded as the indicator of 
constructive trust in cases of fiduciary and other equitable liability in common with other instances of 
unjust enrichment; see The Hon. Beverley M McLachlin ‘The Place of Equity and Equitable Doctrines 
in the Contemporary Common Law World: A Canadian Perspective’, in Donovan M. W. Waters, 
Equity, Fiduciaries and Trusts, 37, 42; John D McCamus, ‘Unjust Enrichment’ in the same work, 129. 
Andrew Kull describes the restatement as evidence of a conservative approach by the American judges 
of the first half of the 20th C, ‘…that is thoroughly out of character for contemporary American 
judges, who are  perfectly prepared, in most legal settings, to go ahead and make such an order as 
justice may seem to require.’ ‘Mistaken Improvements and Restitution Calculus’, Johnston and 
Zimmermann ed. Unjustified Enrichment: Key Issues in Comparative Perspective, 371. See also fn 
201 below. 
 
 John B Donnelly. 95312086 
80
The Anglo/Australian approach to unjust enrichment contrasts with historical 
approaches to actions.194 There are several types; 
1. an action formalised by feudal writ (English medieval);195 
2. action on a general principle (North American unjust enrichment); 
3. a legislated obligation that gives rise to an action (Institutes and 
continental civil law codes);196 
4. an action that defers to a principle that refers to grounds 
(Anglo/Australian).  
 
The comparisons pose a question ‘…what is the jurisprudential merit of the 
action which relies upon a broad principle in the manner of being available as of 
right or as a discretionary remedy whenever it is ‘just’ by a generalised standard, 
to employ it?’ The problem is that a broad and variable usage of ‘just’ has no 
juristic meaning and an enquiry about its meaning may involve merely an 
evaluation of communal values.197When general principles meld the principles 
and the causes of actions into one, such that in relation to unjust enrichment, the 
general principle may be invoked where there is a finding of unjust or 
unconscionable behaviour, it is questionable that there is a law of unjust 
enrichment as distinct from another set of remedies. 
 
 
                                            
 
194 Institutes of Justinian, 111.xxvii.vi. Justinian’s Institutes did not describe an action, but rather, a 
concept of obligation giving rise to an action. Curiously, a related contrast may be made between the 
developing system of post classical Roman law protecting rights of Roman citizens, and a rigid system 
of ancient English writs which were designed to serve the interests of one (English) class. In the latter, 
the action subsumed principle, or, there never was a principle; only a right guaranteed by feudal 
relationship. 
195 A decree of a dictator is comparable. The principle it serves might be wholly divorced from modern 
legal unjustness or even communal standards. 
196 That may apply equally to an obligation arising from modern legislation: the principle it serves might 
not be discernable, offering no clear or certain guidelines for new obligations. 
197 See fn 193 above, specifically the observation of Andrew Kull concerning the practice in modern US 
courts, and below, Chapter 7, p 119 and ‘universalisation’ fn 292. 
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Lord Mansfield is seen by Anglo/Australian law, as a pioneer in anglicising the 
technique of recognising actions and explaining their conceptual basis in a 
manner that might be seen to have anticipated the end of the forms of actions 
that was formalised by legislation a century later. He was not really breaking 
new ground however: after all, the common lawyers had long allowed the action 
on the case where no other action was available to meet the needs of 
justice.198The law drew upon juristic reasoning to say in what circumstances the 
action would lie, just as in modern unjust enrichment.199 Indeed, it might have 
been valid to argue at the outset, i.e., following upon Slade’s Case,200 that the 
action which began as indebitatus assumpsit (to satisfy the contemporary need 
for a writ) was simply an extension of the action on the case, by another name.  
The reasoning underling actions in the English and Australian law has strong 
overtones of the action on the case jurisprudence. Lord Mansfield’s judgments fit 
well with this perception, as will be seen in the next paragraph: he was 
addressing the basis of actions rather than attempting to introduce a ‘justice of 
the case’ principle. His endeavours were ultimately successful, two centuries 
later.  
 
An over-arching unifying factor is that which Lord Mansfield described in terms 
of ex aequo et bono.201 The concept has a very specific role to supply relief 
                                            
 
198 Ultimately to be granted full recognition by ingenious judicial legislation in the Exchequer Chamber 
where the assembled judges affirmed the findings which were to be the rules laid down in Slade’s 
case. The action on the case was explained above, pp 21 ff. 
199 See  Brooke’s commentary on Jordan’s case, in Brookes Abridgement (1536), Accion sur le Case, 5,  
 cited and translated in Lucke, fn 101, Part 2., (1965) 81 LQR, 539, 548-9. Curiously, the ancient English  
 actions were not unlike those of the Classical Roman Law which was the law of the Roman upper  
 classes. It fell to a court official, Praetor Peregrinus, in the post classical era, to insinuate new actions.   
 The Praetor Peregrinus had the same kind of responsibilities as the Praetor, but was responsible for 
administration of law that applied where at least one party was a non citizen: the Classical Roman law  
 was strictly a law applying between citizens: it became an antiquity even in Roman times. 
200 Above, fn 57.   
201  Cf, John P. Dawson, Unjust Enrichment: A Comparative Analysis, 24 ff. Professor Dawson describes 
a very different development in North American restitution where unjust enrichment remedies have a 
‘roving commission’ to supply a need where justice demands it in cases which are not primarily unjust 
enrichment actions. In aequo et bono we begin to confront the debate over common meaning and 
dedicated legal usage which will arise repeatedly as the work proceeds. 
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where, upon the judgment of the superior courts, an action ought to be allowed 
because circumstances are judged to be instances where the law creates or 
recognises a relevant obligation.202 Historically, and in terms of modern 
jurisprudence too, the development of principle follows channels tried and 
proven in both historical and modern systems of law. Neither the action on the 
case nor modern unjust enrichment pretend to allowing actions simply, or only, 
because no other action is available. Each defines the circumstance in which the 
particular action will be allowed. 
 
In Australian law, in a range of actions, the ‘core idea’ of unjust enrichment, 
(Lord Mansfield’s words), is the unifying conceptual explanation of the purpose 
served by the actions. That purpose is to impose the obligation. The obligation is 
the reason of the action. This is the product of jurisprudence of long standing.  
 
As explained in the last chapter, an inter-relationship between strict liability 
actions, technically named actions stricti juris, on the one hand, and a confined 
discretion to grant a new action, has the capacity to explain one aspect of the 
obligation imposed by law. It remains to be explained how concepts or principles 
of unjust enrichment are the overarching explanation of all the circumstances of 
actions where an obligation is imposed. That will arise in Chapter 6. 
 
The core idea of modern unjust enrichment actions is the product of reasoning 
and experience over many centuries. The seeds of the modern methodology 
were sown with the advent of the action on the case from the 14thC. In contract 
by comparison, we might be tempted to look exclusively to conceptual continuity 
as the explanation for its modern jurisprudence. Tort may be somewhere  
 
                                            
 
202 The distinction between ‘creates’ and ‘recognises’ in this context is explained elsewhere: see Ch 7.5. 
Obligations of a non legal kind might be precursors to the law recognising a legal obligation. 
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between these two. The lack of identifiable, or certifiable continuity in 
development of principle leaves legal experience as the only satisfactory way of 
describing the stages through which the development of the law of unjust 
enrichment has passed.  
 
This explains why the character of the unjust enrichment concept, principle and 
rule are seen to be open-ended and jurisdictions have sought to explain the law 
of unjust enrichment in a manner that best suits the modern developments in the 
law as a whole, in that jurisdiction. Whilst civilian jurisdictions have legislated an 
action that is interpreted and applied with regard to the jurisprudence of ancient 
actions from the Institutes of Justinian, United States and Canadian jurisdictions 
have chosen to view the action as a general principle and allowed its 
development in context with the development of the constructive trust.203  
 
Is it possible then, to relate, in the Anglo/Australian context, actions as free 
acceptance, mistake, duress and failure of consideration in a conceptual fashion 
so as to give an over-arching explanation of actions? The key to the answer to 
this question is the uniform purpose served by the actions, for the purpose of the  
                                            
 
203 See fnn 193 and 197 above. This however, is a process that recalls the manner in which courts in the 
early 20C were willing to describe unjust enrichment in terms of a curious and totally unconvincing 
contract jurisprudence, dubbed quasi contract. The connection, it is true, is that common law unjust 
enrichment and the equitable constructive trust (in jurisdictions where it is recognised) both characterise a 
payment, a sum, or the thing received in terms of its value. The special rules of equity however, relate the 
character of the constructive trust back to the unfair or unjust conduct of the defendant, potentially very 
much wider than the common law concept of the unjust enrichment. The ‘underlying notion’ is that equity 
is concerned with the quality of the conduct of the person seeking to impose strict legal rights so as to take 
advantage of vulnerability or misadventure, such as where by taking advantage through forfeiture, the 
party seeks to achieve a gain from the vulnerability or misadventure which was not envisaged in the 
parties’ bargain.  Commonwealth of Australia v Verwayen (1990) 170 CLR 394, 417; 95 ALR 321, 334, 
per Mason CJ; 355 ff, per Deane J. Mason CJ would have confined the minimum equity in terms of 
objective economic costs whereas Deane J saw the minimum equity as necessarily encompassing the total 
impact of the unconscionability on the plaintiff, even including his physical well-being. Unjust enrichment 
is concerned with the benefit whilst the minimum equity is essentially concerned with rights which might 
have relevance to interests. This is an example of a relationship of parties that is characterised by 
equitable principles which define the foundation of rules. 
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action will be seen to be corrective rather than remedial or punitive. This juristic 
purpose is distinct from the jurisprudence of the remedial constructive trust in 
Anglo/Australian law, despite the fact that the latter might be seen as a 
corrective juristic doctrine. In part at least, the explanation is that there is no 
essential need to establish culpability of a defendant in unjust enrichment 
actions. There are issues of taxonomy and jurisprudence at work here. 
Seemingly, it is possible to relate duress and perhaps necessitous intervention 
to a kind of ‘unconscionability’ but why should the remedy for such 
‘unconscionability’ be corrective? 
  
It is readily apparent in such a question that the relationship of unjust enrichment 
to the constructive trust in North American jurisdictions has consequences far 
beyond the limits of the present study. The one conclusion to be made here, 
however, is that the lack of adequate and compelling jurisprudential explanation 
of that relationship resembles, at many points, the quasi contract anomaly, 
principally because the unjust enrichment concept is not compatible with modern 
equity; nor was it compatible with contract, but that was ignored in early 20C 
legal circles. Relationship to medieval concepts of what is ‘equitable’ is another 
matter and this will be considered in chapter 13.  Consciousness of the question 
being asked in modern adjudication is very important. 
 
Returning to the issue identified in the opening paragraph of this sub-chapter, 
modern strict liability actions in Anglo/Australian unjust enrichment co-opt the 
power vested by precedent in the highest courts to allow a new action in 
circumstances which are judged to be united by a unifying concept or principle, 
as was done in David Securities Pty Ltd v Commonwealth Bank of Australia 
Ltd204 and Woolwich Equitable Building Society v Inland Revenue  
                                            
 
204 (1992) 175 CLR 353. 
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Commissioners (No 2).205It is not the prospect of development of new actions 
that ought to be the primary focus however: we should primarily be concerned 
with the reasoning of unifying influences in the modern law that facilitate the 
reasoning of actions in a unifying way. The advancement of this focus will be a 
central issue in chapters 6 and 7. 
 
The study thus far has been most useful because it has introduced the analysis 
of the characteristics of modern unjust enrichment, introducing the fabric of unity 
and purpose in the endeavours of great judges from Lord Coke, to Lord 
Mansfield, and Lord Wright to the great judgments of recent times in several 
national common law jurisdictions.206 It has shown too, how ancient 
jurisprudence has set a precedent for a correlation of actions stricti juris to a 
judicial power vested in the highest judicial authority to decide upon the creation 
of new actions and explain unity of existing actions.  This chapter has brought 
together the key characteristics and explained the conceptual and practical 
differences between the North American action on a general principle on the one 
hand and the actions informed by concepts and principles of unjust enrichment 
as is the law in England and Australia. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
 
205 (1993) 1 AC 70. 
206 Modern unjust enrichment, is by no means the exclusive preserve of the common law: see Eltjo J. H. 
Schrage (ed) Unjust enrichment: The Comparative Legal History of the Law of Restitution, esp., 9, 26. 
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Chapter 6: Concepts. 
 
6.1. Introduction. 
 
There are rarely to be found any meaningful attempts to explain the notion of a 
legal concept, and they appear only sparingly in legal literature.207 Scott and 
Seavey, whose work made a strong contribution to the development of unjust 
enrichment law in the United States, wrote of the  
 
fundamental conception of restitution [synonymous with unjust 
enrichment in the context]… [which] requires an extensive set of 
individual rules to spell out what is meant by ‘unjust’, especially since we 
are met with the fact that in certain situations …a person who has 
obviously benefited another is not entitled to recover.’208 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
 
207 Indeed, there is little discussion of the idea that there exists a ‘concept of law’: see Gareth Jones, ‘A 
Topography of the Law of Restitution’, in P.D. Finn (ed) Essays on Restitution, Ch 1; David Ibbetson, 
‘Implied Contracts and Restitution: History in the High Court of Australia. (1988) 8 OJLS, 312; Keith 
Mason, ‘Restitution in Australian Law’ in P.D. Finn (ed) Essays on Restitution, Ch 2; Andrew Burrows, 
‘Understanding the Law of Restitution: A Map Through the Thicket’, (1995) 18 UQLJ, 149. Mitchell 
McInness, ‘The Structure and Challenges of Unjust Enrichment’ in Mitchell McInnes (ed), Restitution: 
Developments in Unjust Enrichment, 17. 
208 Warren A. Seavey and Austin W. Scott, ‘Restitution’, (1938 ) LQR, CCX111, 29, 36. 
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The point being made by Scott and Seavey is that unjust is not an everyday 
concept and its understanding in the law requires knowledge of a considerable 
body of reflective judgments. This is not at all surprising if it is remembered that 
tort is divided up into an array of quite different actions, all of which, however, 
rely upon common juridical reasoning for their authority.209  
 
The word concept has a wide range of meaning in our language: it might mean a 
notion, or idea at one end of the spectrum, and a hypothesis, a view, or a theory 
at the other. When we speak of concept in the law, and intend that it has a 
definitive or other important role, we tend toward the latter end of the spectrum 
of meaning. It is not necessary to be more specific about meaning: concepts are 
discernible experientially, identified by their functional relevance to a particular 
statement of the law.  
 
I will make several leading statements or assertions to identify what must be 
demonstrated with respect to legal concepts. Legal concepts are: 
• building blocks of legal theory; 
• unifiers of like actions because they signify their character and objective; 
 
A unifying  legal concept of unjust enrichment is; 
• the separator of unjust enrichment from other branches of the law 
because it recalls the legal experience of the courts concerned with 
unique origin, purpose and reasoning;  
 
                                            
 
209  See Province of the Law of Tort above fn 2, esp. chs 2-5. Some limited comparisons of concepts of tort 
and of unjust enrichment are made in Ch 12 below.  Query whether it is correct to describe such 
reasoning as “juridical”: see fn 9.  I believe that “judicial” is adequate in this context. 
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• the catalyst to development because once the cause of action is 
established by recognition of the scope of actions recognised by law, it  
invites the jurist and the courts to engage in reasoning as to what is a like 
case, it being explicitly open to a finding of a new case.210 
 
Some nouns and adjectives used in our language do not invite deep reflection. 
They are not critical to an outcome. This is because they do not contribute to a 
process of reasoning. Legal concepts, on the other hand, may contribute to 
meaning in the law in ways that describe the context of a rule, and its purpose 
and relationship to other features of the law. Though the idea of a ‘legal concept’ 
is used sparingly, there are nevertheless many notions in legal language which 
are best described as such. They vary greatly in what they actually do as part of 
our law. Legal concepts are not exhaustively described as the indicators of 
principles and rules, although they may be that too. They are, importantly, tools 
of legal reasoning.  
 
In the following lines taken from the dictum of Lord Mansfield, ‘…defendant, 
upon the circumstances of the case, is obliged by ties of natural justice and 
equity to refund the money….’211 there are words which can only be understood 
as legal concepts; ‘defendant’, ‘case’, ‘obliged’ and ‘equity’ are words that a non 
legally educated person might not grasp fully and accurately. Professor Hart’s 
approach to defining two different kinds of obligation demonstrates this point: 
one concept of obligation is close to common meaning though it has a place in 
the law: the other is wholly a legal concept, encompassing an obligation that is  
 
 
                                            
 
210 Pavey and Matthews Pty Ltd v Paul  (1987) 162 CLR 221, 257 per Deane J. 
211 (1760) 2 Burr. 1005, 1012. 
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imposed by the law because of an unjust enrichment, a contract, or a fiduciary 
principle.212 
 
Is each of the words from Lord Mansfield’s dictum, that is ‘defendant’, ‘case’, 
‘obliged’ and ‘equity’ a concept simply because it invites the mind to explore the 
depth of meaning? My answer is that they might be. Do these words describe 
‘legal concepts’? My answer is that a legal concept is an abstract idea which 
describes a matter of consequence for legal reasoning. It is clear though, that 
‘consequence’ can be of differing degree; it too is difficult to define. 
Nevertheless, ‘consequence’ has to do with progressing toward an outcome, a 
finding, or a decision. The outcome in a legal passage is that it tends toward 
some conclusion which may be a rule. If a word used in a dictum is a matter of 
consequence it must be that it invites reasoning about meaning. Words which do 
so, contribute, conceptually, to a reasoning process, by which conclusions and 
rules are arrived at.  
 
This analysis of the function of the constituent elements of a legal statement 
helps us to understand that there are some elements that import meaning 
because they have a wider significance than the immediate purpose. This 
applies to those words like contract which describe something of import that we 
will have encountered in another legal passage, perhaps a like legal passage.  
 
 
 
                                            
 
212  H. L. A. Hart, The Concept of Law, 83. Hart draws an important distinction between a concept of 
obligation on the one hand and the effect of being obliged on the other. Being obliged by threat of loss, 
or of violence or forfeiture is about compulsion that is found where the courts serve the interests of the 
state, primarily. Being obliged in the sense of having an obligation to repay monies received as 
consideration for a contract which has failed, is about a relationship of one party to another where-in 
one party has an entitlement or a right to have, and the other has an obligation to pay. The two 
concepts of obligation are very different and the latter would be unfamiliar to many. Obligation is 
discussed below in sub-chapters 7.4, 7.6, 9 and 11. The ‘obligation’ example emphasises the critical 
feature of context, which is partly to do with taxonomy. 
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They are the tools of comparisons and help toward forming a premise. In a 
particular context, they contribute to reasoning or describe the process of 
reasoning. They are especially, notions that assume and apply some 
predetermined premises. In this way, contract immediately assumes and brings 
to the legal passage or statement all the special rules that define what a contract 
is. Unjust enrichment, when used in the context of the law, is such a constituent 
of reasoning process that identifies the taxonomic characteristics of the rules 
that it demonstrably justifies in particular cases. This is the experience 
discernible in the cases. 
 
It is not necessary to assert unerring conceptual continuity nor sustained 
doctrinal characterisitics, nor even distinctiveness from civilian doctrine but it is 
very clear that a concept of unjust enrichment that found its expression in the 
earliest common law writs, has been a powerful catalyst to the development of 
legal principles in modern law.213  
 
6.2. Unifying Legal Concept: The Australian aspect. 
 
The notion of legal concept became especially important as a feature of 
Australian law of unjust enrichment, and possibly, of Australian law in general as 
a consequence of the manner that the High Court described unjust enrichment  
 
 
 
                                            
 
213 A.G Guest’s view that in the period to Lord Mansfield’s time, increasingly, the rationale of the cases was 
that one party had been unjustly enriched at the expense of another, and Fifoot’s observation that there 
was a ‘...single strand running through all these decisions...’ (referring to common counts cases in the 
era of Lord Mansfield), now appear unsurprising; see A.G. Guest, fn 151 above; C.S. Fifoot, History 
and Sources of English Law 186. See also p 92 ff below. 
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in a leading case. The central dictum in Pavey & Matthews Pty Ltd v Paul214 
explains the operation of concepts and principles of unjust enrichment. Unjust 
enrichment is a   
‘...unifying legal concept which explains why the law recognises,  
in a variety of distinct categories of case, an obligation …. and 
which assists in the determination, by ordinary processes of legal 
reasoning, of the question whether the law should, in justice, 
recognise such an obligation in a new or developing category of 
case...’215 
 
Popular perceptions of unjustness and views about what the law ought to be are 
at the root of the predictive difficulty as to what the unifying concept might unite: 
but the difficulty is illusory and, I suggest, it stems in part, from an unwarranted 
emphasis upon the latter part of that dictum. It will make little or no difference to 
the nature of unjust enrichment as a branch of the law if no further instances are 
recognised by the courts.216 It is true, nevertheless, that modern law has not 
satisfied the need for clarity of unifying concepts and principles in unjust 
enrichment, lacking what Professor Birks called a stable pattern of analysis that 
would augment reasoning between cases based on different grounds of unjust 
enrichment.217 
 
 
                                            
 
214 Fn q. Treatment of the underlying legal concept is found throughout this work but especially at pp 91-
98, 108-110, 136, 164 and 176-79. 
215 Pavey, fn 1, at  p 257. 
216 This assumes of course, that there is no significant change in the basis of actions accompanying the 
introduction of new grounds. Some overlap in the meaning attributed to concept and principle is 
apparent here. This will be explained more fully as I proceed. 
217 Peter Birks, Introduction to Restitution, 19-20: discussed again below, pp 172-73, and 259.  Perhaps 
the task of clarifying is partly and initially one that jurists might contribute. 
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The role of the ‘praetor’s edict’ in Roman law, whereby a high official might allow 
new actions, was noticed above.218 Characterisation of the modern system as 
one resembling the Roman form, is an instructive approach because the 
reasoning process draws upon a complete knowledge of available actions and 
developed judicial perceptions of what the law ought to achieve, and how far its 
reach ought to extend in a contemporary society. This exemplifies the essential 
character of the reasoning in the common law that explains the purpose of the 
unifying legal concept that Justice Dean identified. Reaching back to the method 
of the action on the case, it is the underlying rationale of the role of the superior 
courts whereby they will find, by common reasoning, the individual grounds of 
actions: this is what explains the instances of what is found selectively, to be a 
ground of unjust enrichment. The action on the case was never a carte blanche 
to provide a remedy based upon perceptions of fairness,219 and this 
characteristic is present in the modern law too, where the relationship of 
grounds arises by reasoning from a foundation of an overview of all actions and 
their relaionship. 
 
Unjust enrichment is a unifying legal concept because it unites rules of law in 
one conceptual field, just as contract and possession do. It is however, a 
concept of a different kind; it’s only function is to identify a number of specific 
grounds of actions that the law allows. That is, it identifies, describes and 
delineates actions. It is akin to tort to the extent that tort also describes actions.  
 
There is an important difference between a concept or a principle, on the one 
hand, which explains a decision in a specified category of cases, and a uniform 
 
 
                                            
 
218 Above, fn 20. 
219 This was discussed above at p 67-69. 
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principle, on the other, that is applied in cases where-ever the court may deem it 
appropriate as a key to a remedy. Unjust enrichment in Australia and England is 
of the former type. The ‘unifying legal concept’ that was found in Pavey and 
Matthews v Paul220 exemplifies the principle that is active in this branch of the 
law. It is legal reasoning, not political or social or moral reasoning which will 
provide the nexus.  
 
Once we take as a given proposition that the unifying concept/principle is 
founded in curial experience and reasoning, it also helps to explain why it has a 
potential to facilitate development of the law and prevent the intrusion of 
idiosyncratic notions of justice and fairness. It is reserved to the judges who 
interpret the law and apply it in our courts, to admit its extension to a new set of 
circumstances by reasoning from a foundation of an overview of all actions and 
their proper relationship. 
 
The concept of unjust enrichment is, to that field of law, what the concept of tort 
is to the delictual field of law. Would delictual actions survive if the concept tort 
did not exist? Perhaps so: but we would be struggling to explain the relationship 
of the many delictual actions, and some of them might not have been developed 
in consequence. It can be seen immediately that legal concepts are of many 
different kinds, having varying degrees of pertinence to specific rules. Unjust 
enrichment however, is in form (but only in form) in a class like a tort, an equity, 
unconscionability, contract and estoppel.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
 
220 Fn 1. 
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These concepts delineate sets of principles and rules, and in some cases are 
the essence of an action: they are in some circumstances, indistinguishable 
from principles and doctrines because they describe the limits of the field of law 
to which they refer. This may elucidate the difference, if there is one, between 
the concept of unjust enrichment in Australian law and the principle of unjust 
enrichment identified in judgments of the English courts. Both the unifying legal 
concept in Australian law and the English unjust enrichment principle connect 
cases in which the law allows an action. The difference between the two may be 
a fine conceptual point, or purely argumentative. A principle though, does 
something: a concept is something. When the ‘something’ is making a 
connection, or a connective link, the difference may be unimportant.  
 
In the various common law jurisdictions, there are important differences of 
concepts and principles and in place, all of which affect the application of rules 
of law.221 Unjust enrichment in Australian and English Law is both a unifying 
concept and a principle. The concept and the principle are the theoretical basis 
for independent actions. To the extent that the concept provides a unifying 
explanation of actions, just as tort does in delict actions, it is also cognate to, 
even tantamount to a unifying principle of law.  
 
The meaning, or import of such a statement is usually well understood and yet 
there are those who would deny that such a unifying concept and principle are 
law. It will be instructive to examine both sides of this question.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
 
221 ‘Place’ describes my own perception of the characteristics of the neighbourhood in which unjust 
enrichment ‘grows up’; codified or common law, principled or other, coherent or other, fused here and 
not there, equitable but not equity. 
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The Unifying Legal Concept and Unifying English Principle are Law. 
 
The English unifying principle of unjust enrichment is that which describes what 
is the common legal reasoning of individual cases involving a benefit had at the 
expense of another where the courts have identified the reasons of legal 
unjustness.222 Such a principle and the Australian unifying concept do the same 
work. It is upon such a principle or unifying legal concept that the continued 
existence of rules of unjust enrichment depends. “X is unjustly enriched” is a 
statement which only has legal significance because the experience of the law 
tells us what unjust enrichment is in legal terms. This is because the concept 
invokes legal experience.  Were it otherwise, the statement could simply imply a 
moral or social/political conclusion about X’s circumstances. The works of 
modern commentators on restitution and the judgments of the superior 
Australian and English courts are best understood in this light, that is, as that 
which invokes legal experience: the concept gives legal meaning to the 
conclusion expressed.  It could be said that they are tools of methodology rather 
than law; but that would not describe their authority.  The rules might be 
incomprehensible without them.  This is important to rules of precedent.223 
 
One very significant point lies at the basis of what has been said in this sub-
chapter to this point. Actions like mistake, duress and necessitous intervention, 
arising in quite different circumstances, are seen as united by a common 
jurisprudential characteristic that involves the law imposing an obligation in 
certain judicially determined circumstances. Unless it is understood that such a 
methodology has its origins in the action on the case, and that this ancient 
action has a much older jurisprudential precedent, it will be very difficult to  
                                            
 
222 Lipkin Gorman v Karpnale Ltd. [1991] 2 AC 548, 559, per Lord Templeman and 578, per Lord Goff. 
223 See sub-chapter 6.3 below.  The doctrine of precedent might be unworkable without unifying and 
expository elements recognised as inseparable from the rules they relate to.  See also fn 236 below.  
The legal character of concepts and principles is discussed again in Chapter 8, p 156. 
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accept and understand why such a group of quite dissimilar grounds of actions 
exists, as a category. If one relies upon comparisons with modern civilian 
jurisdictions, the point will only become obvious because there, the actions are 
reasoned from the actions in the Roman institutes.  
 
This background is essential also to the issues raised in Chapter 7.5 below. The 
methodology of the action on the case is seldom contemplated in modern legal 
discourse, but it is an enduring phenomenon which has found a place in law, 
ancient and modern, including Anglo/Australian law, North American law, most 
European continental systems and South Africa. This fact suggests a common 
influence, the Roman Institutes, which the common lawyers of today, unlike their 
medieval predecessors, are free to admit.  
 
6.3. Unifying  the Theoretical Basis of Actions. 
 
Unjust enrichment was described by Lord Wright in terms of the right arising 
from a judgment, which explains the duty (obligation) which the law imposes to 
make restitution.224 The meaning of Lord Wright’s words becomes plain if one 
remembers the difference between the early common law writs, (formalistic and 
with no evident foundation in principle), on the one hand, and on the other, the 
judgments of the Roman iudex adjudicating cases on the praetor’s edict225 which 
was formed upon notions of aequo et bono. Essentially, Lord Wright has posed 
a question, by what criterion does an issue of unjust enrichment arise? Such a 
question can only be answered by reference to some wider theoretical and legal 
philosophical basis; wider that is, than a succession of early precedents that 
were sometimes sterile. After all, without the explanation of an over-arching 
                                            
 
224 ‘Sinclair v. Brougham’, Legal Essays and Addresses, 1939. 1, 18-19. 
225 Fn 20 . 
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principle, precedents cannot be precedents at all because the cases will be 
unrelated, one to another.226  
 
The dictum from Pavey cited above227 is perhaps the most systematic curial 
exposition of the unifying concept. There are two propositions – 
(a) it provides a unifying explanation of cases where the law will impose 
an obligation to make restitution: 
(b) it assists in the characterisation of actions, including new actions: 
thus, it reinforces the independence and separateness of the 
restitutionary strict liability from other areas of the law. 
 
It is significant that the law imposes the obligation. It does not as in contract, 
merely enforce a duty arising from the parties’ agreement.228 
 
It must be doubted that these propositions are sustainable when they are made 
in respect of a mere concept, unless it has another character. That the dictum of 
Deane J described also, a principle of law, is plain once it is recognised that the 
characterisation of restitution as fair and just, serves very much the same 
purpose as the principles of contract which led the US Supreme Court to 
interpret the stringent proscription of contracts in restraint of trade under the 
Sherman Act as applying to unreasonable restraints of trade.229One is  
compelled to enquire as to the basis in principle of rules that make use of such  
 
                                            
 
226 See Ch. 11.4 especially p 210, where I have commented upon over–arching principle and the unifying 
legal concept analysing the views of commentators on this observation about precedent.  
227 Fn 1.. 
228 The important nexus between an obligation imposed by law and the strict liability action has not been 
much explored. I believe that it has the potential to simplify much of the reasoning about defining 
concepts (of which the unifying legal concept of unjust enrichment is an example) and their important 
influence upon and the nature of rules. Much of this is considered esoteric in some quarters. Tort, if it 
is studied in this light, also opens up new fields for exploration, and in terms of unifying and defining 
concepts, becomes more readily explicable.  
229 R M Dworkin, Philosophy of Law, 49. 
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powerful legal concepts, or tools of reasoning, as ‘unreasonable’, ‘fair’ and ‘just’, 
for they do not bear a common-place meaning: rather they import reasoning that 
has developed through a succession of cases. The answer as to the meaning of 
unifying legal concept lies   
• in the contemplation of the characterisation of actions given us by Lord 
Wright,  
• in the consideration of the Sherman Act  example given above, and  
• in contemplation of the character and method of the action on the case 
selectively allowing grounds of an action where reason establishes that 
unjust characterises this and other grounds. 
In chapter 13, I shall show that civilian lawyers have achieved a like result 
through the interpretation of the institutes. 
 
 
6.4. Concepts Provide Channels for Legal Enquiry. 
 
I have commented in the introductory remarks at the beginning of this chapter, 
that concepts are tools of discourse. Here, I will examine an extension of that 
idea that is important to the treatment of the meaning of words in a legal context.  
 
The practice of the law in explaining rules by conceptual relationship is the work 
of inductive reasoning. Reasoning from one case to another necessarily involves 
the tools of logic230although the search for consistency and continuity in concepts 
can be illusory.231 A careful distinction must be drawn between the tendency 
seen in some judgments, even in recent times, to hark back to forms of actions  
 
                                            
 
230 See for example Muschinsky v Dodds (1985) 160 CLR 583, 615, per Deane J, which provides a useful 
example of the judicial technique. 
231 Vide Lord Wright’s caution about old theoretical debates where he makes it plain that the history is of 
mere antiquarian value ‘Sinclair v. Brougham’, Legal Essays and Addresses, 1939. 1, 18-19. 
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as a source of reasoning, on the one hand, and intelligent judicial structuring of 
the law on the other.  
 
Lord Mansfield was perhaps bringing his predilection for equity to bear when he 
said ‘...[t]he law does not consist of particular cases, but of general principles, 
which are illustrated and explained by [the cases] ...’.232 Controversial as this 
cross fertilisation of ideas might have been in Lord Mansfield’s day, it is surely 
not objectionable to modern jurisprudence provided the elements of the debate 
are clearly understood. When the modern courts enunciate doctrines in the 
manner of being explained and unified by legal concepts, it has to be possible to 
identify those concepts and to demonstrate that they are the continuing basis of 
contemporary legal reasoning. As such, the concepts spawn legal principles 
from which rules of law are drawn down in individual cases.233 
 
Legal Concepts express the experience of the law. 
 
Far from revitalising defunct and merely historical categories, which an enquiry 
into legal history might suggest, these concepts and the principles which are 
built upon them express the experience of the law. The nature of this discussion 
must be well understood however, because its central idea is that concepts and 
principles identify and express the basic propositions of legal reasoning 
developed and moulded in the courts over decades, and even centuries.234 They 
lend consistency and relationship to actions, as surely as a concept named 
‘contract’ immediately tells the reader about a distinct field of principles, rules, 
and doctrines. A concept called ‘unjust enrichment’ is then, an expression of  
                                            
 
232 R v Bembridge (1783) 3 Dougl 331; 99 ER 679, 681. 
233 The different treatment in US jurisdictions, of doctrines that unjust enrichment may enliven, results in 
US law invoking the constructive trust as a response.  
234 Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Common Law, 5. 
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juristic experience (possibly akin to that of the praetor’s work in declaring his 
edict) which enables a court to define circumstances where an obligation to 
make restitution for an enrichment at the expense of another arises in law.  
 
If this explanation of concept is thought circuitous, then it must be contemplated 
that it is profoundly different from a mere remedy called ‘unjust enrichment’ 
because that has some other juristic reasoning behind it. The concept identifies 
the field of applicable principles and rules and channels the enquiry into the 
experience of the law. This is plainly true of contract, tort and property. 
Does unjust enrichment, as a unifying concept, have centuries of accepted 
meaning as contract and property have? There is no ready response to such a 
question, but in the light of the historical background as traced in chapter 2, it 
could not be denied that there has been a jurisprudence, if primitive in many 
aspects, that has characterised cognate legal processes. The jurisprudence is 
the legacy of the history of unjust enrichment notions in the law. Central to this 
has been the concept of quid pro quo and the method of the action on the case 
that gave the law, at each stage, a focus upon a concept that was called quasi 
contract both in Roman law and in contemporary common law. It will also be 
shown in a later chapter, that the common counts produced theory, reflected in 
cases of Lord Mansfield’s era that demonstrated a developed concept and 
principle of unjust enrichment.235 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
 
235 Pp 136-37: see also Ch 13.2.  As explained at pp 90 and 99, I find it unnecessary to assert the 
continuous development of a concept of unjust enrichment in the early law. The evidence that there  
 was considerable conceptual continuity is strong but the gradual development of defining  
 characteristics of unjust enrichment is the main purpose here because that will support a conclusion 
that the modern jurisprudence of the unjust enrichment actions has been in progress for many 
centuries. 
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Concept of law or common usage. 
 
Analysis of concepts inevitably leads to questions about the authority for 
claiming a special meaning of words we use to describe concepts, principles 
and actions. There are many who argue that legal words have no special 
meaning compared to common usage. The arguments for and against a special 
meaning of words used in legal language are endless.236 They range from the 
view that concepts and legal conclusions based upon them play a significant 
part in our law237 to the view that it is unsustainable that words commonly used 
by lawyers do and should have a special meaning, different from common 
usage.238 Much of this argument is not relevant to the present study because 
‘unjust enrichment’ has no common-place counterpart. The problem is that 
‘unjust’ does. The reason of course, is that persons, especially non-lawyers, but 
also many who are lawyers, may have profoundly different perceptions of what 
is unjust. It is, in clearest terms the archetype of language that fails tests of 
specificity. There will be agreement about the central or typical case but little 
certainty as the scope of meaning widens.  Politics, emotion, greed and linguistic 
science will play a part in the manner in which it is used. 
 
 
                                            
 
236  Cf Raimo Siltala, A Theory of Precedent, 43-45. Sitalya introduced competing notions of principles 
and the source of, and degree of their authority. Literal meaning (interpretative formality) is subjected 
to a number of philosophical objections, especially that words can never be ‘context free’. This is a 
complex subject, but the import is not lost on jurists who would not deny that context might determine 
meaning. ‘Unjust’, is a significant example. Where context does not indicate a clearly accepted 
meaning it is clearly unhelpful however, to introduce a range of possible alternatives to interpretation 
(degrees of interpretative formality). Sitalya also argued that Professor Dworkin’s work supports the 
notion that legal validity cannot embrace legal principles in the manner in which Dworkin treats legal 
rules. It must be disputed that such an idea can be attributed to Dworkin. Extreme cases aside, the 
‘validity’ of principles depends upon their continued acceptance by the courts as the expression of 
legal reasoning. 
237 H.L.A. Hart, ‘Definition and Theory in Jurisprudence’, 70 LQR 37. 
238 A W Simpson ‘The Analysis of Legal Concepts’, (1964) 80 LQR 535. 
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Professor Hart draws parallels that assist in understanding the point being made 
here. Hart uses common conversation that applies to an activity that has special 
rules, such as cricket, as illustrative of the manner in which the use of a key 
expression relies upon the existence of unstated rules.239 Thus, the statement 
“he is out!” in a game of cricket, does not involve the speaker in a diatribe in 
which he/she states that this is a game of cricket, and according to the rule 
about the ball leaving the bowler’s hand and striking the wicket, all other rules 
being satisfied, he, the batsman, is “out”.  ‘He is out’ is a conclusion about the 
laws or rules of cricket. So too in law, ‘…he is unjustly enriched…’ is a 
conclusion relying upon unstated rules of law. 240 
 
Professor Simpson has a different view.241 He believes the Hart’s approach to 
legal concepts, that elucidate legal conclusions, is unsatisfactory. Simpson’s 
main thesis is that it ought not to be the approach of the lawyer that the words 
he/she uses have a special legal meaning. This is because the assumption that 
a word used is a legal concept cannot avoid words that also require definition; 
meaning is therefore inconclusive. No word, Simpson says, can be immune from 
definition.242 In Simpson’s approach, legal concepts can therefore be less useful 
as parts of conclusive statements than Hart and others believe. He attributes 
this to “…the mistake of attempting to link an explanation of the nature of legal 
concept to a theory of logical function of words or sentences…’.243 
                                            
 
239 H.L.A. Hart, ‘Definition and Theory in Jurisprudence’, 70 LQR 37, 43. 
240 Professor Hart’s notion of conclusion of law facilitates this kind of conceptual analysis because it helps 
us to realize that we are talking of a concept that consists of more than a single word or notion: each 
time unjust enrichment is used as an informative, explicit concept in a case, such as where it is asserted 
that “x is unjustly enriched”, the legal conclusion is that ‘[defendant] is unjustly enriched’. In unjust 
enrichment, as a branch of the law, ‘unjust’ by itself has no place; unjust enrichment is the critical 
concept. The legal conclusion is that ‘[defendant] is unjustly enriched’ which combines with the facts 
that constitute the ground of action. 
241 A.W.B. Simpson, ‘The Analysis of legal Concepts’, (1964) 80 LQR 535. 
242 id,547 
243 id,549. 
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The differences as to whether ‘unjust’ should be accorded a special legal 
meaning arise, I suggest, because of the common perception that holds that 
…the law knows what is libel, but every person knows what is unjust. The legal 
concept though, simply does not use the ‘unjust’ of common parlance. In the law 
of unjust enrichment, the concept that we call unjust enrichment is like libel in 
that it has a special legal meaning, albeit, libel may be different in that it may 
have no other meaning. It is a matter of considerable significance that such a 
conclusion of law as ‘defendant is unjustly enriched’, when it is a dictum of a 
competent court, is the expression of a juridical concept. It is the finding ex 
aequo et bono, out of justice and expediency,1 which is at the root of unjust 
enrichment in each case, reflecting an authoritative finding that this is such a 
case. Such a conclusion is not so strange. It is cognate to a finding of 
negligence, deceit, or libel. The courts have said what is and what is not 
negligence, deceit, libel and trespass. It is not such a large step to contemplate 
that in unjust enrichment, the courts will say what is an instance of an actionable 
unjust feature. In each, there are critical premises and in each there is 
precedent, both ancient and neo modern, for the methodology employed by the 
courts. 
 
The Hart approach is consonant with a view that the use of words and 
sentences in a legal context are neutral as to their meaning in another context. 
Theory as to their logical function cannot be constructed without cognisance of 
the legal context in which they are being employed to express a legal idea or 
legal conclusion.244 This was assumed in the opening paragraphs of this sub-
chapter. 
                                            
 
244 An assertion that “I am an Australian” uttered at an international rugby match does not necessarily 
carry the same implication as the same declaration to the immigration officer at the airport. The 
Simpson approach is valid as an argument against the usefulness of a lexicon of words that have been 
‘judicially noticed’. 
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The short answer to Professor Simpson and others who would argue against the 
practice of adhering to legal concepts is that unjust enrichment has an age old 
connotation which really has nothing to do with communal perceptions of 
unjustness except perhaps in so far as they may influence current judicial 
reasoning as to the appropriateness of a new case.245 The law of unjust 
enrichment, is confined by reasoning and this is reflected in its concepts: ‘…[t]he 
law of unjust enrichment is the law of legally reversible enrichment. It does not 
invite the courts to remake the world.246 
 
The legal Concept of Unjust Enrichment expresses empirical characteristics. 
 
Unjust is the critical issue. It is essential to understand what the ‘unjust’ concept 
(if one may call it that) means. It is like proximity in tort, to an extent: it cannot be 
equated to ordinary usage.247 Unlike proximity, it is the empirical character of 
unjust enrichment in Anglo/Australian law which explains that its place in the law 
is neither attributable to a re-interpretation of common law doctrines under the 
influence of civilian doctrine, nor to a perceived imperative of filling a vacuum in 
the law. Interpretations of concepts in the courts are the work of informed legal 
minds, not immutable in a changing world, but not susceptible to a proliferation 
of alternative shades of meaning. They are the product of what Professor  
 
 
                                            
 
245 The conclusions suggested in Sub-Ch 7.3.1 below, are not inconsistent with this view. There it is 
suggested that an insistent communal norm might be one of those adopted by the law as an unjust 
enrichment.  The new case focus, nevertheless, should not be allowed to determine the progress of the 
science.  See p 91 above, where I have attributed conceptual difficulties perceived to exist in unjust 
enrichment to an unwarranted emphasis on the concern for new cases. 
246 Peter Birks, ‘Misnomer’, W. R. Cornish et al (ed.) Restitution Past Present and Future, 1, 6. 
247 It is relevant that whilst the notion of ‘concept of the law’ arises exceedingly sparingly these days, it is 
to be found in earlier jurisprudential works. See sub-ch’s 2.3-2.6 above. 
 John B Donnelly. 95312086 
105
 
 
Ronald Dworkin called ‘interpretive judgment’.248The outcome of such a 
judgment is perceived to be self-evidently correct.249 
 
There are at least two quite different historical characteristics which are invoked 
by the courts to determine what it is that a legal concept brings to the law;  
1. one is typical of unjust enrichment: the practice of the courts in the 
use of that concept serves to call into focus a special field of 
experience to identify those actions which rely upon that particular 
experience;250  
2. another is that kind of concept which identifies branches of 
developed principles, eg contract, which assumes legal and 
commercial principles.  
 
A concept that is an element of a principle and a rule assumes an enhanced 
significance in the law: so it is that 'unjust' is an element of the special legal  
 
 
                                            
 
248 Ronald Dworkin, A Matter of Principle, 168; cf., fnn 362 and 495. Dworkin argues that though there 
may be different interpretations, they are flawed because objections to a moral argument must be 
moral objections; so too, he would intend, objections to a legal argument must be legal objections. If 
then, an interpretation of any ratio is wrong, it must be wrong for legal reasons. Does Dworkin suggest 
that a legal principles are not susceptible to moral critique? That view would suggest that no other 
communal standards are valid either, including principles by which rules might be said to be ‘racist’, 
‘sexist’ and ‘anti-elegitarian’. The importance presently, is that no law can be value free to be 
evaluated solely by ‘legal’ standards. The important difference is in the interpretive function that is 
legal and the evaluative function that is inescapably based upon communal standards.  Ultimately, 
unjust cannot be unaffected by the latter as standards affecting or contributing to judicial reasoning.  
249 id,272 ff. Dworkin’s argument appears to have the consequence that a legally correct finding is the  
 one that judges agree is legally correct; there can be no other correct legal interpretation, written on the 
wind; variations of approach must ultimately amount to the same fundamental interpretation; otherwise 
they are wrong! That is a view that demands further evaluation. In unjust enrichment, a well reasoned 
judgment may well be subject to variation by a later court that takes account of broader perceptions or 
differently interpreted factors. Is Lord Mansfield’s ‘equity to be identified with formal English equity, 
or is it a perception of a wider concept that embraces other civilised systems of law as well?  Chapter 
13 addresses that question. 
250 Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Common Law, 5.  
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notion, that is described in “1” above,251 that is, by virtue of its place as a  
special part in a principle of law. This is consistent with the meaning attributed to 
unjust enrichment in the cases that have described the grounds of actions in 
unjust enrichment, that which is actionable, reflecting the action on the case 
jurisprudence.252  
 
As a for-runner to concluding observations on concepts in the next sub- 
chapter, I identify a number of key statements in the above text: 
1. Concepts are tools of discourse; in law, the legal concepts are the tools of 
reasoning. 
2. Concept of Unjust Enrichment expresses the experience of the law; this is 
consistent with Lord Mansfield’s perception that the cases interpret, 
explain and apply legal principles. 
3. The validity of recognising special legal ideas explained by a legal 
concept can be demonstrated by explaining the importance of empirical 
factors, especially by appeal to comparisons with other related concepts 
of law. 
4. Legal concepts express the experience of the law and draw together 
unstated subordinate rules that make possible the identification of 
applicable principles. 
5. Legal concepts augment the practice of the law of explaining rules by 
conceptual relationship. 
                                            
 
251 The ideas being developed here of a special legal notion follows H L A Hart, Concept of Law, 86; and 
H L A Hart, ‘Definition and Theory in Jurisprudence’, 70 LQR 37. 43. See Ch 9 below, where the 
importance of Hart’s contributions to understanding the law is explained. 
252 See above pp 117-121 and fnn 149 and 163. 
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6.5. Concepts like ‘Unjust Enrichment’ Supply Legal Content of Principles 
and Rules. 
 
What then is the essential force of a legal concept? We may speak of unjust 
enrichment, debt and property, indicating several conceptual categories in terms 
of legal taxonomy, but the nomenclature is much more than a concept and a 
category when we say ‘…that is my property.’ So too, when we say ‘defendant is 
unjustly enriched’, there is more legal character at work than mere concept. 
Professor Hart describes the difference well: Hart would say of such a statement 
that it is not a mere statement of fact but a conclusion of law.253 But there is a 
problem here because we are contemplating legal meaning rather than 
accepted common usage: it seems inescapable that some legal principle must 
tell us what unjust enrichment is before we can comprehend the statement. By 
contrast, a statement like ‘the ball hit the wicket’ is a statement of fact; or is it? 
Do we need to know the rules of cricket to say conclusively that what struck the 
stumps is a ball in cricket terms and what was struck is by the same 
classification, a wicket?  
 
Professor Simpson254 suggests that the enquiry about the meaning of legal 
words follows the same channels, indicating a need to define our terms. But 
there is a distinct difference. Hart’s proposition turns upon there being some 
means of identifying the applicable rule, or rules that give meaning in terms of 
potential rights and obligations. Simpson’s opinion is concerned with specialised 
linguistic usage. The former concerns taxonomy of rules. The latter concerns a 
                                            
 
253  H. L. A. Hart. ‘Definition and Theory in Jurisprudence’, 70 LQR 37, 53. 
254 A. W. B. Simpson, ‘The Analysis of Legal Concepts’, 80 LQR 535, 543-4. 
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lower order of taxonomy restricted to things, albeit, things which have 
consequence for specialised activity.  
 
The distinction is reminiscent of the characteristics of concepts examined 
above.255Between Professor Hart’s treatment of rule oriented analysis, and the 
notion that words used in legal discourse have a specialised meaning as legal 
concepts do, there is a need of clarification: there must be a clear pattern of 
analysis (Birks256) that will ensure that each instance of a rule of unjust 
enrichment arises from judicially accepted criteria. This, in my belief, is where it 
becomes essential to acknowledge the significance of principles. If we return to 
the two propositions seen above, vis., ‘that is my property’ and ‘defendant is 
unjustly enriched’, all depends upon a legally conclusive proposition that says 
what unjust enrichment and property are. Each is a legal concept but each, is a 
conclusion of law if expressed in the manner, ‘…Jones is unjustly enriched..’ or 
‘that chattel is my property’. Do they depend upon a rule? Surely, each time I 
assert that a chattel is my property I am not harking back to a successful law suit 
in which a judge found in those terms. But to understand either as constituting 
an assertion of fact and not a conclusion of law however is to miss the true 
significance of these unifying legal concepts.  
 
A statement like ‘…Brown is unjustly enriched…’ assumes that the speaker 
knows what the concept of unjust enrichment refers to, but it also assumes that 
the speaker is invoking some rule of law which could have that particular 
consequence if a judge, in relevant proceedings, agreed. Similarly, ‘…Brown is 
in possession…’ is a presumption of fact if made by the postman who has 
delivered mail to Brown at that address over a long time. But the same 
statement might be a conclusion of law if made in consequence of a legal study 
                                            
 
255 Chapter 6. 
256 Peter Birks, Introduction to Restitution, 19-20. See p 172 ff below, and sub-ch.11.3. 
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of rules relevant to Brown’s circumstances; and it might be a rule if made by a 
court where such a statement was a critical outcome of legal proceedings.  
 
What is it that makes the difference? I propose that it is that lawyers accept that 
certain concepts have legal connotations and when used in a manner that 
asserts a legal consequence, they are conclusions about the law as it presently 
applies to that item or that assertion of legal right or obligation. To make 
assertions that amount to conclusions of law, the lawyer must share with peers, 
the common conceptual basis of all such statements. What links them is a 
unifying legal concept. That fact can only be meaningful if we acknowledge that 
there is a ‘roadmap’, which will be a set of governing principles. 
 
In all of these circumstances, concepts such as unjust enrichment and 
possession are assumed as tools of legal argument in precisely the same way 
as a mathematician may use a proven theorem as a building block in 
mathematics. We know what these terms mean; we don’t have to prove them by 
argument before proceeding with our analysis. And when the concept is equally 
attributable to different sets of circumstances, it assumes a unifying quality, as 
all adjectival phrases do; e.g. ‘petrol powered’, ‘railway rolling stock’; and 
‘creatures of the sea’. The unifying quality does not rule out that items described 
by the phrase, or actions described by the unifying legal concept may be like 
Victor mowers and motor launches; trucks and locomotives; squid and whales: 
that is they may share common conceptual characteristics and yet be very 
different. 
 
The above treatment begins to suggest what is meant by a ‘unifying legal 
concept’.257 Such a concept calls up the rules adopted in the courts that define  
                                            
 
257 Pavey Matthews Pty Ltd v Paul, fn 1. See also, pp 91-98, 108-110, 136, 164 and 176-79, and especially 
205-206 and 254, for further statements on this point. 
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which actions are admitted under this head of law. The fact that such a concept, 
recognised in Australian law, is thought of as a principle in English law need not 
divert attention from the force of a concept. 
 
What is unified by the concept of unjust enrichment is dependent upon an 
answer to a central question: what is it that the law addresses in unjust 
enrichment? The answer lies in the nature of the concept and English principle.  
The way in which the courts approach such a question in the future might be 
seen in terms of slavish adherence to old categories, or perhaps intelligent 
development of the law that would spurn unnecessary and merely historical 
conceptual limitations. Neither is a prescription for unprincipled reasoning. This 
leads into the discussion of principles that describe the grounds of potential 
actions. 
 
Chapter 7: Introduction to Principles. 
 
7.1. The Objectives of this Chapter. 
  
Several questions should be answered by this study; 
1. what is the jurisprudential nature of unjust enrichment principle? - 
a question which has many aspects; 
2. what is the unifying factor, concept or principle adopted in a 
particular jurisdiction that guides or determines the outcome in 
terms of a rule handed down in a case? 
3. are there subsidiary principles that help to identify the elements of 
actions based upon a larger, connective or categorising principle 
or principles? 
4. how do the unifying legal concept and the principles of the case 
work together? 
 
To achieve these objectives, it is necessary to define what principle is, and what 
it does in cases. Then it will be possible to say, in sub-chapter 7.4, what the 
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principle of unjust enrichment is as applied in cases. In 7.5 I suggest a striking 
comparison with the concept and principle of civilian jurisdictions. 
 
These several levels of inquiry involve the character of the law of obligations as 
a whole, and the character of the law of unjust enrichment in particular. There 
are unwritten characterising factors at work. Two examples will suffice. Firstly, 
are the answers to questions such as those posed in the preceding paragraph, 
attributable to rules that exclusively determine the scope of a branch of the law, 
the limits of jurisdiction, the actions recognised? Thus far, unequivocally, these 
factors are determined by rules. But secondly, are there also boundaries of 
particular branches of law, i.e., defined ‘territories’ that the courts accept and act 
upon, that are not exclusively rules as laid down in cases? The courts rarely 
embark upon a search for delimiting rules, but there have to be such boundaries 
between for example,  
1. unjust enrichment and resulting trusts;  
2. between equitable rights which allow to a party an equity, and an 
unjust enrichment;  
3. between a remedy and restitution;  
4. between a tortious act and an undesirable act that fails the test of 
‘tortious’; and,  
5. between what the courts accept as unjust in the context of unjust 
enrichment, and human conduct that is over-bearing, or taking unfair 
advantage, that belongs to, or is defined in a different legal context. 
 
If it be assumed that there is no theoretical or practical bar to a new action, the 
enquiry will be as to the meaning of unjust in the law, at this point in time.258  The 
                                            
 
258 In contract and tort, enquiry about unifying principles arises sparingly; the unifying factor will be obvious in the majority 
of cases. In unjust enrichment, the enquiry is less readily satisfied. It requires firstly, an answer to the broader question, is 
there an action in contract, tort or equity, on these facts? If there is, then unjust enrichment actions frequently defer to 
other actions where the breach of a right establishes a cause. If the answer is ‘no’, then, and only then, can the second 
question arise, that is, is this set of circumstances one of those in which the law imposes an obligation for unjust 
enrichment? It must be recalled that there is no breach of any right that is a precursor, and a cause of action in unjust 
enrichment. See pp 1 and 16 above. 
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extension of the categorisation ‘unjust’ to a new set of circumstances is the 
archetypal case of review under principles of unjust enrichment.259 
 
The study envisaged in the paragraphs above, necessitates consciousness of 
differences between jurisdictions. It will also involve the state of the law within a 
single jurisdiction when several time-frames are under consideration. It is 
inevitable that there will be subtle differences in the treatment and interpretation 
of legal precedents from one era to another. Furthermore, the reasoning in 
courts of several jurisdictions appears to be differentiated by very different 
perceptions of underlying principles, ranging from those that produce strict 
categories of actions to those based upon liberal general principles. This latter 
consideration points to a need to focus mainly upon the Australian and English 
cases, with reference to other jurisdictions sparingly.  
 
7.2. What is ‘Principle’? 
 
(a) Principles and non legal rules: a comparative illustration. 
 
Attributing major U.S. corporate collapses to a failure of accounting principles, 
London based financier George Soros told the BBC,  
Rules alone are not enough…you need principles….America has a 
rules-based system of accounting. …rules can lead to rules 
avoidance…’260  
 
 
 
 
                                            
 
259 The law is a living thing: new instances of unjustness might emerge because of developments in other 
areas of the law. One example is that, in the future, the rights of shareholders might become better 
defined as a consequence of prohibited practices under the corporations law. 
260 Mr. George Soros, President of Soros Funds Management, New York, Australian newspaper on 2nd 
July, 2002. 
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What are these principles that are not rules? One might be that accountancy 
partners are not directors of client companies.261 Such a principle, apparently 
adopted as an internal company norm, serves the rules concerned with conflict 
of interest.  The company’s ‘internal guidelines on client conflicts’ are derived 
from the rules of the American Bar Association.  Allens Arthur Robinson, a law 
firm, practices strict control over approval of new clients. An executive partner 
must approve the client, and the decision is based, amongst other things, on 
financial criteria and reputation.  A “two-partner deep” or “three-partner” policy is 
applied by large firms for large clients.262 John Atkin, Managing partner of Blake 
Dawson and Waldron, was reported ‘…rules and procedures are one thing, but 
the sense of core values of the firm and their day-to-day application [are the 
essence of] a strong sense of integrity in the firm…’263These examples are 
instances of internal practice principles which contribute to the effectiveness of 
formal practice rules. 
 
These aphorisms are not readily to be compared to legal principles and rules in 
cases, but it may be asked, is the way in which those rules of professional 
practice etc, are supported by principles, relevant to legal principles and rules? It 
is my submission that it is, not in a direct way, but in the manner that principles 
describe specific practical application for rules.  
 
(b) Principles: their legal character.  
 
Principles are then, part of the language of the law which assists in the tasks of 
defining, separating and recognising. Conflict of principles makes for difficulties 
of applying rules in practice. Conflict of principles was abundantly evident in 
                                            
 
261 David Nathan, Baker & McKenzie Inc. as cited in The Business Review Weekly, Sept 5-11, 2002, 62. 
262 Ibid. 
263 Ibid. 
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Sinclair v Brougham264 so that it became quite impossible to say what the case 
stood for.265 
 
Sinclair provides a useful illustration of the choice of a court to apply rules 
exclusively. The House of Lords apparently dismissed the possibility that 
principles might found another rule emanating from the circumstances of money 
had and received. It is just such a primary focus on rules, at the expense of 
principles, which is Mr. Soros’ complaint about the practice of accountancy. 
 
A judgment in an unjust enrichment case recognises that in the circumstances of 
the case, the law will impose an obligation upon the party that received a benefit 
at the expense of another. Obligation is associated with a finding of unjustness. 
We call such an obligation a primary response. This is the jurists’ explanation of 
the way the law works. The need of an explanation of liability is significant and 
equally so for the imposing of an obligation in unjust enrichment. Were damages 
to be argued in response to an unjust enrichment, the response would be 
damages for what? Damages is a response to a breach of a right. There is no 
breach in unjust enrichment.266  
 
Comparatively, a principle that underlies and explains liability in delict and 
contract requires that a case for a remedy (usually damages) must be made out 
in response to a proven breach. In an action in tort, the court does not begin by 
asking what delict is. If it did, the answer might involve ancient cases, especially 
those brought as actions on the case. The answer would involve, significantly, 
why the law regarded actions and events as delictual. Libel is delictual, but why 
is public ridicule not delictual? Simply, the courts have not found it to be so. It is  
                                            
 
264 [1914] AC 398. See also p 112. 
265 See Lord Wright, ‘Sinclair v.  Brougham’, Legal Essays and Addresses, I, 16. 
266 Explained above at pp 1 and 16 above; and see later discussion of the point at pp 129, 133-34, and 157; 
sub-chapter 9.3 and fn 319. 
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when we get to the question as to what has guided the courts in stopping short 
of public ridicule that we concern ourselves with principles. The courts, by 
finding specific acts and events to be tortious have found that the concepts ‘tort’ 
and ‘delict’ describe what it is about those actions or events that qualify them to 
be actionable in tort. It may be that actions and events ‘A though E’, are 
actionable because the communal demand for redress is perceived to be 
insistent.267  
 
The legal interpretation of the communal attitude is not a rule, but it is the 
foundation of a principle of law. The force of the principle is as it was described 
by Lord Reid in Dorset Yacht Co v Home Office, ‘...[the principle] ought to apply 
unless there is some justification or valid explanation for its exclusion.’268The 
importance of the dictum is that it expresses the reasoning that supports a 
strong taxonomy. Once applied, the principle may be wholly or partly 
incorporated in a rule, but that does not destroy its character as the expression 
of reasoning underlying the rule. In just this way, there may be a principle of law 
that describes, in terms of actual circumstances, what is actionable as unjust 
enrichment. Following the “Lord Reid” reasoning, in the facts of a case that 
exhibit characteristics that have been found to be a ground of unjust enrichment, 
the unjust enrichment principle must be applied. 
  
(c) Principle as conceptual ‘umbrella’. 
The principle that describes unjust enrichment is the conceptual umbrella that 
covers all cases where the court of competent jurisdiction has reasoned an 
                                            
 
267 This notion was introduced above in sub-chapter 7.3: see also fnn 109 and 245; it is further explained 
below at pp 114 , 125-29. 
268 [1970] AC 1004, 1027. See Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, Ch 2, ‘The Model of Rules’, 36-
7, discussed below in Ch 7.4 and 7.5. See also Alastair Macadam and John Pyke, Judicial Reasoning 
and the Doctrine of Precedent in Australia, 258; ‘...Lord Reid was finally signalling the Law Lords’ 
acceptance of the fact that the neighbour principle will generally have more weight than arguments 
based on particular precedents, or the lack of precedent for a particular case.’ 
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obligation should arise to make restitution. It does not attempt a justification of 
the similarity of mistake of law and duress for example. The principle is 
quantifiable only in terms of judicial logic which encompasses that the communal 
standard that gives rise to obligation that is insistent. Similarly, contractual 
principle, explained by the concept of contract, is founded upon communal 
expectations that one shall perform one’s formal agreement. Indeed, it can be 
seen in this snap-shot, why the courts in Australia might have chosen to call 
unjust enrichment a concept.269 
 
In tort and contract, the notions of delict and consensus respectively, are the 
conceptual umbrella. In unjust enrichment, the judicial notion of ex aequo et 
bono (‘justice and good faith’: I have chosen to depart from the so-called literal 
interpretation) is in legal terms, the conceptual umbrella.270 
 
The unifying concept and principle in unjust enrichment has been acknowledged 
in cases in early English law down to the present. In Pownall v Ferrand,271an 
endorser of a bill was compelled to pay on account of the holder. Lord 
Tenterdon invoked a ‘general principle’ that one that is compelled to pay where 
another is liable, is entitled to recover. 272 In Dawson v Linton273 property of a 
tenant was subject to distress for a tax due from a landlord. The court adopted a 
 
 
                                            
 
269 See fn 214 above. 
270 Above, fn 21. Acknowledging Hunter’s sources, Kames and Stair and Dalrymple’s faithful 
reproduction, this ‘justice and expediency’ interpretation does not fit the modern law particularly well. 
Whatever may have been the literal interpretation claimed by Kames and Stair, ‘justice and good faith’ 
is probably closer to the intention of judges and jurists who used the terminology in recent centuries, 
probably including Lord Mansfield. One has to make allowances too for the possible difference in 
interpretation, by Stair to Scots law and Kames to civilian law. It seems at least possible that there are 
different nuances in those disciplines, to be had from ‘expediency’. See also, Ch. 13 where ancient 
conceptions of equity (aequo) are considered as possible influences upon the post medieval judiciary. 
271 6 B & C 439; 
272 Id, 443. 
273 (1822) 5 B. & Ald. 521, 523.. 
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similar rule and found the plaintiff had a right to repayment. This reasoning 
exhibits a principle which envisions inter-related cases. 
 
In Brookes Wharf v Goodman Bros.,274 Lord Wright explained liability in terms of 
a general standard of justness corresponding to that of the reasonable persons 
in the law of negligence.275 The latter became the touchstone of standards of 
acceptable personal and professional behaviour demonstrating the concept of a 
general standard. As such, it remains as a comparative tool and helps to explain 
that the courts in later judgements were developing a standard of comparable 
significance. In Fibrosa Spolka Akcyjna v Fairbairn Lawson Coombe Barbour 
Ltd276 Lord Wright described the over arching concept in terms that it ‘… remains 
as Lord Mansfield left it. … [t]he gist of the action is a debt or obligation implied, 
or, more accurately, imposed, by law…’277 
 
In English law, the underlying (general) principle, which exemplifies the same 
broad explanation of the basis of cases, was recognised in Lipkin Gorman v 
Karpnale Ltd.278 The House of Lords approved Lord Wright’s dictum in Fibrosa 
Spolka Akcyjna v Fairbairn Lawson Coombe Barbour Ltd,279 
... [the principle focuses upon] retaining the money of, or some other 
benefit derived from another which it is against conscience that he should 
keep.280 
                                            
 
274 [1937] 1 KB 534, 544. 
275 At 544; ‘reasonable person’ test, Donoghue v Stephenson [1932] AC 562. 
276 [1943] AC 32. 
277 Id, 63. (the italics are mine). 
278 [1991] 2 AC 548, 559; and see Goff and Jones, fn 163, 14-15. 
279 Fn 177 at p 61. 
280 Ibid. The Sinclair case demonstrated that the Lords or some of them, at that time, were impatient with 
broad generalisations. They may have seen the notion of ‘against conscience’ as being such a 
generalisation. See also fn 43 reciting that Lord Mansfield’s contract jurisprudence had excited an 
enduring antipathy towar his concepts of unjust enrichment. Lord Wright’s Fibrosa judgment also 
included the following dictum which has not attracted the same interest in later judgments: ‘…[t]he 
standard of what is against conscience in this context has become more or less canalised or defined, 
…[t]he gist of the action is a debt or obligation implied, or, more accurately, imposed, by law…’.   
 fn 177 at pp 61 and 63. 
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Goff & Jones describe the principle thus, ‘…the law recognises and gives effect 
to in a wide variety of claims ... 281 and ‘… an abstract proposition of justice which 
is ‘...both an aspiration and a standard for judgment’.282  
 
The proposition of justice is here regarded as one that is present in all unjust 
enrichment cases. It is another way of describing what Lord Wright, in the dicta 
above, described in terms that it is against conscience that a party should keep 
the benefit which is the concern of the action.  
 
Through the cases, these legal concepts, justice and against conscience are 
accorded a special legal meaning for the purposes of the law of unjust 
enrichment. The ‘principle of justice’ encapsulates or ‘canalises’ (Lord Wright) 
the legal meaning.  
 
(d) Looking to the cases: what the law holds to be unjust. 
 
In Province of the Law of Tort,283 Professor Winfield explained that the existence 
of an obligation [in tort] is a question of law which must be answered inductively 
by reference to the cases.284 The application of principles by ‘looking to the 
cases’, is reflected in unjust enrichment where, the inquiry is as to what the law 
holds to be unjust; otherwise, unjustness falls to idiosyncratic values. This is 
  
 
 
                                                                                                                                 
 
281 Goff and Jones, fn 163, 12, citing A. Burrows, (1993) 99 LQR 217, pp 232-239. 
282 Ibid , and see John P Dawson, Unjust Enrichment: A Comparative Analysis, 5. See also fn 406 and Ch 
12.1 below where it is noticed that Daniel Friedmann records that this notion of abstract proposition of 
justice was applied by German jurist Ernst von Caemmerer to unjust enrichment and tort alike. 
 
283 Sir P.H. Winfield, Province of the Law of Tort, 188.  
284 Ibid       
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comprehensible when it is remembered that we are concerned, in unjust 
enrichment, with a legal notion or standard of unjust,  (‘canalized’, in Lord 
Wright’s manner of explanation), not a communal standard. This reflects the 
methodology in tort of negligence where Lord Atkin’s neighbour principle is a 
legal standard (as distinct from a communal standard) applied as the facts 
dictate.285 It is a principle, that has long been well defined and it ‘…ought to apply 
unless there is some justification or valid explanation for its exclusion.’286 
 
The cases and commentators affirm that in unjust enrichment, the (English) 
general principle applies to circumstances where the subordinate elements of 
unjust enrichment apply, vis, (i) enrichment  (ii) at the expense of a plaintiff and, 
(iii) in circumstances which are legally unjust,287 not though, in an unprincipled 
manner.288 Just as in other branches of the law, ‘...recourse must be had to the 
decided cases in order to transmute general principles into concrete rules of 
law.’289 Here can be seen the working of the English general principle as both,  
(i) The unifying principle giving definition and form in the range of decided 
cases which define rules of application, and 
(ii) the reason of liability drawing up the subordinate principles and 
concepts. 
 
 
                                            
 
285 Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] AC 562.  Lord Atkin posed the question ‘Who, then in law is my 
neighbour?’ at p 580 See Chapter 7.3-4. 
286 Dorset Yacht Co v Home Office fn 268, at p 1027, per Lord Reid. See Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights 
Seriously, Ch 2, ‘The Model of Rules’, 36-7, discussed below in sub-ch 7.4 and 7.5.  See also Alastair 
Macadam and John Pyke, Judicial Reasoning and the Doctrine of Precedent in Australia, 258. 
287 See Goff & Jones, The Law of Restitution, 16; and see Lipkin Gorman v Karpnale Ltd. [1991] 2 AC 
548, 559, per Lord Templeman and 578, per Lord Goff;  Westdeutsche Landesbank Gironzentrale v 
Islington London Borough Council, [1996] 2 All E.R. 961, 980, per Lord Goff, and 998-9, per Lord 
Browne-Wilkinson; and see Peter Birks, Restitution: The Future, 1-4. 
288 Lipkin Gorman, [1991] 2 AC 548, 578, per Lord Goff. 
289 Ibid. 
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(e) The work of principles is related to the doctrine of precedent. 
 
What do principles do? They are the foundations of rules which, in the absence 
of principles, will lack the essential relationship and identity which enables us to 
say to which area of the law they belong. Such relationship determines the place 
of a rule in the law so that it will become an element of the fabric of precedent.290 
It will be found by reference to binding precedents going before. It may itself 
become a binding precedent (and therefore a rule) for new rules. Principles 
applying in different branches of the law co-opt a specific field of reasoning to 
the facts of a case that determines which precedents have application.291  
 
The principles may characterise mistake, as judicially defined in the cases, in 
such a way that it has the capacity to vitiate both a contract and an enrichment 
received at the expense of another. The judicial reasoning in each is specific to 
each branch of the law. There will be cognate ideas expressed, but in unjust 
enrichment cases, in the courts, in each case, the question arising from the 
grounds of actions is … 
Whether this is such a case where the law must, in justice, order 
the primary response of restitution (as distinct from a remedy).  
In modern law, the answers to this question will turn upon the nature of critical 
circumstances and the meaning of unjust enrichment in each jurisdiction.  
 
 
                                            
 
290 See also Chapters 10 and 13 for discussion of this issue. 
291 The relationship to precedent is discussed again in Chapter 11. The notion of ‘taxonomy in action’ 
captures the meaning of co-opting a specific field, though it is not a particularly attractive concept. It is 
in this connection that the Sinclair judgments conflict. It instructive to observe how key features of the 
judgments have been regarded by later commentators and in judgments, especially, Lord Wright in his 
extra-judicial article entitled ‘Sinclair v. Brougham’, in Legal Essays and Addresses 1, 16; Professor 
Birks in his Introduction to the Law of Restitution, Ch.2 ; and the judgments of the Lords in 
Westdeutsche [1996] 2 All E.R. 961 
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(f) General notions of Fairness do not characterise Anglo/Australian action.  
 
In Australian and English common law, the answers will not derive from 
generalised approaches to the law that have been described as ‘relativistic 
considerations’. These relativistic considerations are the foundations of 
judgments in some jurisdictions. They are the antithesis of those rules of unjust 
enrichment that make the decision according to law reasonable, predictable and 
justified.  
 
MacCormick calls the relativistic considerations ‘universalisation’.292 What he 
means by such a term is that where broad general principles are allowed, the 
rules are being rolled into a single universal action. It follows, where such a 
universal action is in being, that availability of relief depends upon a 
fundamentally negative construction of the action. It tends to avoid the duty on 
the plaintiff to establish its cause of action by appeal to principles of law and 
equity and it allows the plaintiff to rely instead upon the absence of defences.293  
In truth, the absence of a legal explanation for a transfer, which was the basis of 
unjustness in several North American jurisdictions, answers only one question, 
vis., was there a debt? Of course, if there were a debt, then in modern law, 
proceedings for recovery of the debt would be the proper action. 
 
 
                                            
 
292  Neil MacCormick, ‘Why Cases have Rationes and What These Are’., in Laurence Goldstein ed, 
Precedent in Law, 162. MacCormick’s distinction between universalisation and generalisation is an 
important one. The former refers to a broad ground which is satisfied by a general principle. It would 
be inaccurate to suppose that ‘generalisation’ also describes this legal concept. 
293 See Mitchell McInnes, ‘The Canadian Principle of Unjust Enrichment: Comparative Insights into the 
Law of Restitution’, (1999) Alta Law Review, v.  37 No. 1, 1, 10-11, observing that in Rathwell v 
Rathwell (1978) 83 DLR (3d) 289, Dickson J appeared to support this reasoning, making absence of 
juristic reason the key to recovery, whereas, in Pettkus v Becker [1980] 2 SCR 834, he had found that 
free acceptance must be established as the ground. This dictum would have indicated the need for 
individual grounds as distinct from a general basis of an action. 
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In those jurisdictions, the question arising is as to the duty of the law to provide a 
remedy. In these cases, there can be seen to be support for the more liberal, 
negative construction of the action, and this must be borne in mind when 
examining the cases. In these circumstances, in the schema of rules of 
taxonomy, the action seeks a secondary response to a primary obligation.294 
Such liberal actions are based upon the negative construct that indicates the 
event of an unjust enrichment by association with breach of some duty, perhaps 
arising under another head of law. Frequently, the reasoning will be found to 
involve concepts of fairness and broad ‘principles’ of unconscionability. The 
liberal negative construct lacks the functional organization of an independent 
principled action and the consequent organisational role played by precedent. It 
is in danger of exposing the decision making process to individual preferences 
and predilections. This is because the work of principles of law is avoided.  
 
(g) Anglo/Australian law. Categories of actions unified by a guiding principle of 
law. 
In Australian law, the absence of a general rule, or single, universalised, active 
principle, ties the development of the law to the recognition of new categories of 
case explained by unjustness factors united by the unifying concept of unjust 
enrichment.295  
 
The compass or scope of the circumstances constituting juristic reasons for 
imposing an obligation is exemplified by an assessment of what was intended by 
the High Court in David Securities Ltd v Commonwealth Bank of Australia Ltd296 
in its assertion of the need of a ‘vitiating factor’ to import a ground for an action 
                                            
 
294  Discussed in Ch. 8. 
295  David Securities Ltd v Commonwealth Bank of Australia fn 204, p 378. As to the term ‘universalised, 
see note on Neil MacCormick’s use of the term, fn 292. 
296  Ibid. 
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for restitution.297 This approach yields categories of actions for unjust enrichment 
which are unified by a principle of law which guides the courts when they 
consider extension of the categories to encompass a new kind of case. 
 
How restrictive are the categories? In fact they seem not essentially different to 
the grounds of actions recognised by the English courts.298 There is theoretical 
and functional commonality in the grounds of an action in Australian and English 
jurisdictions. Such a thesis is not an absolute quantity. Each jurisdiction is 
evolutionary; each, in that process, borrows from the other at significant points; 
and each is very much open to influence by important judgments in other 
jurisdictions. Developments in the law have been preceded, moreover, by quite 
exceptional juristic analysis, often occurring in, or precipitated by a profound 
dissenting judgment which leads to a readiness of the courts to recognise the 
timeliness of change. Opportunity has dictated that change would occur first in 
one jurisdiction and be followed later, in another, but the significant building of 
learned opinion has been a gradual process, propelled at times by individual 
judgements of great significance to all jurisdictions.299 
 
Australian and English courts recognise the need for discernment of grounds. 
The essentiality of a ground which satisfies the unifying concept or unifying 
principle is captured in the following dictum,  
 
". . . there is no general doctrine of unjust enrichment recognised in English 
law, [and what that law]. . . does is to provide specific remedies in particular 
                                            
 
297  Ibid.  ‘Juridical’, meaning ‘of jurisprudence.’ See fn 9. 
298 See United Australia Limited v Barclays Bank Limited [1941] AC 3, 29, per Lord Atkin. 
299 Eg, Fibrosa fn 173; Pavey fnn 1 and 203; Lipkin fn 217: Air Canada v British Columbia (1989) 59 
DLR (4th) 161, esp. 191 per Wilson J. 
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cases of what might be classified as unjust enrichment . . . [in another 
system].300 
 
By way of contrast Gummow J accepted in principle, counsel’s argument for a 
general normative principle of unjust enrichment in Winterton Constructions Pty 
Ltd v Hambros Australia Ltd301 an opinion that was rejected by Hill J on a re-
pleading of the applicant’s case where His Honour rejected an argument for 
subjective enrichment as the basis for an independent cause of action in unjust 
enrichment.302 
 
Extension of the law of unjust enrichment in a new case has to occur by way of 
assessment of what the contemplated new ground has in common with other 
grounds of actions. If it were not so, then it would be valid to ask whether the 
action properly lies in contract, delict or equity.  
 
Is compound interest a benefit had by a party which has held money belonging 
to the plaintiff?303 Such a subjective statement might not be accepted as a new 
ground. It may have to be stated in term of an existing ground or a derivative 
ground such as mistake of law. The key to the courts recognising any such new 
ground will be defined in terms of a common principle underlying all unjust 
enrichment cases. The principle would unify reasoning between the new case 
and established grounds. It would impose strict limitations as to the character of  
 
                                            
 
300 Orakpo v Manson Investments Ltd (1978) AC 97 at 104 per Lord Diplock. In contrast, an independent 
action is accepted in modern law in North America jusrisdictions: e.g. State Const. Corp. v  Scoggins 
229 Ore. 371, 485, P. (2d) 391 (1971), 393 and White v Central Trust Co. (1984) 7 DLR (4th) 236, 
246-7.  
301 (1991) 101 ALR 363, 374-76. 
302 Winterton Constructions Pty Ltd v Habmbros Ltd (1992) 39 FCR 97,117, citing Pavey and Matthews v 
Paul, fn 1 above, 256-7; David Securities fn 169 above, 378 per Mason CJ, Deane, Toohey, Gaudron 
and McHugh JJ, and 406 per Dawson J. 
303 Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v Council of the London Borough of Islington [1996] 2 All 
E.R. 961, 688 per Lord Goff. 
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benefit, the standing of the plaintiff, determined by diminution of personal wealth. 
Not all of these cases will conform: loss of profit is one thing; establishing that 
another has a benefit directly commensurate to the loss is quite another. Are 
these boundaries to be softened? The wider effect on the law as a whole, in 
terms of possible confusion, would be of very great concern. 
 
For a new case to emerge, the judgment of a court in the new case would need 
to reason that the manner of enrichment, if it were not within an existing ground, 
was such as in judicial reasoning, should be recognised as unjust. At this critical 
juncture, the court will be guided by the reasoning underlying judgments in 
Moses,304 in Fibrosa,305 in David Securities.306 It is here that notions of aequo et 
bono come into play, reasoning that prompted Lord Wright to rule that ‘...in any 
civilised system of law…, 307 and in David Securities Ltd v Commonwealth 
Bank,308  
…distinctions as to the manner of acquiring an enrichment are …no basis 
for the unjust enrichment rule, except in so far as the manner of gaining 
the enrichment bears upon the justice of the case.309  
 
Lord Wright brought the unjust enrichment actions into neo modern perspective, 
bridging the development from Lord Mansfield to the beginnings of modern 
unjust enrichment jurisprudence. He articulated the nexus between the older 
jurisprudence and the new in Brookes Wharf v Goodman Brothers310 and in  
                                            
 
304 (1760) 2 Burr, 1005, 1007. 
305 [1943] AC 32, 61.  
306 (1992) 175 CLR 353. 
306 Id, 375. 
307 Fibrosa Spolka Akcynja v Fairbairn Lawson Combe Barber, fn 177. 
308 (1992) 175 CLR 353. p 373. 
309 Id ,376 
310 [1937] 1 KB 534. 
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Fibrosa Spolka Akcyjna v Fairbairn Lawson Coombe Barbour Ltd.311 In the first 
of these cases, his judgment accentuates the bridging between old and new by 
beginning with the observation that this is a case on the principle of money paid, 
… as in ‘Leake on Contracts’, where a party is compelled by law to pay a 
sum which another who was primarily liable to pay, obtains the benefit by 
discharge of its liability: under the circumstances, the defendant is held 
indebted to the plaintiff in the amount.312 
 
How then, does this notion of aequo et bono constitute a principle? I will answer 
that question by adopting, from the next sub-chapter, a concise statement of the 
nature of the unjust enrichment principle: this is more fully explained as I 
proceed. I describe the principle in these terms.  
  
A failure to perform a primary obligation, (of which unjust enrichment is an 
archetypal example) is an issue of justice because the courts have determined 
that this is such a case where the demand for performance is insistent and the 
communal demand in such a case is recognised by the courts and becomes an 
aspect of a widely applied judicial standard, which is the principle of unjust 
enrichment.313  
 
Importantly, it is the judicial standard that is the principle. It rests upon judicial 
interpretation of an insistent communal standard, not contemporary communal 
perceptions of justice. A dictum of Kirby J in a tort context, applies here with 
equal force: ‘…as a matter of legal authority, [such a finding] does not grow out  
                                            
 
311 Fn 276. 
312 [1937] 1 KB 534, 544. 
313 My summation here recognises the critical issue underlying the nature of ‘unjust’ that is explained in 
7.5 below.  See Mason and Carter Restitution Law in Australia, [222]-[223] and [1514]. 
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of past decisions in harmony with the methodology of the common law.’314The 
dictum is of first importance. A superior court may have the jurisdiction to find a 
new instance of unjustness, but is obligated by judicial responsibilities, to 
conform to the methodology of the law and have regard to its inter-dependence. 
Decisions must ‘grow out of’ past decisions. Taxonomy is not a rule but it is a 
path through the thicket.  
 
In contrast to the principle of unjust enrichment, a breach of contract or tort is 
not a breach of a primary right, it is a wrong to be redressed between the 
parties. In cases of breach of such a common law right, no judgment as to the 
justice of the case is pertinent; indeed, in some breaches of contract, communal 
standards might favour the defendant, and many torts might be wholly 
unintended, but that is irrelevant.  
 
The jurisprudential reasoning of rules is the foundation of principle and thus 
insistent communal standards of wide acceptance are recognised by the courts 
and thereby contribute to reasoning underlying principles and rules of law.315 In 
the next sub-chapter, I will address these points from a standpoint of legal 
theory and show that they are supported by significant authority. 
 
In Chapters 10 and 11, I will endeavour to expose a coherent relationship in the 
way that principles provide the reason and the order of rules. This is true of each 
branch of the modern law, and this much will be demonstrated by a comparison 
with tort in chapter 12. This will make possible a conclusion that principles, 
singularly or in concert, are the building blocks of rules, and draw their  
                                            
 
314 Perre v Appand  (1999) 198 CLR 180, 274-75; the courts would be responding to a community sense 
of obligation. 
315 This is not always obvious, or even, not often obvious in the judgments. This is because rules relate 
back to previously laid down rules in consequence of stare decisis. See p 146-47 below, where I 
explain an old judicial finding that some obligations in community are imperative. 
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taxonomical significance and their symmetry from legal concepts. Because 
principles describe the foundation of rules, it follows that fundamental 
differences in the principles recognised by the courts in several jurisdictions, 
underlie the different legal outcomes. It is important therefore, to recognise that 
the approach to principles is a fundamental concern for students of the law who 
would compare unjust enrichment cases across several jurisdictions.  
 
For the present, I conclude this part with an observation about principles which 
has application to other areas of the law of obligations also. 
Principles are the expression of legal reason and as such, the foundation 
of rules. They are grown upon the legal concepts such as ‘unjust 
enrichment’, ‘contract’ and ‘tort’, from which they take their purpose.  
 
It will be one of the tasks of succeeding sections and chapters to support and 
refine this statement about principle.316 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
 
316 Principles are discussed again in relation to precedent and the authority of cases in Ch 11, especially 
pp 190-92. 
 John B Donnelly. 95312086 
129
 
 
7.3. The Jurisprudential Characteristics of the Unjust Enrichment 
Principle. 
 
7.3.1. Principles and Taxonomy of the Law. 
 
It is essential to understand why unjust enrichment is not a principle capable of 
being understood in terms of communal perceptions of justice. To explain this, it 
is necessary to reiterate, summarily, some observations made above about 
taxonomy. It will then become plain that taxonomy reflects the relationship 
between this area of the law and other heads of the law in contract and tort. I am 
following the Hart and Birks lead in analysing rights duties and obligations in 
terms of primary and secondary obligations, rights and duties:317 it is the only 
approach that satisfactorily explains the character of obligation and the 
difference between actions that result from a breach of a right and actions that 
are dependent upon those limited circumstances where the law will impose an 
obligation.  
 
The points to be recalled are these: 
 
• Every wrong pre-supposes a prior right which is a primary right, including 
contractual rights and rights that the law of tort protects. Rights, to  
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
 
317 See Sub-ch’s 9.2 and 10.2 where the dichotomy of ‘primary’ and ‘secondary’ obligations, rights and 
duties is further explained. 
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• damages for example, for breach (of those primary rights) redress  
 wrongs (the breach) and are secondary rights.318 
•  Where there is a primary obligation that is satisfied by restitution of 
property, the obligation or duty to make restitution is itself primary. This  
 is because there is no breach of any right and therefore no wrong.319 
 
In both Birks’ and Hart’s works is found the notion that performance of an 
obligation is an issue of justice. It follows that imposing a legal obligation 
becomes an aspect of a judicial standard; it is an issue of justice.320 The 
reasoning is further explained below.321 
 
These points can be explained together, in this way.  
• The rule imposing an obligation to make restitution is an example of a 
primary ‘obligation creating’ rule where the demand for conformity, 
represented by the judicial standard established in the cases, is insistent. 
Such rules are supported by secondary rules that empower individuals 
(judges) to make authoritative, binding determinations (orders imposing 
 
                                            
 
318 Specific performance is available only where the common law remedy is inadequate, which will 
include some circumstances where there was no breach: ‘Equity in the Modern Law’, (1996) 26 
WALR, 1, 11. Similarly, there is no right to restitution until the obligation is imposed; failure to pay is 
a separate issue. 
319 The significance of absence of breach is explained at pp 129 and 133-34, and discussed at several 
points above; see fn 266. The distinction between primary and secondary obligations/rights is of long 
standing. Birks’ notes attribute it to Pothier. It has acceptance by commendable sources in the common 
law systems also; see Peter Birks, ‘Equity in the Modern Law: An Exercise in Taxonomy’, (1996) 26 
WALR 1; the article is mentioned at fn 177 above in the context of the relationship to taxonomy; see 
also Peter Birks ‘The Concept of a Civil Wrong’ in D.G. Owen (ed) Philosophical Foundations of the 
Tort Law, 31-55. 
320 See 7.6 below. There are subtle and not so subtle differences in social policy in many societies. It must 
not be assumed lightly that standards of justice are the same in all societies. See Joseph Schumpeter, 
Capitalism, Socialism and Communism, esp. Ch 5. 
321 Sub-ch’s 7.4-7.6 below. 
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obligations).322 The secondary rule is the empowerment, not the imposing 
of the obligation. 
  
• The grounds of actions in unjust enrichment are these issues of justice: 
failure to pay back money paid for a contract that never proceeded, or 
never came into existence, or paid mistakenly, or induced by duress, are 
examples of issues of justice invoking a widely applied judicial standard 
(i.e., the demand for conformity is insistent).  
 
This latter point explains and is consistent with the absence of breach. The 
breach of contract or a tortious breach is not, per se, unjust; but it is a wrong. If a 
judicial standard underlies the redress granted the party wronged, it is hardly 
insistent: it is a matter between the parties. No judgment as to the justice of the 
case is pertinent. 
 
The explanation offered here is also consistent with historical antecedents, 
especially the ancient actions of account and debt which sought not to punish, 
but to rectify.323 Recalling what was said above about Lord Mansfield’s 
perceptions of ‘equitable actions’, the pieces of the jigsaw puzzle begin to fall 
into place. Unjust enrichment actions are distinct from those actions that redress 
wrongs. Unjust enrichment actions involve justice of the case because they are 
based upon a finding of obligation. The taxonomy issue implicit in Hart’s work324 
and developed as an aspect of reasoning in Birks’ essay, assists in  
 
                                            
 
322 H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, 86-99 and 167. There is also a rule of recognition which has an 
independent existence in Hart’s schema, i.e. that which constitutes tribunals and their jurisdiction.  
323 It is of interest that the same applies to equity jurisprudence where specific performance of a 
contractual obligation follows the same form, perhaps because of a long forgotten conceptual 
relationship. Specific performance focuses upon the unfairness of a particular person’s conduct, and 
therefore rectifies that unfairness by ordering performance: Patrick Parkinson ed., The Principles of 
Equity 580, citing Carnell v McLennan (1880) 1 LR Eq (NSW). 
324 H.L.A. Hart, ‘Definition and Theory in Jurisprudence’ (1954) 70 LQR 37, esp. 46-47. See also, Peter 
Birks, ‘Equity in the Modern Law’, (1996) 26 WALR 1,16. 
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differentiating the actions, but it also assists in explaining the juristic reasoning 
underlying the identification of unjust enrichment actions. This will be addressed 
more fully in the next sub-chapter. 
 
By way of conclusion, what can be distilled from this treatment is that principles 
and rules that create obligations in the law address a different field to that 
addressed by principles and rules that describe wrongs. Fibrosa Spolka Arcyjna 
v Fairbairn Lawson Combe Barbour Ltd325 provides an illustration. The 
circumstances were unusual; war prevented the fulfilment of a contract for 
purchase of inventory for which money had been paid. Was it unjust for 
defendant to retain the money? The question would not be an easy one to 
answer by applying popular perceptions of justice; the defendant may have 
suffered severe losses, but that was irrelevant. Whether the defendant had 
committed a wrong, also was not at issue. There was no obligation to repay the 
money until the court recognised the circumstances as constituting a ground of 
unjust enrichment. This is because the property in the money has passed to the 
defendant and there is no aspect of the relationship between the parties that will 
change that fact; no redress existed unless there was an order by a competent 
court to make restitution.  
 
The order for restitution is made because of a finding that the circumstances 
constituted a ground, an instance of those issues of justice, giving rise to an 
order creating a primary obligation. But there is nothing, in the absence of such 
a finding that will upset the defendant’s title, because the benefit was obtained 
legally. It was not a gift, but it was nevertheless legally obtained. The facts of 
                                            
 
325 fn 177, at p 61. 
 John B Donnelly. 95312086 
133
Fibrosa, above, of Exall v Partridge, 326and of David Securities Pty Ltd v 
Commonwealth Bank of Australia,327are examples. 
 
The grounds of actions will be examined in the following sections of this chapter, 
but the cases cited and the examples here given, illustrate the method of the 
underlying jurisprudence. Principles and rules that describe primary obligations 
are distinct from principles and rules that describe wrongs. Taxonomy is much 
more than a rule of convenience. Without this clear division of heads of law, 
principles would become weakened and the uniform interpretation and 
application of rules would be jeopardised.  
 
7.3.2. Principles and Actions: How Principles Describe Actions. 
 
Professor Hart suggests that in finding a unifying rule which assists in answering 
which types of rules make up a legal system, a given rule may unify different 
types of rules.328 Unjust enrichment does not conform to this pattern: the work of 
defining is achieved by resort to accumulated precedent.  No single rule 
describes the variety of actions.  Unjust enrichment is not alone in this: some 
other important heads of law cannot adequately be described only by rules.   
 
 
 
                                            
 
326 (1799) 8 Term Rep 308; 101 ER 1405. This case is discussed again below, where it is shown that the 
judgment of Lawrence J was an important conceptual bridge between the era of the common counts 
and modern law, which went un-noticed for two centuries: see fnn 337 and 632 and accompanying text 
327 (1992) 175 CLR 353. In this case, mistake of law was recognised as a ground in Australian law, for the 
first time. In an important obiter dictum, the High Court recognised the jurisdiction of the court 
includes the power to find that the prima facie right to restitution fails because of other circumstances, 
which mean the defendant no longer has the money (benefit): at 385 ff; and see Australia and New 
Zealand Banking Group Ltd v Westpac Banking Corporation (1988) 164 CLR 662, 673, and Lipkin 
Gorman v Karpnale Ltd [1991] 2AC 584, 579. See p 215-16 below, noting a related finding in Exall, 
fnn 178, some two centuries earlier. 
328 Concept of Law, ch. III.  The issues here are reminiscent of Hart’s treatment of the pitfalls of defining 
law itself.  See also Mason and Carter fn 313, [1514]; in circumstances, plaintiff may have an election. 
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There is a way of classifying rules and groups of rules that affect persons 
individually that distinguishes between 
1. those varied rules that assure us of rights, that crime and tort respond 
to; and, 
2. those inter-connected rules, of which contract, property, testamentary 
rules, including the making of wills, are the most obvious examples. 
 
Hart discusses the former in terms of those rules like crimes and delicts that are 
susceptible of a breach.  He discusses rules like contract, that are of the second 
class, in the manner of being rules that provide a social facility which 
participants may engage in at their election.  The former are sanctions; the latter 
are facilitating and empowering rules in the sense of conferring capacity to self-
regulate and participate.329  The distinction is incomplete however: this is 
because it becomes progressively more difficult to sustain that these categories, 
and types within categories, are exclusively and adequately described as ‘rules’. 
 
What is the conceptual difference between these two classes of rules identified 
here. I suggest, that the question can only be answered adequately by appeal to 
principles.  
 
There is no clear over-arching rule or set of rules to which all torts are 
subordinate: rather there is a notion of the purpose served by the rules of tort 
which might succinctly be described as ‘redress of civil wrongs’. It would not be 
difficult to find expressions of that notion in the cases, as principles.  Contract is 
different because what it unifies is the rules of contract; here is a set of well 
defined rules collectively called contract that defines exclusively what a contract 
is, or more correctly, what is a contract. The rules of contract have no other life: 
they are conceptually, the rules of a system.  Tort, on the other hand is defined 
                                            
 
329  Id. pp 27-28, and see Chapter 9 and fn 319 as to primary and secondary rules.  
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in terms of concepts, principles and rules, which are nevertheless precise, but 
frequently require some evaluative process.330 There may be an over-arching 
principle served by all rules that describe tort: ‘…you must not injure your 
neighbour…’331 might approximate such an over-arching principle. 
 
It is the distinction that is drawn here, between categories defined by concept 
and principle, and the categories, like contract defined mainly by rules, that is at 
the root of the difficulty of defining a unifying factor in unjust enrichment: a factor 
that explains all cases.  In chapter 10, it will be shown that it is informative to 
analyse unjust enrichment and tort as categories of rules thay inform broad 
general ‘abstractions’.  This is demonstrably valid.  Rules of various kinds may 
be supported by common reasoning; this, however, is where principle comes 
into the equation.  The principle is that which justifies rules in unjust enrichment 
cases where the circumstances are an instance of an unjust enrichment 
recognised by a rule of law. 
 
Hart also suggests that several instances of a rule may be different instances of 
related rules that are ‘… linked by different relationships to a central element’.332 
I suggest that these observations have a clear relevance for unjust enrichment. 
Several instances of rules that co-opt different circumstances as grounds of 
unjust enrichment, may be instances of an obligation imposing rule where unjust 
                                            
 
330 The ability of a superior court to find a new tort exists in the concepts and principles, albeit rarely 
exercised. The notion of ‘over-arching principle’ is again discussed in Chapter 11. 
331 Donoghue v Stevenson fn 275, p 580, per Lord Atkin. It may not be valid to draw analogies too closely 
between tort and unjust enrichment. It is not the intention in this work to analyse tort jurisprudence. 
332 Concpt of Law 15-16. Hart treats subordinate elements of a rule as rules in their own right, which 
accords with other jurists, but he also treats the formative ideas that most would call principles, as 
rules: Concept of Law 9-17. Hart’s foremost concern is with such areas as crime and contract where 
rules, even minor rules like the answer to ‘what is theft?’ are comparatively crisp and clear-cut. It  is 
easier to demonstrate his theses in such an environment. His notions are equally applicable to the 
strongly concept oriented groups of rules such as unjust enrichment where, however, a much more 
convincing argument for principles can be made. Hart’s analyses are nevertheless elucidating, whether 
or not one adopts his definitions universally. 
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enrichment, as an independent head of the law is a ‘single complex activity’.333 I 
suggest that  Hart’s notion of complex activity as indicative of a working system 
of rules is another way of describing the broad general abstraction. Conceptually 
unjust enrichment is a complex of rules, explained by common reasoning 
processes, that serve an identifiable principle. This is why Deane J described it 
as a unifying legal concept.334 
 
The English unifying general principle does the same work as the concept 
described by Deane J. Just like Lord Atkin’s broad proposition of reasoning in 
tort, I must not injure my neighbour335 so too, there is in unjust enrichment a 
broad generalisation which is capable of being understood as an overarching 
principle that helps to define the obligation imposed by law. The rule that derives 
from an overarching principle is coupled with and inseparable from each rule in 
cases where unjust enrichment is found.  
 
Acknowledging an over-arching principle does not change our perception of the 
case by case development of the law, conforming to its early jurisprudence. This 
is apparent in old cases as is shown where a plaintiff was obliged to pay to get 
its property in Astley v Reynolds,336 and Exall v Partridge.337  Justice Lawrence’s 
finding in the latter case that the prima facie right to restitution failed because of 
circumstances which meant the defendant no longer has the money (benefit), 
                                            
 
333 It is the dissimilarity of the issues dealt with by the rules that distracts us from this otherwise obvious 
conclusion. 
334 (1985) 160 CLR 583, 619. 
335  Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] AC 532, 580, per Lord Atkin. 
336  (1731) 2 Strange, 95; 93 ER 939. This was an action for money had and received in the King's Bench. 
The plaintiff had paid excessive interest on a loan given on the pawning of a plate and claimed back a 
part of the interest which he had been forced to pay in order to recover his property. The court held that 
in actions founded upon mistake or deceit, the action (indebitatus) would lie, and so too for this 
circumstance where the plaintiff paid by duress ‘...relying on his legal remedy to get it back again.’ 
337 (1799) 8 Term Rep 308; 101 ER 1405 at 311 (Term Rep.). ‘…[t]he justice of the case…’ demanded 
that all three parties to a debt had a joint obligation to pay the amount of the debt of which they had 
been relieved by forfeiture of the property of one. 
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and in describing the obligation in terms of ‘justice of the case’, suggests 
contemporary consciousness of the reasoning underlying the common counts 
but seldom articulated. Clearly, it prefigures modern English law where the 
cases also illustrate the case by case development of a category of  rules that 
are explained by the principle of unjust enrichment that I have called an 
overarching principle.338 
  
In the next chapter, I will endeavour to expose a coherent relationship in the way 
that principles provide the reason and the order of rules. This will make possible 
a conclusion that principles, singularly or in concert, are the substance of rules, 
and draw their taxonomical significance and their symmetry from concepts. 
 
7.4. The Cases, and the Primary Obligation Creating Factor. 
 
Each of the circumstances underlying individual actions, including money had 
and received, free acceptance, duress, total failure of consideration, mistake, 
and one or two others, which constitute grounds of unjust enrichment, has been 
the centre-piece of a new rule of law. By its nature, the rule of law of unjust 
enrichment defers to other rules of common law. That might seem to have been 
an issue of convenience, but it is much more than that; it is the consequence of 
the distinction between primary and secondary obligations and duties.  
 
If Mrs. Pavey held the fruits of a wrong by reason of having not paid for work 
performed under a valid contract, the contract would describe the wrong done to 
the builder. This is because in that circumstance, the money could not be 
characterised as a benefit that plaintiff was entitled to have. It is simply a debt  
 
                                            
 
338 Lipkin Gorman, fn 327 above, is a modern example and the reasoning of rules in that case reflects 
reasoning in Astley and Exall, fnn 145 and 178. 
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owing under the contract. It might be several things including wages owed to an 
employee. But in this hypothetical situation, the work is not a benefit retained at 
the expense of the builder: money owed in consequence of contract could not 
be so described. In that assumed situation, the question of an instance of unjust 
does not arise. The distinction between primary obligations and secondary 
duties is fundamental to this reasoning. 
 
What then is the source of ‘unjustness’ in unjust enrichment?  The simple 
answer is that none is necessary other than the finding of a superior court 
characterising the particular circumstances of an action: precedent is the origin 
of the unjustness. Such an answer is mechanical, however, because it fails to 
recognise the judicial process of reasoning from case to case in establishing the 
precedent.339 It is not suggested that this is readily apparent in judgments, rather 
that it is the underlying reasoning which is significant when the judgments 
address the nature of the case. In this process of reasoning from case to case, 
the superior court resembles the Roman praetor who had a sole discretion to 
allow a new action where the officer found by deliberation on the circumstances 
of the case, and on the praetorian edict listing all available actions, that there 
was an instance of unjustness of the kind outlined here.340 It also resembles the 
juristic method underlying the reasons for the courts granting the medieval 
action on the case. This too has been outlined above.341 
 
It is instructive to return briefly, to Lord Wright’s judgments to observe the 
emergence of reasoning that yields juristic notions of principles in unjust 
enrichment. In his judgment in Brookes Wharf, Lord Wright dispenses with the  
                                            
 
339 Below, pp 123-24, where judicial method is described in the dicta of Lord Wright and Justice Deane, 
and the explanation of the development of principle at pp 124-25. See also the dictum of Kirby J at fn 
314. 
340 See fn 20 and accompanying text. 
341 Above, pp 17, 26-33 and 45. 
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purely formalistic342 approach to reasoning and explains liability in terms of a 
general standard of justness,343 That a standard of comparable significance to 
the reasonable person concept in Donoghue v Stevenson  was contemplated, 
became especially plain in the second of the two cases, Fibrosa Spolka Akcyjna 
v Fairbairn Lawson Coombe Barbour Ltd.344 There, he proceeded to characterise 
the actions in unjust enrichment in the following way: 
 
…[t]he standard of what is against conscience in this context has become 
more or less canalised or defined, but in substance, the concept remains 
as Lord Mansfield left it. …[t]he gist of the action is a debt or obligation 
imposed by law, in much the same way as the law enforces as a debt the 
obligation to pay a statutory or customary impost.345 
 
Lord Wright, in this judgment, turned toward a ‘canalised’ standard of what is 
against conscience, as the standard applicable in unjust enrichment actions, a 
break from the standard which he seemed to suggest in Brookes Wharf, 
founded upon the notion of ‘reasonable man’.346 Nevertheless, the legal concept 
of what is against conscience is a tool of like, or comparable purpose, and the 
reasoning is otherwise unchanged as he describes a general standard of 
                                            
 
342 As in ‘forms of actions’. 
343 That is, that the parties as reasonable persons, ought have decided on a course which is in conformity 
with an accepted standard of justness. If we recall that the notion of a reasonable man had already 
found a place in the common law, as found in Donoghue v Stephenson (fn 275), in a variety of cases 
where it became the touchstone of standards of acceptable personal and professional behaviour, then 
the dictum is recognised for it’s suggestion of such a standard in this area of law. In fact, the notion of 
reasonable person was not persisted with in later judgments in unjust enrichment, but it remains as a 
comparative tool and helps to explain that the courts in later judgments, were developing a standard of 
comparable significance. 
344 Fibrosa, fn 177 
345 Id, at p 63. (the italics are mine).  Fibrosa is rightly thought of as the true foundation of modern unjust 
enrichment.  It marks the end of one era and the beginning of the next.  See Chapter 13.  
346 [1937] 1 KB 534, p 544. 
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unjustness, that is of  ‘… what the court decides is just and reasonable having 
regard to the relationship of the parties.’347 
 
That is an unsatisfactory explanation of legal principle if taken alone. The matter 
of lasting significance, however, is that Lord Wright, in Fibrosa, set the standard 
which was to have a profound influence in English and Australian law and in 
several other jurisdictions. He defined the central issue, and in his ‘Any civilised 
system of law …’ dictum, set a standard which becomes a challenge which all 
jurisdictions were bound to take up. The dictum clearly states the central notion 
of obligation imposed by law, an approach to reasoning that is distinct from 
obligation or duty founded in a relationship agreed by the parties, as in contract. 
 
Justice Deane, in Muschinsky v Dodds,348 drew a parallel between Lord 
Mansfield’s dictum which has been noticed in the previous chapter, and the 
‘...general equitable notions...’ underlying the action for money had and 
received,349 indicating the common law concern for justice of the case. His 
choice of words ‘…concern of the common law for justice of the case…’350 is a 
manner of expressing what the underlying principle is. It has been seen that 
Lord Mansfield used a legal concept of profound genre. It is simply that; like the 
praetor’s exercise of limited discretion, it is the common law’s concern for the 
justice of the case in each instance of a ground recognised by the law. Professor 
Dworkin’s work on principles in the law, which is studied in Chapters 9 and 10, 
will reinforce this perception. 
 
 
                                            
 
347  Ibid. This, like the action on the case and the praetorian discretion, is limited by the scope and purpose 
of the action. Professor Dworkin describes the discretion well:  like the ‘hole in the doughnut’, an area 
of discretion surrounded by a band of restriction: Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, 31-33. 
348 (1985) 160 CLR 583. 
349 (1985) 160 CLR 583, 619. 
350 Ibid. I have introduced the italics. 
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Another principle of general application (though not commonly referred to as a 
general principle) is the principle or doctrine of precedent. This principle (for it is 
a principle, drawing upon the doctrine, as it is applied in individual decisions) is 
the rationale and unifying source in all heads of the common law. Precedent, 
properly characterised as both accumulative and inductive, is an essential tool of 
the law in augmenting the uniformity of actions. It is the method of the law in 
reasoning from one to another set of circumstances in a fashion that establishes 
the relationship of a new case to existing grounds of actions. It will be seen that 
breaking the chain of reasoning, because it is not universally well understood, 
can lead to profound confusion of reasoning that can offer little hope that the law 
will be predictable and certain.351 
 
The development of unjust enrichment depends upon accumulated precedent 
that, by inductive reasoning, provides the basis for justifying extension of actions 
to new circumstances. An unjust enrichment principle or concept of law 
(depending upon one’s starting point) underlies and explains these precedents. 
They unite them in a fashion such as to provide the connective logic, the 
syllogisms, which help the reasoning from one case to another. They are the 
basis of finding of existing primary obligations, and occasionally, new primary 
obligations which rely on legal reasoning, not a wrong or a breach. 
 
The statements in the last paragraph, as simple as they seem, pose something 
fundamental about unjust enrichment actions. Primary obligations in the law of 
obligations are relatively rare because the jurisprudence and methodology of 
contract and delict assume certain rights which underlie actions when another 
party has acted to deny or impede those rights, by way of a breach. Primary 
 
                                            
 
351 In Ch. 12, a comparison is made between unjust enrichment methodology and modern developments in 
the Australian courts in negligence cases. The underlying concepts in the law can prove crucial to 
common understanding of principles and therefore, to predictability of rules. 
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obligations do not arise as a response to a breach of a right. Where the primary 
obligation does arise because of the character of a benefit, there has to be a 
tightly reasoned set of criteria acknowledged by a superior court as an instance 
of a primary obligation creating factor. There is a limited number of 
circumstances where what is had by A from B can be characterised as a benefit. 
It is not characterised by a debt. It is not voluntarily given by B. There is no legal 
process at work, nor reasoning established which gives the possessor, A, a 
claim valid against all the world such as a contract or a game of chance. It is 
indeed, a narrow field of benefits that are capable of being subject to the primary 
obligation. But there are even greater limitations. Plaintiff “B” is qualified to claim 
the product of the primary obligation only if B can establish that A has the benefit 
at B’s expense. The rules characterising benefit and ‘at the expense of B’ are 
stringent and further limit the category of possible unjust enrichments. What is 
left is a very small number of sets of qualifying circumstances. It is then up to the 
law, by its processes of inductive and deductive reasoning to say which 
circumstances, amongst the very limited sets of circumstances that satisfy the 
criteria I have outlined, is unjust in law: that is, unjust according to legal 
reasoning as distinct from unfair by communal standards.  
 
The law must rely on precedent. Where there is none, it must rely on secondary 
authority, such as a decision of a court in another jurisdiction, extant or long 
dead. It is not surprising then that the long history of the notion which Lord 
Mansfield called aequo et bono, out of justice and expediency,352 was found to 
be a characterising concept, by which I mean, a concept which explains the 
character of particular principles and rules. Such a concept is inevitably an 
active force in the law rather than just a latent idea. Because of its ‘activity’ in 
characterising particular principles and rules, it is valid to regard it (this unjust 
                                            
 
352 Above, fn 20. See also fn 270 where the interpretation of aequo et bono in terms of ‘justice’ and 
‘expediency’ is questioned. 
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enrichment legal tool), as being itself a principle of law. It is very much a matter 
of looking at it from cause to effect in saying whether it is a concept or a 
principle. Whichever it is, it provides the precedent, the reasoning, the logic of 
finding a set of circumstances which the law will say is an instance of the 
‘unjust’, the inequitable, in the sense in which Lord Mansfield used the notion of 
‘equity’ in his famous dictum.353 That, in turn, was a finding strongly influenced by 
the notion of ‘the equitable’ in Roman law, which has been noticed above.354  
 
The law chooses which sets of circumstances are unjust by legal definition. The 
‘unjust’ may refer to the manner of the enrichment, but it is not the ‘manner’ 
which is at issue; nor is it the character of the party who has it; nor that party’s 
actions. The circumstances of the case are found to be united by a ‘… legal 
concept that explains why the law recognises, in a variety of distinct categories 
of case, an obligation on the part of a defendant to make fair and just restitution 
for a benefit derived at the expense of a plaintiff …’.355 The passage identifies 
what the law does in a case. The immediately following passage explains the 
legal reasoning in such a decision: ‘…determination, by the ordinary processes 
of legal reasoning, of the question, whether the law should in justice, recognise 
such an obligation in a new or developing category of case.’356 The passages 
warrant close attention: it is submitted that each word is significant. The focus is 
enrichment that is not gratuitous, and has neither contractual nor philanthropic 
basis. It might be expected that new grounds will be exceptionally rare, and the 
law clearly intends that it should be so. 
 
                                            
 
353 Moses v Macferlane, fn 42, at p 1007; see also Ch. 13 where the ancient notion of the equitable is 
examined. 
354 Above p 74. See below Chapter 13: the ‘scholarly transfer of wisdom’ is the legacy for the common 
law, rather than direct transfer of doctrine and rules. 
355 Pavey and Matthews Pty Ltd v Paul, fn 1, p 257 per Deane J. 
356 Ibid. In an established action, a rule will be applied in accordance with precedent which may be 
acknowledged as based upon a key principle. Reasoning of unjust enrichment from principles will be 
the course for new actions. 
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Reasoning from the notion of ‘the unjust’, has few parallels in the law. It is like 
the adjective when we speak of the royal prerogative, crown jewels, or 
parliamentary procedure; almost primitive conceptually because it refers to a 
single simple and closely limited category. It categorises, or more correctly, it 
creates a branch of taxonomy by applying a very specific ‘name’ that identifies a 
concept of specific meaning. It speaks very specifically about that item to which 
it attaches. That is a consequence of its history and its isolation in the scheme of 
developing concepts and principles of law. The reasoning of the ancient action 
on the case was similar. 
 
Is the concept/principle akin to equity? The answer must be “no!” despite 
superficial resemblances of principles. Equity acts in personam, characterising 
the quality of a person’s acts. It does however, create obligations and in this 
respect, the method of unjust enrichment is akin to the methods of equity.357 The 
‘unjust’ in unjust enrichment is the reason of a chose, giving a right to judgment 
of a court to the person at whose expense another person has become the 
holder of a benefit. It does not, moreover, create an equity as has been argued 
by counsel in a foundational case.358 Lord Goff’s reasoning in Westdeutsche  
Landesbank Girozentrale v Council of the London Borough of Islington359 comes 
to mind. There he reasoned, in a minority judgment as to the issue of interest, 
that the common law might adopt an equity rule that a party might incur a liability 
for compound interest arising from holding money of another. But the change of 
focus from equity to unjust enrichment also involves the change of focus from 
conduct to object.  
 
                                            
 
357 It would be fruitless to pursue the point however, because in doing so we will be contemplating 
jurisprudence in the early centuries of the last millennium. 
358 Sinclair v Brougham 1914 AC 398, 454-5. Lord Sumner dismissed the argument for a personal claim 
in equity as a mere confusion as to what Lord Mansfield’s findings in Moses v Macferlan (1760) 2 
Burr 1005; 97 ER 676, concerned; it was never so intended by Lord Mansfield. 
359 [1996] AC 699. 
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Lord Goff must have been conscious of this dichotomy between liability for 
conduct of a defendant and liability that attaches to the character of a benefit: 
there is a sense that the proceeds of inequity and the focus of the rules of unjust 
enrichment must have something in common. The difference is fundamental, 
however. Liability for compound interest in equity would arise because the  
defendant is alleged to have property or the proceeds of property in which 
plaintiff has an equity or an equitable interest. This is not so in unjust enrichment 
particularly because it is not supposed that the plaintiff has more than a chose 
before judgment.  
 
The issue observed above is close to the borderline of two very different fields of 
jurisprudence. It is easy to say that the interest which plaintiff might have had 
but for the unjustness, becomes inseparable conceptually from the loss of 
advantage in being denied a benefit that is quantifiable only in terms of 
damages. Again the conundrum of altering the taxonomic boundaries arises so 
that we would soon be asking what rules of law properly apply to the issues. 
 
I conclude this part of the work with these observations.  
1. The Australian unifying legal concept or English unifying general principle 
of unjust enrichment (which I have described as achieving a like purpose) 
imports a special meaning for the actions which it supports.  
 
2. It is very different from principles which explain other actions in the law of 
obligations and from doctrines of equity because the principle of unjust 
enrichment attaches to an inanimate thing, a sum of money or money’s 
worth, and imposes an obligation upon the party acquiring or possessing 
that sum or potential sum (in the sense of realisable property) at the 
expense of the plaintiff.  
 
3. It is the concept (or principle) which vests in another (a plaintiff) a chose 
in action without a breach.  
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4. It does not create an equity nor invoke equitable remedies.  
 
5. It is responsive to unjustness defined by precedent that establishes 
obligation, in absence of a breach, rectifying respective rights rather than 
remedying a wrong.  
 
6. It is like the ancient writ of right or debt, vesting in a plaintiff a chose, a 
right to the judgment of a court, to impose upon another, the holder of the 
particular benefit, an obligation to make restitution. 
   
May not modern courts modernise the character of the action? An answer to this 
question must be tempered by these two considerations.  
1. It must be asked, where stands the demarcation, the separation of 
powers between the courts and the legislature if courts may make 
such fundamental change as overturning centuries of development 
of the law and its jurisprudence?  
2. If a court changes the boundaries in the course of a judgment, it 
has neither jurisdiction, nor even opportunity in that case nor 
perhaps in the next decade, to explain and adjust the 
consequences for other branches of the law. The prospect of 
confusion becomes patent360  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
 
360 A related issue is discussed above, at p 59-60; ‘…, it is important to observe that the basis of any such 
development of new cases has to be found in legal reasoning; otherwise it is purely a whim. Such legal 
reasoning is to be found in legal concepts and principles.’ 
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7.5. Unjustness: Instances of Obligation Imposed By Law. 
 
This section addresses a novel view of the nature of unjustness.361 Each new 
ground of unjust enrichment, as it has developed, is another instance of 
unjustness, not because of a breach of a right, but because a notion of 
obligation imposed by law is a judicial response to the circumstances of the 
particular ground. 
 
It has been said at several points, that in unjust enrichment, the law creates or 
imposes a legal obligation. That however, does not mean that there are not 
other kinds of obligation that might have arisen from the same circumstances; 
nor does it follow that such other kinds of obligation are irrelevant to the 
obligation imposed by law. Legal obligations are not by any means an essential 
coincidence with moral obligations or compulsive forces of cultural origin.362 
Those other obligations may arise out of communal acceptance of standards of 
moral and/or ethical behaviour. They may arise out of codes of acceptable 
conduct in employment, in sport or in communal life. Such other obligations are 
seldom of universal application or universally observed in community. There  
 
                                            
 
361 The issue has been raised in several areas of this work and it is true that this section could be located at 
several other places. It’s relevance to this section lies in the relevance to the nature of the unjust 
enrichment concept and principle. 
362 See fn 248 above where a related issue is considered. Hart maintained that morality does not explain 
law. That does not preclude however, that a judge, in reasoning a decision in an unjust enrichment 
case, might employ tools of reasoning that have some commonality with reasoning that describes 
human perceptions of morality. H.L.A. Hart, ‘Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals’, in 
R.M. Dworkin ed. The Philosophy of Law, Essay 1, 17, at 21-22; H L A Hart Concept of Law, 167, and 
ch. 9, pp 208-212; See also Neil MacCormick, HLA Hart, 24-5. If law is morality then all that is law is 
moral. Morality though, is a set of standards by reference to which law might be critically analysed: 
see Hart, Concept of Law, 211. 
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may be, nevertheless, some obligations arising out of communal standards that 
are central in importance to community as a whole. An obligation to be truthful in 
one’s dealings may be an example. The care of the aged, of children and of the 
disabled, and animals also, in a community-wide sense, may be examples of 
such obligations. If, in a perfect society, none of these kind of obligations had 
been left unfulfilled, then there might be no cases arising in the courts and 
therefore no obligations might have been recognised by law.  
 
A funeral of a kind that is in keeping with the deceased’s station in life would be 
a community obligation resting upon an executor with funds, because it is 
central to the interests of community that the dead be buried. Such an obligation 
was recognised as an element of a ground of restitution in Rogers v Price363 
where expenses were paid by another out of necessity. Baron Vaughan in that 
case, described the obligation upon the executor to pay, as ‘…not an imperfect 
obligation, but [an] imperative obligation.’364That does not mean that the legal 
obligation was an imperative one, but the communal obligation to pay was 
imperative.365 The communal obligation thereby became also, an obligation 
recognised by law: it was a legal obligation: it was imposed by law.  
 
In Re Rhodes366 was a case in which the court recognised that money spent on 
the necessities of an intellectually disabled person, might in circumstances, be a 
benefit conferred upon a person who was primarily responsible to pay (although 
for a different reason described below, it did not impose the obligation). The 
communal obligation thereby became an obligation imposed by law. This was 
another instance that may well be understood in terms of core of community. A 
somewhat different instance was where an owner of a horse left it in the care of 
                                            
 
363 (1829) 3 Y & J 28; 148 ER 1080. 
364 Id. 37. 
365 It may be considered fortunate that there are no degrees of legal obligation in unjust enrichment. 
366 (1890 44 Ch D 94. 
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an agent under an expired contract. The court imposed an obligation to pay the 
bailee upon the bailor/owner.367 The care of the animal was an imperative 
obligation owed to the community, for its keeper must not turn it out and, thereby 
cause public risk, or let it suffer distress.  
 
Obligation, in a communal sense, stands in sharp relief in the necessitous 
intervention cases: it is readily apparent that an obligation would be imposed by 
law. In In Re Rhodes, the court stopped short of imposing an obligation on the 
basis that it was not shown that the payor had expected repayment at time of 
paying.368 The community obligation might not have been diminished by such 
reasoning but the reason of the failure of the plaintiff’s case is consistent with 
the need for absence of voluntariness. Communal obligations are not limited to 
necessitous intervention cases. Lord Mansfield, in Moses, found, ‘…[if] the 
defendant be under an obligation, from ties of natural justice…’,369 a dictum that 
might be read as recognising some particular kind of communal obligation as a 
pre-determinant of circumstances where the law will recognise and impose legal 
obligations.  
 
This perception of origin of legal obligations does not open the doors to notions 
of duties and obligations, drawn from non legal contexts, being recognised by 
the courts as though they were law. Such a development would represent a 
failure of system and an abandonment of the judicial methodology that the 
doctrine of precedent represents. Decisions about communal values are not 
decisions about law and cannot be correct in law. 370 Therefore such a decision, 
if one were taken, cannot be authoritative. The approach outlined above does 
 
                                            
 
367 The Great northern Railway Company v Swaffield (1874) LR 9 Ex 132. 
368 Fn 366 above, at 105-106 per Cotton LJ. 
369 Fn 177 at p 1008. 
370 A dictum in a modern case on negligence is pertinent: Such a decision is not founded in authority of 
‘… past decisions in harmony with the methodology of the common law.’ Above, fn 314. 
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not advocate the development of rules in that manner; but it does postulate that 
the law might adopt a standard that reflects notions of imperative obligation, 
imperative in the society in which it is expressed. The doctrine of reasonable 
man [person]371 in the law of negligence is such a standard. The important 
characteristic of such a standard is that it is a legal standard whereby the law 
adopts communal experience as the essence of a legal proposition. By its 
nature as a tool of legal precedent, it cannot consist of considerations drawn 
from non-legal contexts that have no consistent meaning in the law.372 
 
JC Smith argues the existence of what I have called a community obligation.373 
As distinct from obliged that can mean responding to self interest, Smith argues 
that obligation can only be used to express a necessity based on protection of 
the interests of others.374 This, he says, reflects the existence of ‘…obligation 
creating practices and institutions.’375 
 
Smith asserts that the ‘…classic example of an obligation creating social 
practice is that of promising…’.376 I would understand promise as a social 
practice in the sense that it relates to veracity and to self assumed obligation 
that in a general sense, society has an expectation of being reliable and  
 
 
                                            
 
371 Donoghue v Stephenson, above fn 275. 
372  See I M Jackman, Primissory Obligations in the Law of Restitution’, (1995) 69 ALJ 614.  Imperative 
obligation: subjective benefit and promissory obligations that subsist outside the law of contract. 
373 Legal Obligation, 51. 
374 Ibid. Smith’s reasoning is independent of case law. 
375 Id. 52. 
376 Id. 20. Smith cites Hart, Concept of Law, 43 ‘…when we promise, we ...[are] imposing obligations on 
ourselves and conferring rights upon others…in lawyers parlance,  we exercise a power conferred by 
rules…’.  Grotius argued that there were two sources of obligation emanating from the natural law, i.e., 
promise and inequality: Robert Feenstra ‘Grotius’ Doctrine of Unjust Enrichment as a Source of 
obligation; its Origin and its Influence in Roman-Dutch Law’ in Eltjo J.H. Schrage (ed.) Unjust 
Enrichment: The Comparative Legal History of the Law of Restitution 197, 201. Curiously, it was in the 
late medieval cases in debt and assumpsit  that promise without consideration, implied and fictional, 
had a strong bearing upon the circumstances wherein indebitatus assumpsit, the fore-runner of unjust 
enrichment, emerged. 
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predictable. In a purely common law sense, bidding at auction is capable of 
being construed as a promise even though it may be imperfect because of some 
supervening contractual or statutory rule. Similarly, accepting is another case of 
promising. Recognising that one acted under the influence of mistake, or per 
force of duress can be reasoned along similar lines: just as one should be 
obligated by one’s promise, one should also be released from one’s obligation if 
the basis of the assumed obligation falls away or is unsound, or indeed fails to 
eventuate. Obligation is removed to one who benefited from the mistake, the 
failure of consideration or the acting under duress. Smith’s explanation of the 
social institution of promise will do also for these other instances of modern 
grounds: the grounds are such as is necessary for the existence and well-being 
of community in the sense that if community cannot rely upon outcomes, it is at 
risk of being destabilised. ‘Obligation…’ says Smith, ‘…involves community 
because obligation practices are …[a] necessity for existence and well-being of 
the community’.377 
 
It may be argued that such a theory of obligation practices is unreal in modern 
society. This is perhaps because law has, to a great extent, replaced the 
communal obligations so that a lower order of philosophy obtains, if it is not 
illegal, I have no obligation; but that is not new. It is pertinent that the origin of 
the action on the case that prefigured tort and unjust enrichment jurisprudence 
was motivated by the need to maintain the King’s peace, an obligation which all 
citizens shared.378 
 
The fact that in modern cases, the court goes directly to the obligation imposed 
by law without pausing to consider the communal obligation, does not detract  
 
                                            
 
377 Id. 83. The reasoning also extends to freedom of promising, accepting etc. as would explain some of 
these grounds.  
378 See fnn 54, 55 and 61 above. 
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from what has been observed here. The task of the court is to find whether or 
not a ground of unjust enrichment has been shown. In a potentially new case, 
the court could simplify its deliberations greatly by considering whether there 
was an imperative obligation of another kind that the law might adopt as an 
instance of legal obligation because of unjust enrichment.  
 
Brief as this treatment of obligation has been,379 it suffices to demonstrate that 
the emergence of new instances of unjustness that found the actions in 
contemporary and modern unjust enrichment, have been much more 
conceptually motivated than would be the case if they were simply, instances of 
the arbitrary emergence of grounds.  
 
Significantly, this treatment of the basis of obligation offers credible explanation 
for the reasoning of Lord Mansfield in Moses380 that has been the subject of 
unreflective criticism from the bench.381 It is relevant that judges who have 
adjudicated upon grounds of unjust enrichment have been guided by many 
reflections, over many centuries, upon communal obligation including influences 
from non common law jurisdictions and ancient law.382  
 
It is my thesis that many of the modern grounds have, in origin, communal 
perceptions of imperative obligation as their basis. Plainly, these developments 
are not adequately explained in terms of rules. Many kinds of principles have  
 
 
                                            
 
379 Smith makes a useful correlation between ‘oblige’ and ‘ought’ which is not dealt with here in the 
interests of brevity. 
380 Fn 42 above. 
381 Ibid. 
382 Lord Mansfield’s reasoning is an instance of this and see Robert Feenstra ‘Grotius Doctrine of Unjust 
Enrichment as a Source of obligation; its Origin and its Influence in Roman-Dutch Law’ in Eltjo J.H. 
Schrage (ed.) Unjust Enrichment: The Comparative Legal History of the Law of Restitution 197, esp. 
201-204. 
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contributed to the reasoning processes that ultimately formed the rules in 
individual cases. 
 
 
Chapter 8: Selected Works of Jurisprudence Augment Clarity of Concepts 
and Principles. 
 
In the introductory sections of this work,383 I have claimed that it is possible to 
demonstrate the manner in which several theoretical approaches demand and 
suggest answers to particular problems perceived to be relevant to practical 
unjust enrichment law. This short chapter addresses the reason for selective use 
of theoretical works to augment the study. 
In this work, I have made particular use of works by H.L.A. Hart; Neil 
MacCormick, Ronald Dworkin, Lord Lloyd of Hampstead; M.D.A. Freeman and 
Sir Frederick Pollock. Freeman’s and Pollock’s works that are presently relevant, 
are ‘introductions’ to jurisprudence.  
It is not essential to attach one’s analysis wholly to one or the other theoretical 
approach. The effect of each is elucidating. To view principles and obligations 
from the viewpoints of the parties and the adjudicator can yield enhanced 
understanding. The special attention given to concepts and principles is also 
elucidating. This doesn’t preclude the employment of Professor Hart’s juristic 
analysis of law in terms of interacting rules: rather, it recognises the merits of 
Hart’s characterisation of primary and secondary rules384 and observes the 
                                            
 
383 Pp 3 & 4 above. It is significant that Smith holds that obligation is causally related to action (in the 
physical sense). This, in medieval times, might have related to the need of keeping the baron’s swords 
in their scabbards. 
384 Concept of Law, 96-98. 
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manner in which policy, conventions, habits and usages prepare the way for 
new rules.  
 
Hart’s notion of primary obligation is a significant example of the manner in 
which his theories do two important things:  
• firstly, they adopt and characterise existing rules; and  
• secondly, they move the analysis forward toward new rules that may 
emerge from a significant obiter dictum that constitutes a central 
thesis for an emerging rule.  
 
An example of the first of these observations is the manner in which Hart’s 
characterisation of primary ‘obligation creating rules’, sets unjust enrichments 
apart from orders for damages arising from a breach of contract or tort. 
Obligations stemming from obligation creating rules can come into existence 
apart from any act of a defendant: they may be found to be arising from the 
circumstances of a case, including where a party is benefited by a non voluntary 
act of a third party, or where incontrovertibly benefited. Craven Ellis v 
Cannons385 is a good example of a benefit arising simply from the circumstances 
of a case. A person performing unpaid overtime to meet a critical deadline, is 
another: it is outside the contract but undoubtedly beneficial to the employer if it 
was within the parameters of the employment contract, and in the absence of 
voluntariness. 
 
An obligation in unjust enrichment is a paradigm of a primary obligation. The 
unpaid over-time example might be fruitful of considerable expansion of the role 
of unjust enrichment if pursued: simply, by analogy, it is open to the courts to 
                                            
 
385 [1936] 2 KB 403. 
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recognise a new case. Hart’s notion of primary obligation well describes the new 
source of obligation in what might prove to be an emerging case.386 
 
Obligations don’t arise at every cross-road; there must be circumstances that 
provide the basis of reasoning. The theoretical works argue the manner in which 
critical circumstances are integrated into the rule-making process.387 It is this 
central idea that rules fall into one or other of these two categories, primary and 
secondary, that is most informative. Rules are not well categorised as orders of 
an authoritative institution. Separation of rules into classes that assume 
underlying jurisprudential factors is the first key to an understanding of 
obligations and duties imposed by law. 
 
Many rules assert or protect rights by creating obligations. Others establish or 
authorise the structures and powers and authority that make the rights and 
obligations a reality. Without the secondary kind of rules, the obligation creating 
rules would be an esoteric expression of hopes and aspirations. The primary 
kind of rules provides an essential foundation by recognising that a given set of 
circumstances creates an obligation. The secondary rules recognise the source 
of authority and of the duties of individuals who act in authoritative roles. 
 
Professor Dworkin’s thesis does not appear to pre-empt the Hart notion of 
primary and secondary rules. It does however find that there are concepts that 
demand a particular uniformity in understanding. And it does recognise that 
certain preambles that might be relevant to several rules, act together with other  
                                            
 
386 The obiter of Chief Justice Mason in Commissioner of State Revenue (Victoria) v Royal Insurance 
Australia Ltd (1994) 182 CLR 51, 69-70, provides an example of an imputed obligation arising from 
an enrichment which may, in a future case, be recognised as an obligation arising from an unjust 
enrichment within the scope of cases that the courts recognise as instances of unjustness.  Mason CJ 
opined that ignorance might be a ground of restitution. 
387 That Dworkin’s approach to this is significantly different to Hart’s thesis is readily understood, but that 
fact does not preclude the one informing the other. Professor Dworkin’s work will be examined below 
and in chapter 9. 
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preliminary issues to create a climate of legal culture in which rules exist. Unjust 
enrichment, negligence, proprietary and fiduciary relationships depend for their 
meaning on a culture and a climate of understood meaning that gives life to 
these principles. Hart’s Concept of Law does not deny this, though it might 
define only the rules as law. Apples are fruit but apple trees are not. 
 
Pursuing the limits of the rules/principles debate does not augment the overall 
purpose to offer clarity to legal rules, actions and discourse; it is essential 
nevertheless, to understand that, even if one does not regard the principles and 
the concepts as law, it will prove impossible to work with law without 
acknowledging their existence. Taxonomy is not law but the question that arises 
in this connection is, can the law work without an educated approach to its 
separate fields of rules and supportive theory? Tort and contract have quite 
different conceptual bases, the one delictual and the other consensual. That is a 
fundamental illustration of taxonomy at work. Inducement to breach a contract is 
concerned centrally with contract, but it is a delict and belongs to tort388 though 
one might have to prove the contract to make one’s case in delict. This is a very 
basic illustration of taxonomy at work. In the present work, such a 
consciousness of taxonomy becomes critical to the separation of notions of 
unjustness and unconscionability; rules of unjust enrichment and of equity; 
concepts of benefit from concepts of proprietary rights and of an equity. 389 
                                            
 
388 Lumley v Gye (1853) 2 E & B; 118 ER 749; McKernan v Fraser (1931) 46 CLR 343, 358-9 per Dixon J. 
Overlapping of concepts and its consequences in individual cases is the focus of several chapters in Stepen 
Waddams’ Dimensions of Private Law, esp. pp 28-30 and 43-47. Waddams analyses historical and recent cases in 
which there might be no single concept to which the decision might be attributed, but rather to interaction of two 
or several concepts. See also Emerald Construction Co Ltd v Lowthian [1966] 1 All ER 1013. 
389 Waddams, fn 388, finds an element of what he believes is ‘unjust enrichment’ in cases where there may be a lack 
of rules to respond to perceived unjustness. Tulk v Moxhay (1884) 2 Ph 774; 41 ER 1143 was cited as an instance 
of overlapping concepts underlying a decision. There a plaintiff successfully claimed in respect of a failure to 
observe a covenant regarding a common square garden wher the covenant bound the former owner, but not the 
defendant. Waddams cites the case as an illustration of ‘an element of unjust enrichment.’ In fact the case was 
decided in equity upon a principle of express covenant: see Patrick Parkinson, The Principles of Equity, 64. The 
instance demonstrates that it is important to be clear about taxonomic boundaries. It is one thing to recognise that 
equity acts upon injustice, usually attributable to a wrong, but quite another use ‘unjust enrichment’ as a broad 
category of instances of perceived unjustness. 
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Though the paragraphs above describe ideas that are basic, or even very 
preliminary and general, they introduce the possibility that the study of the 
meaning of key foundational features, including meaning of law, of rules, and 
principles, augments the work of clarifying the role of concepts and principles in 
relation to rules of unjust enrichment. 
 
Chapter 9: Principles, Rules and Theory. 
 
9.1. Legal Philosophical stance of Hart and Dworkin.  
 
It becomes plain that there is little that can be compared between the legal 
philosophical approaches of these renowned jurists, Professors Hart and 
Dworkin, of the mid 20th C and latter half thereof. Their approaches are 
important for the fact that each attempts a fundamental theoretical approach, or 
overview of the law as distinct from commentary on specialised branches. But 
they are very different overviews, the former insisting upon a ‘rules’ approach 
such that everything that is law is a rule.390 The latter adopts a ‘principles and 
rules’ approach. In the final analysis, the differences are not as stark as the 
student might have expected them to be.  
 
The works of Hart and Dworkin represent two conceptual windows (or different 
windows on concept) that allow the student to view doctrinal law from different 
perspectives. Neither had unjust enrichment specifically in mind, but the  
 
 
                                            
 
390 That might be more readily applied to contract in the sense that everything that is contract is a rule, but 
it is not readily applicable to unjust enrichment, which was relatively unresearched in terms of juristic 
analysis in Hart’s time. 
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‘windows’ are an especially useful approach to understanding unjust enrichment.  
Each approach offers an explanation of why the legal concept ‘unjust’ gives rise 
to an obligation. Each is innovative in the sense that the reader is seeing 
concepts, principles and obligation differently than might have been the case 
before studying their approaches, and therein lies the merit of developmental 
analysis. Despite their differences, and in many respects because of the 
theoretical issues that their works demonstrate, their works together describe 
critical features of modern law. 
 
9.2. Professor Hart’s characterisation of Rules and Professor Dworkin’s 
Analysis of Principle and Rule. 
 
The differing Hart and Dworkin approaches to the theory of principles and rules, 
coming  from different philosophical view-points, contribute insights that help 
one to understand the development of modern concepts and principles and 
sometimes, to explain the underlying reasoning of important judgments. This 
section identifies two theoretical issues which suggest a theoretical basis for 
unjust enrichment, an entirely new approach to the task of identifying principles 
and the way they work, specifically in unjust enrichment.  
 
The first theoretical issue is Hart’s enabling characterisation of rules.391 Hart’s 
primary rules are those that establish obligations and duties and those which 
proscribe certain human actions. He cites crimes, offences, and delicts. Rules 
which do not themselves constitute binding standards of obligatory conduct are 
secondary rules, not in the sense of being lesser rules, but because they follow 
 
 
 
                                            
 
391 H.L.A. Hart, Concept of Law, ch. 5 V: see also, Peter Birks ‘Equity in the Modern law’ (1996) 26 
WALR, 1, 10-12. 
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upon or are consequential upon a juristic act, or legal event, such as a breach of 
contract.  
 
Hart thought of primary rules in terms that they expound the law. He did not 
have unjust enrichment specifically in mind and he might have regarded primary 
rules of common law that give rise to an action as exceptionally rare. The 
primary rules are those that interpose or interject upon a state of affairs where 
there was no illegality, no wrong, and no case for compensatory ruling: that is 
there was no foregoing juristic act to which a breach response is the ordinary 
consequence:  the rule in unjust enrichment is not a response to such an act in 
any event.392 
 
If the criteria of a primary rule are that it imposes binding standards of obligatory 
conduct, and that it owes its origin to law,393 then unjust enrichment must be so 
categorised. The binding standard is usually that which describes rights and 
obligations, and proscribes actions in contravention. An obligation arising from 
the circumstances of the case that owes its origin to law is primary in this sense. 
The function of the actions is to impose the obligation, as Neil MacCormick 
explains, is the first and only juristic act.394 Distinct from this is a remedial action 
 
                                            
 
392  H L A Hart, Concept of Law, 96-98. Neil MacCormick, HLA Hart, 105-6 explains this method of 
differentiating a action in tort or contract that responds to a breach, a foregoing juristic act, (or a 
foregoing act of juristic significance. MacCormick suggests that primary rules, as Hart intended were 
‘…all those categorical requirements which govern natural acts and other acts which are not 
themselves always or necessarily rule-invoking acts…’, at 106. 
393 Ibid. As distinct from those that co-opt the law to enforce an agreement. 
394 Delictual actions, by contrast, define the breach and fix the remedy. Unjust enrichment, which does not 
rely upon breach and is unconcerned with fault, simply imposes the obligation to make restitution of 
the unjust enrichmet gained at the plaintiff’s expense. That is what MacCormick means by its ‘first and 
only juristic act’. It is as simple, in juristic terms, as a statutory liability to pay a tax. See The Great 
Northern Railway Company v Swaffield (1874) LR 9 Ex 132, 136, per Piggot B, where His Lordship 
rejects the notion of culpability as a relevant consideration in a case where the issues are the rights and 
obligations of the parties arising out of measures taken in a case of necessity. See also, Peter Birks 
‘Equity in the Modern law’ (1996) 26 WALR, 1, 11-20. There is however, an historical association 
which is noticed presently. 
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that acts upon a breach of a right (to be free from tortious interference, or to 
have one’s contract performed). 
 
Why is this important? It is, because it assists the conceptual character of the 
unjust enrichment which, unlike a breach of contract, is a ‘non-event’ in juristic 
terms, because it does not respond to a foregoing juristic act. It is important 
because it assists the conceptual explanation of the obligation to make 
restitution in the absence of a remedial rule: there is nothing to be remedied 
because there is no wrong. It is important also, because it helps to explain that 
rarity of the common law, the action for interjecting a right to have money or 
proceeds of money that was legally acquired. 
 
The second theoretical issue is identified by Professor Dworkin who illustrated 
the dependence of the law upon principle with an example drawn from the US 
anti-trust legislation concerning unreasonable restraints of trade.395 The United 
States court in the particular case to which he referred, ruled that the statutory 
provision is a rule of law, not a principle which might have required of the courts 
that they formulate rules in conformity with it. As a rule in its literal form, 
proscribing contracts in restraint of trade, it would have proscribed a great many 
contracts and the court reasoned that it was not the intention of the legislature to 
make such an invasive law concerning commercial agreements. The exercise is 
one of statutory interpretation but the process is one in which the effect of an 
important principle of contract law, i.e. one affecting the capacity of parties freely 
to contract, posed a need to read the statutory rule more narrowly than its literal 
interpretation, avoiding the mischief.396 By this means, Professor Dworkin  
 
 
                                            
 
395 R M Dworkin, Philosophy of Law, 48 - 49. See above, p 96 where the comparison is used to help 
explain the characteristics of the Australian unifying legal concept. 
396 Maunsell v Olins [1975] AC 373; Anstee v Jennings [1935] VLR 144. 
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demonstrates the essential relationship of principle and rule which exists even 
where the rule is a statutory one. 
 
Highlighting the distinction between rule and principle, Dwokin makes the  
further observation that many rules can be reduced from a principle by stating 
them in conjunction with words such as ‘unreasonable’, ‘negligent’ or ‘unjust’, 
the words making the rule rely on some principle beyond the scope of the 
particular rule.397 The outcome, proscription, is plainly found in the rule. The 
broader principle might be seen, in Dworkin’s example, as one upholding 
contract: the rule then becomes an exception to, or a special case of that 
principle.398 The several exceptions will also need to be defined by some 
principle; otherwise, it will be impossible to predict the outcome. Dworkin points 
out that the principles enable counsel to argue the plaintiff’s case.399 
 
9.3. Some Conclusions thus far, about Unjust Enrichment and Legal 
Theory. 
 
The relevance of these theoretical diversions is that they introduce a method of 
classifying and describing rules, especially empowering rules and obligation 
creating rules, in a manner that facilitates analysis. Firstly, Hart’s obligation  
 
                                            
 
397 Above, fn 395, p 49.  
398 Contrastingly, North American unjust enrichment jurisprudence operates as a rule in its own right. It is 
more difficult to state the principle to which the rule is cognate but, because the remedy in US and 
Canadian law is the constructive trust, the rule stems from the inequity of the unjust enrichment and 
the principle enunciated by Lord Mansfield in Moses v Macferlan might well be seen as sufficient: 
above, fn 182 and p 74.  See also Chapter 13 below, where it is argued that unjust enrichment rules are 
properly classed as exceptions to the general policy of the law to protect payments. 
399 Above fn 397.  See also the reasoning pages, pp 39, 51-53 above, on the developing character of 
principle: principles are binding on judges who, subject to the rules of precedent, must apply them if 
the case requires. Dworkin poses the question whether a judge imposes pre-existing rights and 
obligations. This is an interesting issue for unjust enrichment because the court imposes an obligation: 
the obligation was not pre-existing; nevertheless, the position of the plaintiff is surely defined by a 
principle that would, in the circumstances of the case, give plaintiff a right to the judgment of the 
court, resembling a chose-in-action.  
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creating primary rule takes its authority from its character; in unjust enrichment, 
the right which the rule seeks to restore is a primary right, i.e. to have what is 
justly, one’s own, which compares to a right to have one’s property unhindered 
or one’s contract performed. Such primary rules operate on the facts such that, 
in the case of the unjust enrichment rule, if A has from B what the law 
recognises should, by reason of justice as defined in the cases, belong to B, a 
restitutionary obligation will be imposed by the law to rectify or correct the cause 
of the unjustness. The imposition of the obligation that corrects the unjustness is 
an imperative by reason of rules that Hart calls ‘rules of recognition’, that 
empower a court in the given circumstances of the case, and require it to decide 
according to law. They are simply the recognition of circumstance in which an 
action arises. Hart gives a name to laws, common law or statutory, which 
empower courts to hear a case and make an order. Such a thesis does not 
purport to change or prioritise rules of law; it simply addresses methods of 
analysis. A unique obligation is at issue; no other obligation in the common law 
‘law of obligations’ is sued upon without establishing a breach. 
 
Summarising the above, the different character of obligations in unjust 
enrichment is consistent with Professor Hart’s notion of primary obligation, such 
that we are able to characterise a rule in an unjust enrichment case as a 
‘primary obligation creating rule’. Such a rule imposes a binding obligation that 
addresses the correction of existing rights rather than the remedying of a breach 
of rights. This addresses the difference of the circumstances of the rule that 
might otherwise be seen as lacking a place in jurisprudence. It does not 
introduce a discretionary power in the adjudicator: the imposing of the obligation 
is a legal imperative where the grounds of an action are proven. The rule binds 
the party to which it is directed upon the circumstances of the case, to make 
restitution. 
 
The next point is that Professor Dworkin’s reasoning demonstrates the power of 
a principle that categorises an action according to what it achieves. In the case 
of unjust enrichment, what is characterised is an enrichment in the hands of the 
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recipient or its holder. The principle interposes the character of ‘unjust’ in the 
circumstances of the case. So too, in the example noticed above, ‘unreasonable’ 
characterises a contract as one that will be proscribed under the US Anti-Trust 
law, as described by Dworkin.400 The notion of a categorising principle assists 
analysis and is well described as an ‘analytical tool’. 
 
Dworkin has demonstrated the power of principle, not simply to soften or rectify 
an unreasonable rule, but to enable two apparently conficting principles to work 
together. The application of Dworkin’s example in the context of unjust 
enrichment is especially informative. The unjust enrichment principle is a 
powerful principle after-all, because the rule it sponsors negates the right to 
property in the money at issue. A similarity of its method to several doctrines of 
equity is immediately recognisable. Equity however, is concerned with the 
character of a person’s act or neglect, whilst throughout the long history of 
unjust enrichment its principles and rules have concerned the character of 
benefit.  
 
Bringing these two theoretical approaches together in the specific context of 
unjust enrichment, which may not have been contemplated by either jurist, 
provides nevertheless, a clear exposition of the conceptual characteristics of the 
unjust enrichment action. It provides a language and a concept of methodology 
that will help to contrast the action to other concepts and principles of the law. 
Indeed, it becomes clearer, in the light of Hart’s and Dworkin’s theories, why it is 
appropriate, and necessary to characterise unjust enrichment, not as an 
independent action, but as a concept that explains many instances or sets of 
circumstances that the law holds unjust.  Simply, unjust like illegal, delictual and 
inequitable is not itself the cause of action. 
 
                                            
 
400 R. Dworkin, Philosophy of Law, 48 – 49; see above, p 96; and again at p158 in a somewhat different 
connection. 
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The concept/principle may characterise the circumstances of mistake, and 
duress for example. It will therefore be possible to deduce the elements from the 
rule in the case that it concludes. Such elements might be those that describe 
the essential characteristics of subtractive enrichment that will describe a duress 
case.  They may descrine the essential features of free acceptance.  A finding of 
unjust enrichment, has a single purpose in the law, that being to describe or to 
apply an instance of a ground of action disclosed by the facts of the case. That 
purpose is inherent in the unifying concept, or in its English counterpart, the 
unifying legal principle.  So understood, it will be essential that the grounds of 
actions and other suboridinate principles can be described objectively. 
 
The facility to explain the obligation creating primary rules in theoretical terms, is 
an important new development in the work. These rules are not concerned with 
a breach but have a justification that is capable of being explained in a way that 
unites all such actions. The unifying legal concept or English unifying legal 
principle invoked in the circumstances of a case, introduces the character of 
efficacious legal principles and rules that exist because the law defines 
circumstances of what it holds unjust. These efficacious rules are those that 
empower the imposition of an obligation and vest a chose, a right to judgment, in 
the plaintiff to correct or rectify and enrichment by restitution: just as surely the 
victim of a breach in contract or delict has a right to sue for redress as a direct 
consequence of the breach that is objectively defined. The latter however, is not 
adequately or accurately described as a correction.  
 
At a theoretical level, the unifying concept is also the key to the enabling and 
adjudicatory secondary rules that Hart described as ‘rules of recognition’ and  
‘rules of adjudication.’ These rules introduced by Hart’s theories are, in the 
common law, the ordinary consequence of precedent. Therefore; 
1. when subsidiary principles are understood to describe the nature of 
benefit, of subtractive enrichment, and the legal meaning of unjust, and, 
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2. those subsidiary rules also include the enabling and power conferring 
rules that are the ordinary rules of appointment, of adjudication, of 
jurisdiction and judicial powers and responsibilities, that is, rules that Hart 
called rules of recognition and adjudication, assumed to be present in a 
civilised and developed system of law, and, 
3. the elements of an action are present, because an established ground of 
an action is recognisable on the facts and, 
4.  therefore, the law acts upon the plaintiff’s case in a predictable way.  
 
That is an instance of the court acting according to law by imposing upon a party 
that has obtained a benefit from the plaintiff in circumstances that are unjust by 
legal standard, an obligation to make restitution. This describes the effect that 
every civilised system of law should have rules that oblige one who is unjustly 
enriched, to make restitution of the benefit thus received.  
 
The correspondence of practical and theoretical characteristics is, I believe, the 
foundation of that stable pattern of analysis that Professor Birks strongly 
recommends.401 This is important background to questions and doubts that arise 
in chapter 12 about the efficacy of legal reasoning that is not founded upon 
doctrinal elements of law, which are principles tried and proven in a succession 
of leading cases. Dworkin alludes to such a thing: can it be said that prior to trial, 
a party is suing for recovery of rightful property or enforcement of a right when 
the basis of the decision cannot reasonably be assumed by counsel?402 
 
Applying Dworkin’s analysis, the concept described by Lord Mansfield as natural 
justice and equity is not a rule of law; it is the principle upon which rules will be 
founded, and it becomes inseparable from rules which are reasoned from it. The 
                                            
 
401 Above fn 217, p 92 
402  RM Dworkin, above fn 400, 50-53. 
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words operate in the same way as ‘unreasonable’, ‘negligent’, and ‘unjust’ 
operate in the anti-trust example given above. They apply principle to a rule 
concerning the circumstances of a case. It will be shown in chapter 11 that 
Justice Windeyer thought defined principles of this stature become embedded in 
the law and contribute very significantly to its meaning and consistency.403 
 
The Dworkin approach to principle and rule well describes the manner in which 
the common law draws upon a fountain-head of precedent contained in 
judgments handed-down over many centuries, to establish the principle that will 
be the basis of a rule in a case. This perception is important background to the 
correlation to be made in chapter 10 between the common law which draws 
upon the rich source of principle that is organised by the doctrine of precedent, 
and the Continental systems of law that draw upon the rich resource of the 
Justiniaic Roman codes as a source of principle. 
 
Chapter 10: Principles of Unjust Enrichment; Understanding their Unique 
Features and Objectives. 
 
10.1. Introduction. 
 
A number of important statements emerge in this chapter. The following are the 
highlights. 
• The decisions of superior courts establish that as a matter of precedent, 
principles of unjust enrichjment support a finite list of actions in unjust 
enrichment, even though they have not closed the list.  
 
 
                                            
 
403 Hargrave v Goldman (1963) 110 CLR 40, 63. The dictum is presented below at pp 189-90.  See fn 370 
asto Lord Mansfield’s dictum. 
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• The finite list of actions reflects the number principles which define 
instances where the law recognises a legal imperative that it imposes a 
binding standard of obligatory conduct in response to an unjust 
enrichment.  
• In approaching this finite list established by the superior courts over time, 
it is helpful to view the actions in a specific unjust enrichment context;  
o i.e., where principles of the law of unjust enrichment apply, there 
can have been no breach such as would set up a secondary rule 
and a concomitant right to damages or another remedy, for a 
breach of a right.  
 
If these issues are understood, it is not difficult to see that the actions are 
necessarily linked by a common exemplifying principle, or are described by a 
characterising concept.404 
 
10.2. Finite List of Actions and the Singular Objectives. 
 
Ultimately, the principles upon which rules are based, travel with the rule. The 
rule cannot be a meaningful part of a system of law without the underlying 
principles that describe its etymology and taxonomy. Similarly, principle is 
nothing until recognised by superior courts in the process of laying down a rule. 
Legislatures can make rules that might have no evident basis in principle, but a 
modern court, freed from procedural tram-lines of the forms of actions, must 
reason its decision in an unjust enrichment case by following the established 
precedents and applying the reasoning. The lower court could not be following a 
precedent if it applied reasoning unrepresentative of the higher court’s decision. 
Applying a rule according to its obligation under the rules of stare decisis must 
 
                                            
 
404 The end result, whether concept or principle, in the present context, is the same. 
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involve applying the principle upon which it is based. These issues are further 
discussed in chapter 13. 
 
Making the same statements about limits of jurisdiction, in a slightly different 
way, will help to clarify what is achieved by the unifying concept or English 
principle of unjust enrichment operating in a variety of cases. The decisions of 
the superior courts  
• that recognize that particular grounds of unjust enrichment are the 
determinants of what will be subject to judicial intervention by 
imposing an obligation in unjust enrichment; 
• that state these grounds in rules that must be observed in 
accordance with the doctrine of stare decisis; 
• that assume rules of recognition governing a judicial officer 
deciding a case according to law; 
• at this point in time; and  
• in these social and commercial circumstances,  
will be fundamental in a legal system functioning according to law. The doctrine 
of precedent will bind lower courts to go no further.  The effect of such rules is to 
state in each case of a ground that this is such a case to which any legal system 
that fulfils the criteria of a legal system, would respond by creating and imposing 
an obligation upon a party to make restitution. That reflects the foundational 
Fibrosa principle.405 
 
The notion that there is a law enshrined in precedent that governs the extent of 
jurisdiction, is not restricted to unjust enrichment in modern law. The legislature 
and the courts determine what behaviours are acceptable in modern commerce, 
corporations law and business. These laws specify offences and characterise 
 
                                            
 
405 Fibrosa Spolka Akcynja v Fairbairn Lawson Combe Barber fn 177. 
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particular conduct as unconscionable, misleading etc. This modern regulation of 
business and contractual fairness responds to social and commercial 
imperatives, which may not have justified such intervention of the law and the 
courts in previous decades.406 They do however, have their limits defined by the 
limits of a particular legislative instrument and judicial interpretation of the law. In 
the same way, in unjust enrichment, at any particular juncture there will be a 
finite list of allowable actions which reflects the circumstances that the law 
recognises as instances of unjust enrichment. The rules that establish such a 
system are founded upon a central principle of unjust enrichment that describes 
for the various actions, a unity of purpose. The Fibrosa principle is a broad 
statement of that principle.  
 
It has been shown that there are ancient precedents for the method whereby a 
supervising official (in the common law, a judge of a superior court) will from 
time to time, be found to be contemplating social and commercial imperatives 
and the scope of allowable actions.407 In this ancient principle and in modern 
practice also, there will be a defined frame-of-reference or jurisdiction, and a 
defined purpose, vis., to answer whether a new action is required, or more 
specifically, whether the limits of jurisdiction ought to be extended.  
 
 
 
                                            
 
406 There may have been a time when insider trading was regulated by ordinary good faith and conscience. 
The notion of social and commercial imperatives justifying development in the law is rarely discussed 
in modern law especially because the rationale of extension of a law to a new case is argued in legal 
terms. Cf Daniel Friedmann ‘Unjust Enrichment, Pursuance of Self Interest, and the Limits of Free-
riding’ Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review, v. 36, 830, 839ff, surveying social and commercial forces 
that underlie development of the law of unjust enrichment.  Perceived social and commercial 
imperatives have been a significant influence in US law where the law envisaged in the Restatement is 
‘…broad, flexible and open ended…, See Friedman, above, 838. In civilian systems of law the  
 justification for a rule in unjust enrichment might be expected to be more visible in public discourse on 
new and prospective legislative developments in the law. Friedmann explains that the role of the courts 
in curtailing too wide an interpretation is nevertheless an important factor: at 837-8, citing John P 
Dawson, ‘Indirect Enrichment’, 2 Ius Privatum Gentium, Ernst von Caemmerer (ed), 1969, 789. 
407 Fn 20 above. 
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The impact of this complex of principles and rules is that it governs actions;   
binds a judiciary to function according to law; and sets the limits from time to 
time, of the jurisdiction. Thereby, it defines unjust enrichment and the jurisdiction 
in which it is applied by the courts. That complex of principles and rules is what 
Professor Hart described in terms of rules of recognition and rules of 
adjudication, 
‘…the ultimate rule of recognition … must be regarded from the 
internal point of view as a public, common, standard of correct 
judicial decision.’408  
These instances of allowable actions that constitute the limits of jurisdiction, are 
as a matter of law and logic, linked or explained by a common principle.409 
Modern unjust enrichment in Anglo/Australian jurisdictions is symptomatic of a 
system of law, 
• that provides the conceptual foundation of each action.  
• that recognises and enables the superior courts, as a matter of 
rule of recognition, to declare new cases.  
and in which, 
• reasoning and logic are founded upon historical notions of aequo 
et bono, (equity and expediency) such that the courts rely on many 
centuries of learned opinion and upon practices in other 
jurisdictions, ancient and contemporary, that contribute reason, 
 
                                            
 
408 Concept of Law, 116. ‘Internal point of view…’, from the aspect of a participant in the particular legal 
system. 
409 At p 94 above, I have shown how the Australian ‘unifying legal concept’ and the English style of 
general principle do the same work. The present discussion encompasses both as principle. 
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consistency and predictability by establishing the foundations of 
doctrine of unjust enrichment.  
That there is such a recognition of underlying principle is an imperative: without 
the explanation of an underlying principle, precedents cannot be precedents at 
all because the cases will be unrelated, one to another.410 
The underlying principle is one that explains that the superior courts evaluate 
the scope of jurisdiction, adhering to judicial notions of legal logic. What it 
amounts to, in the simplest terms, is a decision that these circumstances are 
some of those contemplated by Lord Wright in his Fibrosa dictum,  
…[a]ny civilized system of law is bound to provide remedies for cases of 
what has been called unjust enrichment or unjust benefit, that is to 
prevent a man from retaining the money of or some benefit derived from 
another which is against conscience that he should keep.411 
 
The dictum amply states the principle of all modern cases; but whose 
conscience is at issue? This can only be answered in terms of ‘conscience 
explaining the succession of precedents’. It is incapable of being adjudicated 
upon except by a court of adequate jurisdiction, usually the superior court in a 
jurisdiction. Lord Wright’s use of ‘conscience’ must then, refer to legal 
conscience which is tantamount to the legal meaning of unjust. 
 
This applies also to the application of legally determined meanings of concepts 
such as mistake, free acceptance, total failure of consideration and other 
grounds of unjust enrichment. The recognition of the criteria essential to a 
decision to impose an obligation to make restitution is a critical structure in the 
                                            
 
410 See above, p 97 and Chapter 13, where I have described the same phenomenon. 
411 Fibrosa Spolka Akcynja v Fairbairn Lawson Combe Barber, fn 177. 
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law, and is critical to the nature of ‘conscience’ just as it is to the legal meaning 
of ‘unjust’.  
 
These criteria include;  
• common acceptance of the structure of the law; 
• common criteria of an action,  
• common recognition of a judicial duty to apply the law,  
• consistency with the doctrine of precedent,  
• consistent finding of a universal legal conscience.  
All of these essential features are the outcome of an intricate web of applicable 
principles.412Conscience becomes conceptually akin to reasonableness as a 
standard in tort: that amounts simply to a similarity of methodology.413  
Principles nevertheless, are the expression of legal reason and are grown upon 
the concepts from which they take their purpose. They are not a-priori truths 
having independent justification in a jurisdiction where the judges pursue reason 
and logic in stating the law. These are important issues when we come to say 
what elements of a finding of unjust enrichment are law and are therefore 
binding under the doctrine of precedent. 
 
The High Court of Australia, in its judgments defining unjust enrichment in 
Australian law, has ruled that the categories of case in which the law will impose 
an obligation to make restitution are not closed.414 The judgments did not add 
‘…as tended to be the case where the common counts were accepted as  
                                            
 
412 See Chapter 5, p 84-5 above. A notion of general principle of the Canadian kind has no place in such an 
interaction of principles because the underlying principle in Canadian law is expressed as a 
consequence of equitable doctrines applying in that jurisdiction. 
413 Not as some would have it, i.e., that there is a direct correlation; eg, R.F.V. Heuston and R.S. 
Chambers, Salmond and Heuston on the Law of Torts, 13. 
414 See Pavey & Matthews v Paul (1986-87) CLR 221, 257, per Deane J. 
 John B Donnelly. 95312086 
173
defining the territory…’,415although the experience of the law shows us that such 
a degree of formalism had characterised actions in the relatively recent past 
when courts in all common law jurisdictions were disposed to regard the 
common counts as the de-facto shape of unjust enrichment actions.416 In 
Australia & New Zealand Banking Group v Westpac Banking Corporation, the 
High Court indicated a distinct change,  
The basis of the common law action ...should now be recognised as lying 
...in restitution or unjust enrichment ...417 
 
The dictum adopts the complex of concepts principles and rules discussed 
above, including the Fibrosa principle. It could have no other meaning but that 
expressed or encompassed by that complex.  
 
For some lawyers, these dicta may pose more questions than they answer. 
They may question what it is about unjust enrichment that determines the scope 
of unjust enrichment actions? Is there an underlying principle which is assumed 
in such a dictum, and what is its nature. Is it a general principle of unjust 
enrichment by reference to which the courts will impose a rule? Are there 
several, or indeed many principles (as distinct from rules), each one of which is 
explained by unjust enrichment? If there is a general principle which explains all 
rules, is it impossible to say what it is? The answers to these questions involve 
the capacity of the courts to adopt the stable pattern of analysis which Professor 
Birks proposes, such as will allow them to reason from one action to another in a 
 
 
 
 
                                            
 
415 Above p 73. 
416 See Lord Wright’s observations on the point as regards English law, above pp 126, 138-39 and 171 and  
fn 231. 
417 (1987) 164 CLR 662, 673. 
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fashion which presents the law as unified.  Indeed, recent trends in the 
Australian High Court suggests that no progress is being made in this respect418 
 
Professor Birks observed that the courts have not made inroads upon the 
development of such a ‘stable pattern of analysis’ as would assist in the 
reasoning of a unity of this branch of the law.419The ‘vacuum’ which Keeton 
observed following upon the abolition of the common counts420 is a reality to the 
extent that the jurisprudence has not yet been fully developed and uniformly 
explained. It is potentially more significant in the Australian context because of 
the limitations imposed by the size of the jurisdictions. 
 
A significant issue in relation to the pattern of analysis is the disparity between 
Australian law and English law in regard to the unifying legal concept and the 
unifying principle of English law. The concept and the English general principle 
are not well understood and little or no effort has been made to explain that 
there is little practical difference.  Australian law will continue to need the 
broader frame of jurisprudence which is offered by the English jurisdiction at 
least in unjust enrichment, and whilst it need not follow slavishly, the capacity for 
comparative jurisprudence offered by a much larger jurisdiction is the key to 
internal Australian uniformity. English and Australian law are nevertheless, 
similar in their treatment of the elements of unjust enrichment. The key is the 
                                            
 
418 Fn 217 above. Roxborough v Rothmans of Pall Mall (2001) 208 CLR 516 demonstrates that the 
Australian High Court may not be progressing toward a stable pattern of analysis. See J Beatson and 
GT Virgo ‘Deferability Principle in Unjust Enrichment’ (2002) 118 LQR 352 at 353, ‘…the lack of 
clarity in the majority judgments as to the nature of the claim and what must be established emphasizes 
the need for clear,well defined principles such as the unjust enrichmen principle…’; Beatson and  
 Virgo questioned Justice Gummow’s dismissal of Lord Mansfield’s (Para 70-74) aequo et bono 
concept in Moses, saying that he omitted to analyse positive opinions including those of Profesor 
Winfield, at p 353 and queried Gummow J’s preferred analysis (para 84) in terms of unconscionability 
rather than unjust enrichment; ‘… “unjust” is not a cipher for a general investigation into justice…It is 
a concept that can be defined with some degree of precision by reference to the cases.’,  Beatson and 
Virgo, at 354. 
419 Ibid. 
420 G W Keeton, The Elementary Principles of Jurisprudence, 414ff. 
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inductive judicial process that explains why the law answers the question as to 
when the obligation will be imposed, that is ‘injustice’ in a primary sense rather 
than a wrong as a secondary question; the former is characteristic of unjust 
enrichment; the latter is exemplified by a breach in contract and tort.  
 
Each of the jurisdictions (English and Australian) acknowledges that the law is 
open to further development. If we characterise the development of unjust 
enrichment law as evolutionary, it can mean two things: firstly, the unity of 
conceptual foundation (because nothing can otherwise evolve); and secondly an 
emergence from, or breaking free from procedural constraints (which, in their 
day, made a jurisprudential explanation of the unity of actions unnecessary). 
There is no contradiction here: Lord Mansfield could look at the law, within the 
rigid confines of the forms of action, and recognise unifying factors that continue     
to explain development in modern cases in the superior courts.421 What is 
needed to perpetuate what Lord Mansfield began is a conscious development of 
unjust enrichment jurisprudence encompassing and filling out the need for a 
unified, stable pattern of analysis proposed by Professor Birks.422  
 
These sections have achieved the objectives listed at the beginning of the 
chapter, by demonstrating that the nature of grounds and of actions determine 
the extent of jurisdiction of the courts and therefore the actions depend upon 
principles that define clearly the character and the limits of jurisdiction. It has 
been explained also that linking the theoretical character of principles and rules 
to common reasoning when compelling communal standards are reflected in 
compulsive findings of legal principle, avoids the anomalous constraints upon 
 
                                            
 
421 This perception is at the root of the conclusion which I shall later arrive at, that it is essential that the 
law recognises and develops a jurisprudence of unjust enrichment, which will inevitably begin, as a 
modern science, with Lord Mansfield: see below, p 244-45, and the observations made on the 
judgments in Roxborough fn 12 in fnn 182, 418, and 617. 
422 Fn 217 above. 
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reasoning that has been seen as reminiscent of the forms of actions. It also 
offers the opportunity of developing sounder reasoning from case to case such 
as will achieve an explanation of what Lord Wright may have meant by universal 
conscience, that is, the correspondence of legal principle with compelling, 
universal communal standards of which honesty, truthfulness and good faith 
describe the paradigm of acceptable conduct. 
 
10.3. Comparison with Structure of Continental Systems of Law and a 
Significant Conclusion. 
 
Conceptual comparisons with some aspects of continental law in this sub-
chapter will provide a background to an mportant conclusion about the structure 
of English and Australian law. A useful contribution to knowledge of 
jurisprudence in modern unjust enrichment is found in this study. Essentially, 
this concerns special characteristics of concepts and principles in both 
Australian and English common Law, and many Continental systems, that are 
the foundations of law. 
  
The sub-chapter will also introduce the comparison between fundamental 
character of unjust enrichment and tort.  This brief topic notices the conclusions 
reached by a leading German jurist about a common feature of unjust 
enrichment and tort in common law and German jurisdictions.  The comparison 
is limited to a fundamental structural consideration. 
 
In Chapter 12 it will be noted that the comparison between tort and unjust 
enrichment has a precedent related to the German law. Eltjo Schrage and Barry 
Nicholas cite the commentary on jurisprudence of Ernst von Caemmerer who  
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drew a parallel between ‘general forms’ in tort and in restitution.423 Von 
Caemmerer considered both to rest upon fundamental abstractions, i.e., that a 
person should be compensated for injury by unlawful acts on the one hand, and 
nobody should be permitted to retain an unjust enrichment, on the other. Von 
Caemmerer explained that these are general propositions of the law: it is for the 
codes, the precedents and the contemporary courts to ‘fill them out’ especially 
by curial interpretations.424  
 
Von Caemmerer supposed that in either of these abstractions, the ‘filling out’ 
might take the form either of a general statement or of specific cases: both 
methods are in theory, compatible with each system. This recalls the oldest 
jurisprudential debates on the Continent about the nature of the unjust 
enrichment principle which, in the 12th C, focussed upon attempts to make 
general statements of law: ultimately they were abandoned, to revert, in the 
German and French codes initially, to the instances of cases allowed under the 
Justinian’s codes.425  
 
Schrage and Nicholas comment that the ‘filling out’ only becomes sensible when 
the critical questions as to when liability arises are answered by one or another 
juristic method. In the case of the German legislation, the task must be 
completed by ‘legal practice’. Von Caemmerer says courts and the practitioners 
have then to resolve the issues concerning critical concepts including ‘unlawful’, 
‘unjustified’, ‘without due cause’ etc.’426 
                                            
 
423 See Eltjo Schrage and Barry Nicholas ‘Unjust Enrichment and the Law of Restitution: A Comparison’, in Eltjo J. H. 
Schrage ed Unjust Enrichment: The Comparative Legal History of the Law of Restitution, 9, 26.  The comparison here is 
not part of the comparison between principles and rules that is addressed in Chapter 12.  It does however, explain the 
choice of tort for that comparative study. 
 424 Ibid.  
 425 The jurisprudential perceptions about the concept and principle are discussed again in Ch 13. 
426  Fn 423 above, at pp 26-7. It is not suggested that any of those concepts accurately reflects ‘unjust’: ‘Unjustified’ in the 
English idiom implies that there is is no legal justification. In the Anglo/Australian law, the party enriched has a good 
title until the disgorgement is effected by order of the court: up until that point, the party holds the benefit legally. Cf 
Daniel Friedmann ‘Unjust Enrichment, Pursuance of Self Interest, and the Limits of Free-riding’ Loyola of Los Angeles 
Law Review, v. 36, 830, 837-8. Friedmann explains this phenemon in relation to the German law where the notion of 
‘unjust’ is avoided in favour of a notion that reflects ‘absence of justifiable reason’ which coincides with early 
continental jurisprudence. 
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The critical process of development of concepts principles and rules from these 
‘abstractions’ follows one or other of two forms, that is a specific case-by-case 
finding of an instance of liability or obligation on the one hand, and on the other, 
the interpretation of a general statement of principle in legislation in the work of 
defining the rule in particular cases.427 In Anglo/Australian unjust enrichment, the 
reasoning from fundamental abstraction to rule follows the form, ‘are the 
circumstances of this case an instance of what has been found legally unjust?’ 
Such a question does not explicitly acknowledge the abstraction.  
 
This ‘categories of case’ approach is not to be confused with that specie of 
‘case-by-case’ approach that is strictly a process of accretion without unifying 
conceptual explanation: some jurists might have perceived the latter  
phenomenon to be ‘justice between man and man’ without understanding the 
depth of jurisprudential method that was developing or has developed.428 The 
circumstances of case approach is very much more finely foccussed on principle  
because it is built upon concepts and principles that define the obligation 
imposed by law, the nature of benefit, the circumstances of subtractive 
enrichment and the nature of ‘unjust’. On the other hand, the final step of 
reasoning from abstraction to general principle envisaged by von Caemmerer is 
not the broad general principle approach of North American jurisdictions. It is 
rather more reflective of the English principle of unjust enrichment which has  
 
 
                                            
 
427 In the German system, there is an analogy: von Caemmerer pointed out that it is  ‘…a matter of 
legislative technique whether one codifies a general statement or rather specific cases’. Schrage, fn 423  
above, 26. 
428  Fn 42. 
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been perceived to fulfil a generalised unifying role.429As I have explained in 
Chapter 7, the English principle nevertheless essentially does the same work as 
the Australian unifying legal concept: indeed in practice, it is difficult to separate 
the two as concepts. That fact makes the observation that follow equally 
applicable to Australian law. 
 
In previous chapters, I have sought to give meaning to the notion of a unifying 
legal concept and its counterpart unifying principle in English law. In Chapter 6, 
the key statement of principle in Pavey was examined.430This has provided a 
definition of concept and principle in a manner that is unique amongst common 
law jurisdictions although the English principle of unjust enrichment achieves the 
same purpose. The special contribution of the judgment is its achievement of an 
understanding of ‘concept of law’ that has seldom been articulated in the 
common law. This facility of foundation and categorisation of actions introduced 
by the unjust enrichment unifying legal concept establishes a clear and focussed 
jurisprudence. This is further explained in chapter 11. For the present, its 
importance is the clarity about unjust enrichment jurisprudence which it 
sponsors.  
 
To explain this point, it is necessary to take advance notice of a conclusion to be 
reached in chapters 11 and 12. In the Continental and South African Roman 
Dutch law, the rules of unjust enrichment are legislated but their conceptual 
basis is predominantly the actions of the Roman Institutes. The interpretation of 
instruments by the courts freely and usually acknowledges this conceptual 
basis.431 In the Anglo/Australian common law, the progression of judgments that  
                                            
 
429 See Goff and Jones, fn 163, 16. ‘…recourse must be had to the decided cases in order to transfer 
general into concrete rules of law”. Goff and Jones, fn 163, cite Lord Wright’s analysis of Lord 
Mansfield’s famous dictum. 
430 Above p 91, sub-ch. 6.2.Pp 87 and 92 and fn 215. 
431 Some detail of the basis of many Continental systems is set out in fn 193 above. 
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define actions in unjust enrichment fulfils the need of developed conceptual 
foundation upon which the grounds of actions are established by rules. This is 
after-all, what the unifying legal concept and the English principle of unjust 
enrichment achieve. The Pavey judgment is not the first, but it is the most 
central of these judgments in Australian law. In English common law, the 
judgments in Lipkin Gorman and Orakpo432 again, not by any means the first,  
but the most central, fulfil the same need of conceptual focus. In civilian law, that 
basis is supplied by the Institutes. Each in its own way, supplies the conceptual 
basis of actions.  
 
That is an important conclusion because it demonstrates conceptual factors in 
Continental law that are present, albeit in a very different form, in the English 
and Australian common law: that is, each relies upon a doctrinal conceptual 
basis, which is foundational law in the condictiones on the one hand, and 
foundational doctrines established in leading common law cases that are the 
land-mark cases for modern common lawyers. Each then relies upon 
development and application of principles by the modern courts in a manner that 
is true to the doctrinal basis of unjust enrichment and tort.433  
 
In von Caemmerer’s analysis, each system has, both in unjust enrichment and 
tort, a fundamental abstraction that is the concept of a tort and an unjust 
enrichment, and each relies on the superior courts to ‘fill them out’. Von 
                                            
 
432 Above fnn 222 and 300 respectively. 
433 See fn 406 above.  The north American approach differs significantly, at least as far as unjust  
enrichment is concerned, because the action of unjust enrichment as described in the Restatement, is 
the theoretical foundation of the jurisprudence. The cases, old and new, refine and interpret the 
general principle but they do not define it in the same sense as English case law does. The action 
embodied in the  general principle is akin to a legislated action. The Continental law is also legislated 
but the legislation adopts and interprets the ancient codes, the condictiones, to achieve a consistent 
application of age old jurisprudence. See fn 435 below: the essay of Evans-Jones and Kruse there 
cited characterises the Continental codes as ‘systematic’ systems of laws, an epithet which does not fit 
the English and Australian common law well and the North American law not at all. 
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Caemmerer’s notion of fundamental abstraction does not quadrate with the 
individual condictiones and the doctrinal case law of Anglo/Australian law: 
rather, it is the statement of general objectives of the law which determines 
which condictiones and which foundational cases belonging to the head of law 
described by the fundamental abstraction. In fact, it may augment the work of 
superior courts in modern common law if the key decisions they make, for 
example, as to the critical elements of the general principle in negligence, and 
the unifying legal concept of Australian unjust enrichment, were to be 
characterised in the manner of being crucial or fundamental characteristics of   
the law. More specifically, when the Ausralian High Court comes to making a 
critical examination of what has been called “mirror loss” and “subsidiarity”,434 as 
it inevitably will, it will do so in full consciousness that it is perhaps making land-
mark change, not just to unjust enrichment, but to the other specialities of the 
law that will inevitably undergo some doctrinal change in the result.  
 
Von Caemmer’s perceptions and the tentative conclusion I have drawn about 
similarity between the structure of German law and Anglo/Australian common 
law do not suggest an historical or jurisprudential convergence,435 nor does it 
offer particular benefit to be had by the comparison, but it demonstrates that in 
 
                                            
 
434 See Niall R. Whitty, ‘Rationality, Nationality and Taxonomy’ in Johnston and Zimmermann ed, 
Unjustified Enrichment: Key issues in Comparative Perspective, fn 193 above, essay 23, 658 at p 705. 
Whitty suggests that dispensing with ‘mirror loss’, the exactness of the at the expense of principle, and 
‘subsidiarity’, the rule that unjust enrichment defers to most other forms of liability, explains the 
vitality of German and Anglo-American law. His reference to ‘Anglo-American’ law can be taken to 
refer to parts of North America other than Quebec and Louisianna.  
435 See also Professor Ronald Dworkin’s treatment of rules and principles, above fn 399 and p 152. The 
comparison between the two foundations of principle is there explained, simply as a somewhat similar 
methodology. In comparing the condictiones of civilian law with the causes of actions in the English 
common law, Evans-Jones and Kruse did not assert convergence; rather, they found the condictiones 
systematic, in contrast to potential overlap and internal exchangeability in the English grounds, a 
characteristic that suggests the absence of a convergent trend: Robin Evans-Jones and Katrin Kruse, 
‘Failure of Consideration’, David Johnston and Reinhard Zimmerman, fn 193, 129, pp 135-6. It is 
doubtful however, that they have understood accurately, the Enlish actions to which they attribute 
over-lapping.  Schrage and Nicholas, above fn 423, point out that German jurist Martinek specifically 
discounted a suggestion that it does suggest such a thing. 
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addition to rules in the cases, there is a need of recognition of the doctrinal 
features of a head of law in English/Australian and Continental systems alike. A 
doctrine-like perception of the law would explain the character of rules that are 
the basis of actions, separate them in terms of taxonomy, and define them in 
terms of purpose. Whether such rules are truly doctrine does not diminish this 
need. In the alternative “embedded” might do.436 That is simply an 
acknowledgment of the efficacy of taxonomy and clarity of jurisprudential 
objectives. It is a clear message to those who favour in the alternative, an active 
general principle and normalisation of a generally stated ground of action. This 
is a suitable introduction to Chapter 11. A short reassessment of unifying 
concept in unjust enrichment will also provide a suitable introduction to Chapters 
11 and 12. 
 
10.4. Returning to the ‘Unifying Concept’. 
  
This sub-chapter makes a brief assessment of the possibility that juristic 
classification might assist toward the objective of defining a uniform pattern of 
analysis. The issues are demonstrated by Ernst J. Weinrib; ‘…[j]uridical 
classification presupposes that private law is a juridical phenomenon.’437 Weinrib 
was writing of contract, especially the fundamentals of contract theory.  Such 
elements of contract derive, he says, not from commercial or constitutional 
convenience or necessity but from the juridical character of contract.  
 
Categories, says Weinrib, ‘…are isolated when they are not systematically 
connected to one another.’438 The conclusion he leads us to, descending from 
accepted principles and rules, is that the characteristic unity of a discreet branch 
                                            
 
436 Fnn 162 and 457. 
437 ‘Juridical Classification of Obligations’ in Peter Birks (ed) The Classification of Obligations, 37, pp 37-
39, citing G W F Hegel, The Philosophy of Right, s. 77R. 
438 Id. p 39. 
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of the law also characterises the subordinate classifications it contains.439 The 
dilemma however, is whether one regards the juridical nature of contract as 
stemming from the juridical character of agreement or alternatively, from 
promise: the difference might be significant.440  
 
A juridical concept of unjust enrichment will be differently analysed depending 
upon fundamental characteristics that vary with the jurisdiction, for example, 
whether it is a unifying legal concept or an active normative general principle. 
The character of ‘unjust’, whether or not it is regarded as a juridical question, is 
to be determined upon a complete overview of actions.  
 
In the end, it will be essential that the juristic classification agrees in all   
respects with the fundamental requirements that rules must be united by 
principle stated in the cases if they can be truly regarded as instances of the 
application of precedent; and secondly, a decision making new law would 
properly require a judgment of extraordinary quality; a profound treatment of 
authority and of principles.441  It is doubtful that juridical analysis, the opinions of 
legal scholars, can contribute more than this in terms of practical application of 
principles especially because, in the final analysis, reasoning is plainly the work 
of the courts rather than the commentators. 
 
                                            
 
439  This, as regards unjust enrichment, is because in juristic terms, the law does not extend to categories of 
commercial losses or unanticipated expenses which defy explanation in terms of ‘benefit’ and 
subtractive enrichment. Indeed,  it might be said that that Weinrib’s presentation suggests that the 
doctrine-like character of unjust enrichment will itself determine that the circumstances that we call 
‘grounds’ are the rational imperative of unjust enrichment. 
440 Ibid.  Weinrib claims that restitution is a ‘notorious example’ of the frustrating influence of history 
upon the development of juridical categories of law. I demur.  I believe that one of the great benefits of 
having Lord Mansfield in the middle of common law unjust enrichment history is that he has provided 
the stimulation that has allowed modern juristic character of the law to survive the stultifying effects of 
the quasi contract misconception on the underlying jurisprudence. Weinrib’s statement however, might 
have intended a comparison with the North American law of restitution. 
441 See p 188, below. 
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A clear understanding of juridical classification may nevertheless, provide a 
safeguard against unprincipled developments. Problems about whether an 
action is truly, taxonomically within the sphere of unjust enrichment are what this 
consciousness might seek to avoid. Such a question is a rarely encountered in 
unjust enrichment however,  because unjust enrichment actions cannot arise 
unless there is a benefit had at the expense of a party in circumstances that are 
a ground of an action.     
 
Alternatively, there may be a different approach to analysing actions simply 
according to content, and the principles they serve. A broad general principle 
may be so described. In this kind of action, which is dubiously representative of 
Anglo/Australian law, it could be asked are the offending actions formed upon a 
foundation of external policy or quasi constitutional factors that do not derive 
from the juridical characteristics of unjust enrichment? The use of legislated 
actions of unjust enrichment for recovery of benefits of a broader classification 
might be an example.442  This might become a reality if the at the expense of or 
“minor loss” rules, as they are sometimes called, are softened. 
 
Whatever the merits of claims made for adoption of juristic character of rules, 
actions and principles in general, I do not favour pursuit of the re-interpretation 
of unjust enrichment under the banner of juridical or juristic analysis, especially 
because I believe that the reasoning that characterises the fundamentals of 
unjust enrichment is adequately described, either as doctrine or doctrine-like 
principle, or as ‘concepts and principles embedded in the law’443 which achieves 
the same effect as attributing doctrinal characteristics to the elements of the        
                                            
 
442 See fnn 18, especially the article of Professor Birks’ in which he argues the influence of socio/political 
factors in the drafting of the original Restatement. It is just this kind of influence that, in Weinrib’s 
argument, sets up a rationale of actions that is at odds with the grounds determined by inate doctrinal 
characteristics. See fn 435 suggesting that Weinrib had North American restitution in mind when he 
asserted a frustration of the doctrinal development of modern grounds. 
443 Fn 162 above and below 457. 
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actions. The doctrine-like character of unjust enrichment rules entails a similar 
characterisation of concepts and principles.  This will achieve precise and 
predictable classification of grounds.444  
 
The fundamental rules of unjust enrichment assume a significant unifying 
potential because together, the rules which we could categorised as Professor 
Hart did, that is, as primary, secondary, rules of recognition and rules of 
adjudication,445describe the character and extent of the law. They define 
instances of rights and obligations. This, however, depends upon analysis of the 
leading cases and follows from the nature of the considerations that are unjust in 
law, rationally, self-determining.446 
 
The significance of the discussion of classification from a juristic standpoint is 
that Weinrib’s notions are focused upon a special extension of classification; 
taxonomy, but with a more specifically descending order of classification that 
introduces notions of juristic concepts such as the inherent purpose of rules. The 
question ‘what is justice?’ can be seen to be as significant as what the law says 
is an instance of unjust enrichment. This I believe, is an interesting approach. An 
adequate enquiry is nevertheless achieved by attention to taxonomy that, if 
followed according to the principles of the cases and in terms of parameters that 
satisfy the test of concepts and notions elucidated by methods properly adapted 
to their character.447  This will defenc the law against definition of rules according 
to new and unpredictable parameters. 
 
                                            
 
444 Fn 442 above. 
445 Chapters 9 and 11. 
446 Above, sub-chapter 10.2.  
447 See Professor Hart, fn 571, and see Hill v Van Erp  (1997) 188 CLR 159, 190, per Toohey J, making a 
cognate assessment of the proximity principle in tort; see pp 233-34.  
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Chapter 11: Jurisprudence of Unjust Enrichment. 
 
11.1. Introduction. 
 
In this chapter, I will explain further the importance of a clear and focused 
jurisprudence of unjust enrichment.  
 
Over the course of eight hundred years, the common law of unjust enrichment 
has been isolated from developing principles and rules and from the kind of 
influences that were the foundation of legal taxonomy. The Crown, through the 
official policy of the courts, tried relentlessly to isolate the common law from 
outside influences so that at least officially, Roman law and ecclesiastical Canon 
law would play no part in the development of jurisprudence. Unjust enrichment, 
from the time of its earliest manifestation in common law, experienced several 
mutations driven by fundamental changes in the common law as a whole. These 
mutations were not all positive for the development of principle and its early 
association with assumpsit and the persistent quasi contract perception stultified 
the growth of jurisprudence.  
 
Such was the impact of the forms of actions and the residual fixation upon 
stereotypes as principles and rules, that the jurisprudence was, in any case, 
thought to be unnecessary or irrelevant. It is indeed ironic that at the end of the 
journey, the English common law of unjust enrichment has limited, and yet 
fundamental similarities to Roman law and to Roman-Dutch law of Continental 
Europe and South Africa. The extent of similarity is outlined in the previous 
chapter. 
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In spite of the durability of the underlying concept and principle, there exists a 
conviction amongst some members of the profession that Anglo/Australian law 
of unjust enrichment has yet to embark upon its natural journey, hand-in-hand 
with equity; there is a belief that unjust can be rationalised by merging it with 
concepts of unconscionable and inequitable.448 It is true that North American 
common law has gone down this path, but the North American unjust 
enrichment has probably been influenced by just one aspect of civilian 
jurisprudence of Continental Europe: German law has avoided the word ‘unjust’ 
in favour of ‘unjustified’ that has a wholly different connotation.449The comments 
in the previous chapter make it plain that a law of unust enrichment that 
depends upon absence of juridical reason for transfer, does not represent 
Continental law: indeed it resembles only one of many aspects of the 
Continental actions. There is an urgent need of clarity about jurisprudence if the 
courts are to continue to develop a law of unjust enrichment that is internally 
consistent, predictable and soundly argued and explained in the courts.  As the 
development of arguments will show, the conceptual character of unjust 
enrichment is the key to unity of actions.  
 
 
                                            
 
448 The Australian High Court has exhibited the influence of this line of thinking without explaining how 
the fundamental differences of purpose and focus can be assimilated; see fnn 536 and 537 below. In an 
obiter dictum in Dart Industries Inc v Décor Corp Ltd (1993) 179 CLR 101, 111, Deane and Dawson 
JJ expressed an opinion that, in a context of a fused law and equity, principles of fairness and justice 
underlying earlier decisions were to be seen as at least cognate to equitable standards of 
unconscionability, or lack of good conscience. The dictum may have been rather more directed to 
equity informing the concept of unjust in unjust enrichment than to promoting assimilation of 
principles and rules. The US law is considerably more ope-ended: see fn 412 above.  
449 Above, fn 426 and accompanying text. See also fn 293 and accompanying text. The notion of ‘lack of 
juristic explanation for transfer’ which may be considered a satisfactory approach to jurisprudence in 
some North American jurisdictions appears to debunk principed explanation of the actions: In this 
respect, see above p 88; the lack of jurisprudential relationship between the unjust enrichment principle 
and the constructive trust resembles the quasi contract enigma because unjust enrichment as compared 
to equity has a completely different focus: and p 121; the enquiry as ti whether there is a justiciable 
reason for transfer ‘…answers only one question…’: and see also 170 and 174; without recognition of 
an underlying principle, rules cannot be precedents because they are not capable of being uniformly 
explained.  See Daniel Friedmann ‘Unjust Enrichment, Pursuance of Self Interest, and the Limits of 
Free-riding’ Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review, v. 36, 830, 838, where he comments upon the 
difference between ‘unjust’ and ‘unjustified’ in relation to German law. 
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Every civilised system of law should have rules of unjust enrichment450and its 
development, in the common law, is the task of the courts. That is not to say that 
decisions by courts of ultimate authority will be good law in the practical sense 
and in terms of jurisprudence, when the decisions fail to recognise the 
theoretical issues and take account of the relationship to the common law as a 
whole. These are issues of theory and taxonomy: they are not rules of law: 
nevertheless, it will be shown that internal consistency in the law cannot be 
sustained if they are ignored as issues. 
 
The questions to be answered in this chapter are these: 
 
1. How do the works of theory analysed in previous chapters, assist analysis 
of concept, principle and rule? 
2. What elements of a decision, of concepts, principles and rules, form part 
of the rule and might therefore constitute precedent for later cases? 
 
The latter question is important: there must be clarity about what is law, and 
therefore, as to how the courts are to explain a law of unjust enrichment that is 
internally consistent. 
 
11.2. Theory, and Decisions in the Courts. 
 
Rules must be united by principle. When a superior court makes a decision 
effectively breaking new ground, a great deal depends upon its interpretation of 
concepts principles and rules. The finality of the superior courts’ decisions is a 
determinant of the direction that the law will take because of the obligation of 
inferior courts to follow binding precedents. A significant question is this, 
                                            
 
450 The passage is meant to recall Fibrosa, above, fnn 476 and 411 and accompanying text. 
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what does theory offer as guidance to the courts on issues of jurisprudence 
when a fundamental change in the law is contemplated?451 
A starting point will be a recognition that a decision making new law would 
properly require a judgment of extraordinary quality; a profound treatment of 
authority and of principles; and, extraordinary foresight as to what will be the 
effect of a new decision upon the existing grounds. Of equal importance is the 
compatibility of the new ground and its incidents, with other branches of the law. 
Such was the quality of decisions in Fibrosa,452 Pavey,453Lipkin Gorman,454and 
David Securities,455 to mention but a few examples.456 Rules governing what a 
superior court may do and what its decisions must do are the standard by which 
a learned opinion might be formed that a decision is law: I will treat this topic 
under several headings and suggest conclusions that can be drawn. 
 
(a) The rudiments of jurisprudence of unjust enrichment. 
 
It is in this context that rules that Hart calls rules of adjudication and rules of 
recognition are perceived to be the product of concepts and principles that 
promise consistency, predictability and efficacy in theoretical terms.457 In this 
light, the choice of approach by which one will be guided, i.e. of Hart or Dworkin 
or others, is not crucial, and much can be learned from each of them. Of crucial 
 
 
                                            
 
451 Cf Sir Frederick Pollock, A First Book of Jurisprudence, 17, pointing out that a rule of procedure made 
by a judge is a law even though it is habitually called ‘a rule of court’. 
452 Fibrosa Spolka Akcynja v Fairbairn Lawson Combe Barber fn 177. 
453 Pavey and Matthew’s Pty Ltd v Paul. fn 1. 
454 Lipkin Gorman v Karpnale Ltd. [1991] 2 AC 548. 
455 David Securities Ltd v Commonwealth Bank of Australia fn 204 
456 This line of reasoning might suggest that there are issues that might eventually see the High Court re-
visit its decision in Dart Industries, fn448, at least to explain perceived anomalies.  The nature of the 
theoretical problem is noticed by Mason and Carter, 1995, [1711].  A part of equity is not ‘…excised 
to become part of the law of restitution.’ 
457  See Windeyer J in Hargrave v Goldman (1963) 110 CLR 40, 63, describing important concepts as 
‘…concepts, pre-requisite to a finding of liability, embedded in the law, by compulsive 
pronouncements of the highest authority, and which give the law symmetry, consistency and the 
defined bounds essential to reasonable predictability.’ .See fn 467 below. 
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importance though, is the character of the primary obligation that is imposed by 
a court in response to an action for unjust enrichment. That was argued in Ch 7 
as the central characteristic of unjust enrichment.458 This highlights a need for 
understanding of the jurisprudence that encompasses the structure of concepts, 
principles and rules of unjust enrichment. The rules must be understood as inter-
related and this needs to be explained. 
 
It has been seen in Chapter 6 that Hart proposed that several instances of a rule 
may be different constituents of the same complex activity.459 To view the notion 
in a modern relevant context, it could be explained that a company limited by 
shares, and a company limited by guarantee are instances of a corporate legal 
entity that can be seen as a ‘complex activity’. Hart’s notion of ‘complex activity’, 
in a given context, captures the interaction of the many subsidiary rules, and in 
unjust enrichment, it refers to subsidiary rules that uphold and defend a primary 
right and a complementary primary obligation. It is a tool of language and has no 
legal significance except in the manner that it borrows ideas from everyday 
usage to help explain what is happening in unjust enrichment. 
 
In the unjust enrichment context, a notion of ‘complex activity’ has served its 
purpose if it contributes to understanding that the rule in an unjust enrichment 
case relies upon a complex of contributing rules. These contributing rules reflect 
the manner in which other groups of rules work together such as ‘rules of the 
law of negligence’, ‘rules of equity’ or ‘rules of contract’. Each group will be 
important to the foundation of rules in cases that draw upon these foundational 
and subsidiary rules. The character of these contributing rules becomes 
important when it is considered that they may be critical to the rule in a particular  
 
                                            
 
458  pp 126-27 and 132-33. 
459 Above p 135-6, and see fn 333. The notion employs the Hart notion of complex activity which 
combines reasoning from several sources of principle; H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, 15-16; see 
also Neil MacCormick, H.L.A. Hart, 20 et seq. 
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case. In unjust enrichment, the character of benefit is defined by such subsidiary 
rules. 
 
Comparison with other fields of law is elucidating. It will augment my purpose to 
look briefly at comparative experience in chapter 12 where a comparison of 
concepts, principles and rules is made with especial focus on the law of tort. 
Some aspects of the tort comparison however, have immediate relevance. One 
might ask, is the ‘neighbour principle’460 which has had such a profound 
influence on the law of tort, a principle of law, or is it a rule, or an element of a 
rule? If it is a principle, the next enquiry is this: is it now, as it was in Lord Atkin’s 
1932 judgment, an underlying concept upon which a narrower precedent was 
built?  
 
In suggesting answers to these questions, it is pertinent to consider the 
relationship of principle and precedent (itself a legal doctrine) in the following 
way: 
• Is it so that in Lord Atkin’s day, the neighbour principle was not 
part of binding precedent? and  
• might it therefore have been departed from by a court of lower or 
equal jurisdiction even though, in doing so, the rule in 
Donoghue461 might have been rendered artificial, or uncontrolled 
by governing principle, or devoid of substance without it.  
 
 
 
 
                                            
 
460 fnn 344, at p 582 per Lord Atkin. 
461 Ibid. 
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As though to answer this very question, in a 1963 dictum, Windeyer J described 
the neighbour principle as  
  ...a concept of a duty of care ... a prerequisite of liability in negligence
  ... embedded in our law by compulsive pronouncements of the highest 
  authority.  
He continued,  
  ...and it may well be that it could not be otherwise, if the law of   
  negligence is to have symmetry, consistency and defined bounds and 
  its application in particular cases is to be reasonably predictable.’462  
 
Consideration of Donoghue’s case will reveal the rationale of Justice Windeyer’s 
conclusion. Without the concept of duty of care, there was no uniform, 
reasonable basis for distinguishing between a case where a duty might be owed 
and one where no such duty could reasonably be imputed.  
 
Such is the nature of the theoretical issue which underlies the description of 
unjust enrichment and its function in the law. Justice Windeyer’s dictum, if we 
may apply it to unjust enrichment, would hold the subsidiary elements of the 
primary obligation, to be embedded in the law. This reasoning entails that when 
we refer to the obligation that arises from a demonstrated ground of unjust 
enrichment, we refer also to those subsidiary elements of the unjust enrichment 
concept which are ‘embedded’ in the law, that is, firstly, the obligation relates to 
a ‘benefit’ defined in the cases; secondly, a plaintiff will only have standing if the 
enrichment is at her/his expense;463a and thirdly, it is founded upon a ground of 
legal unjustness recognised by the superior court of the jurisdiction. 
 
 
                                            
 
462Hargrave v Goldman (1963) 110 CLR 40, 63. 
462a See Mason and Carter, fn 313, [205], negating one of the elements of unjust enrichment. 
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There are other subsidiary rules that are embedded in unjust enrichment or that 
are assumed by its central features. One is that voluntariness vitiates the ground 
of the action, but others define the elements of grounds such as the meaning of 
free acceptance, failure of consideration etc. All of these subsidiary rules, 
principles and concepts are contemplated in the concept of unjust enrichment. 
 
Explaining unjust enrichment in this way assists in analysing the jurisprudence. 
At the heart of the complex activity (unjust enrichment) are special primary and 
secondary rules. The primary obligation of restitution reflects a primary rule of 
the kind that defines the curial response to an unjust enrichment ground, by its 
interaction with secondary rules of adjudication and rules of recognition that Hart 
described as ‘the heart of a legal system’.463  Hart’s ‘primary rules’ are those that 
establish obligations and duties and define crimes, delicts and contract.  The 
obligation in unjust enrichment, being the direct consequence of the enrichment 
is primary. His secondary rules include those that establish the jurisdiction of 
courts to deal with primary rules. Rules of recognition that I have explained are 
really a consequence of precedent, are part of these secondary empowering 
rules because they relate to the manner of recognising obligations rather than 
the obligation to make restitution itself. 
 
 
 
                                            
 
463 The Concept of Law, Ch 5, esp. pp 96-98. See above Ch 9.2, pp 142 ff. The distinction between primary 
obligation and obligations perceived to arise under other areas of law can only be explained adequately 
in terms of Hart’s notion of primary and secondary rules. Obligations under other heads of law, with 
the exception of some rules in equity, are secondary in the sense that they derive from an order to 
abide by a judgment, so that they are responses to secondary rules under Hart’s scheme of primary and 
secondary obligations, rules, rights and duties. Cf fn 280 above.  See also fn 319 above, concerning the 
long history of the distinction between primary and secondary obligations.  Professor Birks advocates 
a similar approach to that of Hart, in this respect: Peter Birks, ‘Equity in the Modern Law’, (1996) 26 
WALR 1, 11-20; and, Mason and Carter, fn 313. 
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Neil MacCormick’s commentary on Hart, observes that Hart intended by rules of 
recognition, that they describe the obligation of the official, qua judge, to apply rules 
and adjudicate according to law. This is consistent with the doctrine of precedent in 
the common law.464 Such obligation to apply the rules authoritatively stated by a 
superior court, involves both the application of primary rules imposing a primary 
obligation such as to make restitution, and secondary rules, ‘finding tort’, ‘ordering 
damages’. Unjust enrichment is quite different to tort in this respect. In unjust 
enrichment, what is required is the rule of recognition inherent in precedent, binding 
the court to impose the primary obligation according to law. It is simply a rule 
familiar to lawyers that bears a special characterisation to enhance explanation of 
the innate characteristics. Each speciality of the law will be found, to some degree, 
to exhibit its own special characteristics. 
 
MacCormick envisages that many of these rules will be found in the intent of the 
legislative rules that establish the office of judge and the institution of the court. He 
explains that Professor Hart’s subordinate rules and the rule defining the ground of 
a particular action, are law. That primary obligation extended to ‘…all those other 
rules which are “valid” [Hart] because they satisfy the criteria of recognition.’465 In 
this way, unjust enrichment is a primary rule because it identifies an obligation; but it 
is also a rule of recognition because it joins with the statutes establishing the 
judiciary requiring a judge to impose, through enforceable orders of the court, an 
obligation to make restitution.466  
                                            
 
464 See A. MacAdam and J. Pyke, Judicial Reasoning and the Doctrine of Precedent in Australia, esp. ch 16, for their 
treatment of principles and rules in the context of modern doctrine of precedent. I do not however adhere to their 
conceptual compartmentalisation of rules and principles in the law, which I believe is highly artificial in some 
circumstances, a fact which is borne out by this study of unjust enrichment. Other leading texts consulted have 
included Rupert Cross and JW Harris, Precedent in English Law; Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Nature of the 
Common Law’ (‘Eisenberg’), Laurence Goldstein, Precedent in Law’ (‘Goldstein’), and R. Dworkin, ‘The Model of 
Rules’ in Ronald Dworkin ed. The Philosophy of Law, Ch 11, (‘Dworkin’). 
465 Neil MacCormick, H L A Hart, 22. 
466 Judicial duties and the powers that they imply are reflected in Professor Hart’s rules of adjudication and rules of 
recognition. Characterising rules in this way does not suggest anything about the authority of the rule: it is simply a 
matter of categorizing the rules to assist analysis. Hart did not have unjust enrichment specifically in mind, but the 
notion of a ‘primary rule’ becomes particularly useful in unjust enrichment in describing the differences between 
rules that are founded on breach of a primary rule, e.g. contract, where the primary rule is an obligation to perform 
ones contract, and secondary rules, ordering compensation for the breaches of  contract, that do not arise in unjust 
enrichment because the imposing the obligation to make restitution is a primary response to a primary rule, that 
which holds that in circumstances identified by the superior court, one is obliged to make restitution for unjust 
enrichment.  
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Thus far, the work of this chapter has been to analyse the complex of rules that 
serve to define the rudiments of unjust enrichment jurisprudence. This will 
facilitate one of the conclusions to be drawn at the end of this chapter in these 
terms: 
 
• without a predictable jurisprudence of its own, unjust enrichment is at risk 
of being defined in terms of doctrines of other branches of the law, to the 
mutual disadvantage of taxonomy and principle in each. 
 
(b) The work of concepts in relation to jurisprudence. 
 
In negligence, the principles determine the circumstances that give rise to a duty 
of care resting upon a particular person in a specific case. A host of concepts 
are invoked in a rule of this kid. In unjust enrichment, the principle or concept 
that unifies cases tells us what is essential to the action. Concepts of benefit or 
enrichment, and at the expense of, and legal unjustness, establish the criteria of 
recognition: these rules address issues, especially, the standing of the plaintiff, 
the character of the benefit in dispute, and the reason of legal unjustness: 
‘recognition’ gatheres together several different kinds of rules that affect a 
plaintiff’s ability to make its case. The concepts like benefit and unjust, make it 
possible to articulate the rule. Thus legal concepts are ‘…concepts, pre-requisite 
to a finding of liability, embedded in the law, by compulsive pronouncements of  
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the highest authority, and which give the law symmetry, consistency and the 
defined bounds essential to reasonable predictability.’467 
 
It becomes clear then that to say what is law and what is mere legal concept or 
a supporting principle, is a task fraught with some complexity.  It can be 
concluded though, that analysed in this way, concepts of unjust enrichment, 
express essential characteristics of secondary rules, (defining rights to legal 
redress and the obligation on judges to apply the primary rules of law). It is 
therefore possible to assert that the subsidiary concept of at the expense of, for 
example, is an essential part of a rule of law and therefore of the rationii of 
relevant cases. It could not be contemplated than an action existed without it. 
 
The negligence general principle and unjust enrichment concept/principle, whilst 
expressed as principles underlying the rule in the case, are in fact also rules of 
recognition in the sense in which Hart uses that categorisation. The enabling 
principle and the obligating rule of recognition, work together, establishing the 
rule and obliging the court to apply it according to law. If one follows Justice 
Windeyer’s dicta cited above,468 they are inseparable from the rule laid down by 
a court in a finding ordering damages for negligence or restitution for unjust 
enrichment. That conclusion follows Hart’s reasoning also.These concepts, 
principles and rules are the tools by which the courts ‘fill out’ the broad 
propositions, or ‘fundamental abstractions’ that will be commented upon in the 
next chapter. 
 
It is now possible to say how the principle of unjust enrichment is related to a 
unifying concept. This is because the reasoning in both the English general 
principle and the Australian unifying legal concept, informs both the primary  
                                            
 
467 Hargrave v Goldman, per Windeyer J, above fn 462. 
468 Ibid. The dictum is quoted at p 191. 
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rules and the secondary rules, depending on which purpose one has when 
referring to the principle. And when it is asked, does the concept, or the principle 
or both, form part of any decision of the superior courts which is binding upon a 
court below, it can be answered that  
• as an essential part of the primary rule, the source of the obligation 
imposed by law, and  
• as an essential part of the secondary rules, empowering and obliging a 
court to order restitution,  
both concept and principle are inseparable from the decision of the court.  
 
These paragraphs contribute to a second conclusion to be drawn below. Thus, 
The function of the unifying legal concept is to draw together the characteristics 
of an action. Concepts are seen to be central reference points which assist in 
defining the factors which draw the law to a unity of purpose. 
 
(c) Theoretical contribution to underlying jurisprudence. 
 
The merit of following Hart has been that his work makes Justice Windeyer’s 
dicta that much more specific in terms of what is authoritatively ‘embedded in 
the law’. The principles of unjust enrichment are made more comprehensible by 
analysing them in terms of primary and secondary rules; they take on this 
character of ‘rules’ in the authoritative finding of the court. 
 
 
Two summary points may be made at this juncture: 
1. The concept and principle of unjust enrichment are inseparable from the 
law when they are found in the decision of a court. The concept of unjust 
enrichment is important to taxonomy when used in other contexts; that is, 
it informs about the nature of the obligation imposed by law and about the 
role of the court in a relevant case. 
2. ‘unjust enrichment’ is not mere conceptual, contextual background to the 
reasons for the decision; it does not cease to be law in an actual decision 
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simply because it is seen to be a mere concept. Indeed, it assumes the 
charcter of doctrine.469  
 
These conclusions help us to understand what Hart intended in his thesis when 
he wrote ‘…a distinguishing, if not the distinguishing characteristic of law lies in 
its fusion of different types of rules.’470 The conclusion describes well the 
reasoning of the Justice Windeyer dictum. 471 
 
 
11.3. Hart and Kelson: Theory Augmenting Reasoning in the Cases. 
 
In unjust enrichment, the character of subordinate rules as essential elements of 
a judgment, is well illustrated by the reasoning of Lord Goff in Kleinwort Benson 
Ltd v Lincoln City Council.472 Lord Goff observed that the action in restitution for 
mistake accrues at the time of payment:473 Lord Goff found that the action arose 
independently of whether the parties or one of them, believed reasonably, on an 
established view of the law, (or even because of a previous curial decision) that 
there was no mistake of law. It could be said, at the time of payment of the 
money, that no one was mistaken. (This was because other litigation on the 
swaps cases had found the swaps agreements ultra-vires). But that was not the 
issue if in the eyes of the law, the money was received at the expense of the 
plaintiff in a circumstance that the law holds to be unjust. The actual 
consciousness of mistake, at the time of payment (under the supposedly valid 
                                            
 
469 Compare the juristic meaning of an ‘account’ in the ancient action: unjust enrichment is not mere 
quantum: see above, p 38 and fnn 78 and 93. As to the meaning of this reference to doctrine, see pp 
179-80 above describing the doctrinal foundations of rules in the common law to be found in the 
leading cases, specifically the conclusion that a ‘…doctrine-like perception of the law would explain 
the character of rules that are the basis of actions.’ 
470 Concept of Law, Ch 5. 
471 See also Sir William Anson, Principles of the English Law of Contract, 195, 471 for related comment 
on the character of mistake in contract. 
472 [1998] 4 All ER 513. 
473 Id,at 542. 
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pre-existing agreement) was irrelevant.474 This illustrates the complex system of 
different rules that conforms to Hart’s pre-requisite of law. Lord Goff’s dictum 
employs a rule descending by virtue of precedent, from authoritative cases, that 
mistake is a ground of an action in unjust enrichment, rather than an event. Hart 
would have expected that the law of unjust enrichment would comply with a 
fundamental characteristic in that it is “…a fusion of different types of rules…”, 
and the law of negligence likewise.475 This assumes, I believe, that rules may be 
developed by analogy with another field of law476 or another action in the same 
legal field, which resembles the complex activity that Birks referred to as a 
pattern of analysis.477  
 
A theme pursued by Hart in his Concept of Law, explains that the union of two 
elements of the law, that is, the coercive rules and the obligation creating 
rules,478 has the power to explain or elucidate ‘the concepts that constitute the 
frame-work of legal thought’.479 If applied to concepts upon which unjust 
enrichment is built, the statement might be seen to be relevant to the 
dependence of obligation upon the tripartite elements,  
                                            
 
474  It follows that honest receipt cannot operate as a defence in point of principle. If one interposes that the  
 law will not impose an obligation because of honest receipt, it must be that there is something by way 
 of a qualifying factor which forms no part of the syllogism; see Kleinwort Benson  fn 472, 540-1, per  
 Lord Goff. Cf.,  David Securities Ltd v Commonwealth Banking Corporation fn 204, p 399, per 
Brennan J.  
475 Concept of Law, Ch 5. In Kleinwort Benson,fnn 472 and 474, the payment was in any event, not the 
focus of mistake. The mistake was the belief of the parties in the particular case, that the swaps 
agreement was valid. 
476 I perceive Hart’s notion of  ‘fusion’ however, as rules working together in the manner of equitable 
estoppel working together with rules of contract in Waltons Stores (Interstate) v Maher (1988) 164 
CLR 387, esp. 428-429 per Brennan J, rather than some degree of melding in which rules loose their 
identity and taxonomy of the law is compromised. See also Austotel Pty Ltd v Franklins Self Service 
Pty Ltd (1989) 16 NSWLR 582, 602-603, per Priestly JA, dissenting. See also Rupert Cross and J W 
Harris, Precedent in English Law, p 26, stating that reasoning from case to like case by analogy is 
consistent with Stare  Decisis; the authors cite Parke B in Mirehouse v Renell, (1833) 1 Cl. & F. 527, 
546. ‘Our common law system consists in the applying to new combinations of circumstances those 
rules of law which we derive from legal principles and judicial precedents; and for the sake of 
obtaining uniformity, consistency and certainty, we must apply [them] where they are not plainly 
unreasonable and inconvenient, to all cases which arise:…’. 
477 Above p 173-4 and fn 418. 
478 Hart’s notion of obligation has been noticed in the explanation of obligation above in sub-ch’s. 7.3 to 
7.5 inclusive. 
479 Concept of Law, 81.  
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 (i) the concept of benefit,  
 (ii) the exclusiveness of the subtractive enrichment, and  
 (iii) the juridical nature of unjustness. 
Indeed, it is the interaction of rules which Hart has characterised as coercive for 
one part, and obligation creating for the other that gives life and momentum to 
these concepts. Here can be seen an explanation of the role of unifying concept 
which draws together subordinate concepts into the kind of unity Hart refers 
to.480 
 
These paragraphs contribute to the conclusions below in this manner: 
 
• in regard to the notion of unifying legal concept, the words refer to the 
conceptual structure of the action, combining as it does the rules that 
provide the characterisation of obligation and the rules that determine a 
legal standard of unjustness.  
 
Just as tort provided the conceptual framework within which the courts were 
able to find new economic torts, it was possible too for the courts to find, as in 
David Securities Ltd v Commonwealth Banking Corporation,481 adopting the 
decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Air Canada v British Columbia,482 
that mistake of law was a new ground in unjust enrichment. The reasoning that 
once mistake was a ground, there is no point in distinguishing one mistake from 
                                            
 
480 Contrast the reasoning Hans Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State, 50 ff.  Kelsen inverts the 
notions of rule and sanction to propose that the reason of the rule, which Hart would equate with 
principle, is mere justification for the primary aspect of law, vis the order which must be complied 
with. There is no apparent scope for interaction of concept and principle in a Kelsen like approach. 
This will become pertinent to a later conclusion in this work. 
481 (1992) 175 CLR 353. 
482 (1989) 59 DLR (4th) 161, p 191. Schrage and Nicholas, above fnn 423 and 435 point out that German 
jurist Martinek specifically discounted a suggestion that it does suggest such a thing. 
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another,483 indicates resort to a wider concept. That wider concept has no 
intrinsic legal authority, however. It belongs to taxonomy. It is useful for present 
purposes to reflect that the example illustrates that there is a principle of unjust 
enrichment being relied upon that is broader than mere inert concept and 
broader than the immediate ‘mistake’ rule: so too with the development of tort.  
 
It is conducive to understanding of the unjust enrichment unifying legal concept, 
in the mean time, to examine a finding in the judgments in Burnie Port Authority 
v General Jones Pty Ltd484 which remains a masterful description of judicial 
methodology, even though the Australian High Court has adopted another view 
of the concept of proximity (at least in some cases).485  
 
In Burnie Port Authority the High Court explained the place of the authorities on 
the tort of negligence in the Australian law, to that point in time. As there 
analysed, the concept of proximity explains the difference between the dicta of 
Brett MR firstly in Heaven v Pender486and then in Le Lievre v Gould487 (then Lord 
Esher) where his reasons for judgment drew upon analogy of physical nearness 
on the one hand, and the principle enunciated by Lord Atkin in Donoghue v 
Stephenson488 on the other. The majority judgment in Burnie Port Authority 
included this conclusion:  
  ...that common element of proximity ... remains the general conceptual 
  determinant and the unifying theme of the categories of case [of  
  negligence]489 ... [w]ithout it, the tort of negligence would be reduced to 
                                            
 
483 Hydro Electric Commission of Nepean v  Ontario Hydro (1982) 132 DLR 3d. 193, 209, per Dickson J, 
applied by the majorities in Air Canada v  British Columbia (1989) 59 DLR (4th) 161, 191, and David 
Securities Ltd v  Commonwealth Banking Corporation  (1992) 175 CLR 353, 375. 
484 (1994) 179 CLR 520, 541-3. 
485 This phenomenon is described in Chapter 12. 
486 (1883) 11 QBD 503 (CA), 509. 
487 [1893] 1QB 491 (CA), 497. 
488 [1932] AC 562,  
489 Citing Deane J in Stevens and Co. v Brodribb Sawmilling Pty Ltd, (1986) 160 CLR 16, 53. 
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   a miscellany of disparate categories among which reasoning by the  
  legal processes of induction and deduction would rest upon   
  questionable foundations since the validity of such reasoning essentially 
  depends upon the assumption of underlying unity and consistency.490  
 
This dictum if applied to the unifying legal concept of unjust enrichment, mutatis 
mutandis, captures the notion of function and purpose of the unifying concept. It 
is not that tort jurisprudence and unjust enrichment jurisdiction are identical, but 
the judicial methodology is as applicable to unjust enrichment as it is, or was 
then seen to be, to tort.  
 
The concept is the catalyst for the elements of rules that will be developed with 
reference to it. It describes the scope and the focus or purpose for the elements 
of a rule in a specific action. Hart’s words attributing elucidating power to the 
concepts are particularly meaningful if contemplated here. Concepts that 
elucidate jurisprudential reasoning by giving it a framework and a place, are 
inseparable from law. Whether they are law is a matter of semantics because it 
will not make a difference either way. A judgment which is explained in terms of 
such concepts inevitably attaches them to the rule it lays down.491 The concept  
in the circumstances of a case, drawing the applicable precedent into harmony, 
with notions of primary obligation imposed by law, describes the complex legal 
methodology in which concept principle and facts become the rule.             
These observations contribute to the conclusions below in the following 
particular way. 
 
 
                                            
 
490 (1994) 179 CLR 520, 543. The dictum may have been received with some reservation in United 
Kingdom. In Peabody Fund v Sir Lindsay Parkinson Ltd, [1985] AC 210, Lord Bridge had denied any 
precision about proximity that would make it a practical test rather than a convenient label ‘to attach to 
the different features of specific situations’. at 240. Perhaps renewed emphasis on case-by-case 
analysis means that both jurisdictions are arriving at the same end point. 
491 Concept of Law p 79. 
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  The function of a unifying concept or other unifying influence, is   
  centrally important to the efficacy of precedent. If a law is to be a  
  sustainable rule, it must be justifiable in terms of a legal principle. Rules 
  must be united by principle. 
 
An instructive contrast, necessarily described in briefest outline, can be made 
between the method demonstrated in the Burnie Port dictum above, which is 
consonant with Hart’s theories of interacting concepts and rules, on the one 
hand, and Hans Kelsen’s theory of law on the other. Kelsen’s theory is, I believe, 
the theoretical foundation of a system where the actions, in contract tort and 
unjust enrichment are explained as a selected group of like actions that take 
their authority from the power of the court to impose them where it reasons that 
precedent and the circumstances justify an action. So described, the difference 
between that and modern unjust enrichment is not plain except that the Kelson 
approach might be taken to assume the validity of employing concepts 
developed in tort for example, to the development of rules in contract or unjust 
enrichment, without really assessing their appropriateness individually. Under 
Kelson’s theory, each rule is a separate legal sanction.492 The approach, regards 
rules as emanations of an objective general order so that the legal sanction or 
order of a judge is law rather than a rule that has a specific theoretical and 
taxonomic relationship to the delict or malevolent event it addresses. This would 
lead to the conclusion that there is no unifying factor other than the character of 
law as authoritative orders of an official (qua judge) empowered by the particular  
                                            
 
492 Hans Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State, 63-67; analysing John Austin, The Province of 
Jurisprudence Determined, esp. lecture 1. Kelsen’s theory of law recognised a ‘pure’ original norm 
and individual norms are manifestations of it. Therefore, he argued that law consists of a singular 
conception of norms instructing officials to apply sanctions in given circumstances; the content of the 
rule was the key to what circumstances and by whom an action ought to be sanctioned.  See also 
Theodore Benditt, Law as Principle and Rule, 54 ff and ch 7. 
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norm. Concepts and unifying principles are unnecessary to such a theory.493 It 
can only apply to unjust enrichment if it be assumed that the unjustness factor is 
nothing else than a grouping of relevant cases of enrichment. This would seem 
to be more mechanical than theoretical; it is wholly lacking in the essential basis 
for judicial reasoning that establishes likeness between cases of enrichment 
found to be unjust in law. Indeed, it would seem to be explicable, if at all, as an 
interpretation of codified law. It is incongruous in the context of common law. 
 
The point of the comparison is that the perception held by some judges and 
commentators that the grounds of unjust enrichment are arbitrary rules would 
seem to have a philosophical basis which may apply in some jurisdictions and 
which might be seen to explain codified systems of law. In the latter, the 
legislature responds to perceived communal need and there might be no unified 
jurisprudential process of judicial reasoning leading up to the establishment of a 
new ground. In the forms of actions era, the issuing of a new writ (though, in 
fact, it was never done) might have been tantamount to legislating a new 
ground. In modern common law, this line of theory has not been influential and 
demonstrably, it is not reflected in the case law of Australia and United Kingdom. 
Furthermore, it can be concluded that the ‘arbitrary grounds’ theory is unlikely 
ever to have been associated with English common law, when it is remembered 
that quid pro quo was the most important of many concepts that had a 
prominent role in more than one branch of the common law, as a unifying 
concept.494 
 
                                            
 
493 General Theory of Law and State, 63-67. The term ‘fragments’ is referred to by H.L.A. Hart, Concept 
of Law, 35, to show how endeavours have been made to distinguish legal material from its context. 
Both Kelsen and Hart were engaged in critical analysis of Austin’s theories of law: John Austin, The 
Province of Jurisprudence Determined, esp. lecture 1. 
494 Above p 58. Other important ancient concepts were those that underlay actions of debt, account and 
assumpsit. Admittedly, these examples are taken from an era when jurisprudence of individul actions 
was not well defined. See fn 658 below; the work of the jurisprudence is to limit the scope of grounds 
to allow as fully as possible, the validity of ordinary relations. ‘Inequitable’, ‘unconscionable’ and 
‘tortious’ issues are dealt with by different principles and should remain so.  
 John B Donnelly. 95312086 
205
Hart’s theory of law is essentially based upon the character of concepts and 
their capacity to inform and shape the law. The judge is applying perceptions of 
justice which he/she reasons to be concordant with standards accepted by the 
community as binding standards of obligatory conduct.495The explanation of this 
is that the conceptual character of the unjust factor is the key to understanding 
the unity of rules and the reasoned development of actions based upon the 
unjust concept. Justice Deane’s dictum in Burnie Port is again relevant:  
‘...the validity of such reasoning essentially depends upon the assumption of 
underlying unity and consistency.’496 
 
The role of concept recognised in Hart’s theories and illustrated by the ancient 
concept of quid pro quo and the Burnie Port dictum has played a central part in 
development of the common law and not least, in the development of unjust 
enrichment.  
 
11.4. Unifying Legal Concept/Principle and “over-arching principle.” 
 
The issue to be addressed in this part of the chapter concerns the notion of an 
over-arching principle that might explain liability in all cases of unjust 
enrichment. It will conclude that there is substantial authority recognising the 
essentiality of legal principles as foundations of rules. It follows that unjust 
enrichment, as well as tort, is not well or adequately described as a system of 
rules. Is there one principle that explains liability across all actions for unjust 
enrichment? 
 
                                            
 
495 Above sub-ch. 7.5 and 9.2, and fn 362. Hart’s main reason for separating law and morality was that the 
natural law philosophies that strongly connect law and morality have the unintended effect that 
‘whatever is law, is moral.’  Whilst law and morality over-lap, morality ought to be a standard by 
reference to which law can be critically analysed; see also Neil MacCormick, HLA Hart, 24-5. See 
also fn 406 where the foundation of obligation in ‘social and commercial imperatives’ is discussed. 
496 (1994) 179 CLR 520, 543. 
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Neil MacCormick’s commentary reflects the same conclusion about the 
conceptual significance of proximity as did the High Court in Burnie Port 
Authority.497 Rules of law apparently within the same field of liability, are capable 
of being ‘incoherent’ without some external, over-arching explanation.498 The 
absence of such over-arching explanation would deliver a jurisprudence of a 
‘Kelsen’ kind in which the legal issue for a court is the instances of rules rather 
than the context of fact and principle which together support a rule. If law 
consists only in responses to a given sets of facts, taxonomy becomes a mere 
grouping of different kinds of events. No longer is it properly described as legal 
taxonomy; rather it is taxonomy for law: that is to say, the sphere of legal 
thought will be limited to the characterisation of remedies as types of responses. 
Such a classification of remedies calls for much less conceptual acumen.499 In 
such a scene, there is no place for principles and unifying concepts; only for 
rules. 
 
MacCormick explains his point by supposing different speed laws for differently 
coloured cars; the laws are comprehensible and capable of being observed by 
various motorists, but the rules lack any underlying cohesiveness.  So too, a rule 
of liability impugning a producer of a soft drink that markets it’s product in an 
opaque bottle is comprehensible; but how is the law to anticipate the scope of 
such a rule? And what other instances of liability might be explained by the 
same reasoning? Similar questions can be asked about the actions for 
 
                                            
 
497 Above fn 484. 
498 Legal Reason and Legal Theory, 160. The Kelsen approach is a development of the lower extreme that 
von Caemmerer recognised, above fn 282, in which, at one end of the spectrum, rules are specific 
cases, and at the other, they are an instance of application of a general principle. In addition to being an 
instance of a case, rules are seen to call upon the authority of a central rule making power as compared 
to a reasoned jurisprudence wherein the rule is shown to be as an instance of the application of an 
overarching principle that explains common reasoning in all such cases.  
499 Contrast Hart’s words attributing elucidating power to the concepts , above p 201. It is pertinent that 
this observation was made in connection with the contemplation of the ‘unifying’ characteristic of the 
concept explained in the Burnie Port dictum, above fn 490. 
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restitution of a benefit gained by unjust enrichment where the grounds might be 
total failure of consideration, mistake and duress. 
 
An explanation of the law, in unifying terms, is required, even if not articulated by 
judges, where-ever obligations to make restitution arise. A general principle (of 
the English unjust enrichment persuasion) ensures that each rule is 
comprehensible within a context of related rules, and so ensures that the finding 
in a particular case is coherent in its context, rather than absolute regardless of 
incoherence relative to other rules.500  
 
The function of a unifying concept or other unifying influence, is centrally 
important to the efficacy of precedent as a doctrine in common law, and thereby, 
to the courts deciding cases according to law. This is because, as has been 
explained above, it provides the over-arching principle that allows that a 
judgment in one unjust enrichment case is authority, mutatis mutandis, in 
another such case under the same branch of the law, though the grounds are 
different. Pavey501 provides a good example of this because the nature of unjust 
enrichment as enunciated in the majority judgment in that case has been cited 
extensively in Australian cases502 The function of the English general principle of 
unjust enrichment is the same.503It follows that the Australian unifying legal 
concept and English unifying principle make the doctrine of precedent  
 
 
                                            
 
500 See Neil MacCormick, ‘Why Cases Have Rationes and What they Are”, in Laurence Goldstein ed, 
Precedent in Law’ 155, 162. 
501 Pavey and Matthew’s Pty Ltd v Paul, fn 1. 
502 Id, 256. See for example the subsequent Australian cases: Australia and New Zealand Banking Group 
Ltd v Westpac Banking Corporation (1988) 164 CLR 662, 673; David Securities Pty Ltd v 
Commonwealth Bank of Australia fn 193, p 370-2; Baltic Shipping Co v Dillon (The Mikhail 
Lermontov) (1993) 176 CLR 344, 376; Brenner v First Artists Management Pty Ltd [1993] 2 VR 
221.259, per Byrne J; and Angelopolous v Sabatino (1995) 65 SASR 1, 11. 
503 Above, p109-10. The English general principle of unjust enrichment is unlike the general principle of 
negligence. Its work is co-opting specific reasoning to the facts of a case that determines which 
precedents have application.  The comparison is indeed interesting but it cannot be made in this work. 
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unequivocally available to unjust enrichment where it will act as a force for 
certainty and predictability in decisions. 
 
Dworkin has explained that a rule might not be a binding precedent without the 
over-arching principle that explains actions that have a common purpose.504 
Such a position becomes comprehensible in the context of unjust enrichment. 
Professor Burrows’ approach supports this assertion: he wrote of the four stages 
of enquiry in establishing a restitutionary claim as ‘...the fundamental ingredients 
of the claim...’ and he said, they are ‘...the equivalent of the duty of care, breach 
of duty, non-remote damage, and defences in the conceptual structure of a tort 
claim.’505 What this observation entails is not that unjust enrichment is supported 
by the same type of principle as is the tort of negligence, but that each is 
described, circumscribed, by the succession of cases which determine its 
character. Indeed, in Burrows’ observation, there is to be seen the best clue as 
to what Deane J in Pavey meant by the terminology ‘unifying legal concept’: the 
words refer to the conceptual structure of the action which is the product of 
judicial rulings.506 
 
In tort, the duty of care has come to be recognised as an element of the rule in 
particular cases and to be explained by a wider conception of legal structure, 
that is, the concept of proximity.507 Lord Reid in Dorsett Yacht Co. v The Home 
Office508 recognised, not a new principle about borstal boys and yachts, but the 
more general application of the neighbour principle in a manner which makes it 
 
                                            
 
504 Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, Ch 2, ‘The Model of Rules’, p 30 ff. 
505 Andrew Burrows, ‘Understanding the Law of Restitution: A Map Through the Thicket’ (1995) 18 
UQLJ 149, 158-9.  
506  (1987) 162 CLR 221, 256-7; See sub-ch. 6.5. 
507 For purposes of analogy, I assume for the moment that the apparent abandonment of ‘proximity’ as a 
unifying concept in Roxborough, above fn 12, could be confined to the facts of the case in future 
decisions of the High Court. 
508 Fn 268. 
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much more difficult to separate principle and rule when concluding what the 
binding decision of the case was.  
 
Despite the role of over-arching principle in tort, in Candler v Crane Christmas & 
Co509 the majority was unwilling to find that negligent miss-statement was within 
the scope of the principle. Such a decision leans toward a Kelsen view of law510 
because the distinction seems artificial. Presumably, the court was unwilling to 
see negligent misstatement as being in any way unified by a unifying principle 
with negligence in preparation of foodstuffs.511A question arises, what is the 
nature of the law on this particular point? This is a question which must hang in 
the air in each and every discussion about the nature of a rule, because to 
ignore it is to risk arriving at conclusions which address what, by way of a 
remedy, is a fair outcome instead. It may well be that the law needs to be 
changed or updated, but the driving forces of change need to be understood in 
terms of legal reasoning rather than simply in terms of practical necessity: the 
latter will produce law of practical necessities rather than law unified by 
jurisprudential methodology.512 
 
Tort is not the only source of useful analogy. Equity would have no difficulty in 
recognising that a principle of unconscionability, defined in the circumstances 
                                            
 
509 [1951] 2 KB 164. 
510 Hans Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State, esp. 63-67. Kelsen’s theories are explaind briefly 
above, sub-ch 11.3.  Kelsen regarded the grounds of actions to be determined by necessity of official 
sanction rather than united by overarching principle. 
511 The ratio of Candler, above fn 509, is conceptually incomprehensible in the context of the reasoning in 
Donoghue v Stephenson fn 275, at 580, per Lord Atkin; so too, the ratio of Searle v Wallbank [1947] 
AC 341, and that in State Government Insurance Commission v Trigwell (1979) 142 CLR 617 are 
conceptually incompatible with Dorset Yacht (fn 508), a difference between a responsibility to fence in 
borstal boys in proximity to yachts and the absence of such a responsibility in respect of cattle adjacent 
to a roadway. Rules may have different origins and attach to principles more appropriate to a bye-gone 
age, yet the economic reality of the need of keeping in cattle in the modern circumstance of fast 
travelling vehicles and super highways is at least as arguable as the necessity of restraining 
adventurous young state detainees. 
512 David Stevens and Jason W. Neyers, ‘What is Wrong With Restitution’ (1999) 37 Alta. L. R. 221, 226-
7, address this mistake in reasoning in the context of a critical analysis of a seminal article, L. Fuller 
and W.R. Perdue ‘The Reliance Interest in Contract’ (1937) 46 Yale L J, 52. Stevens and Neyers 
succinctly state the problem ‘The remedial response is inadequate as an organising principle…’, at 
226. See also Birks, Introduction…, 9-12.  
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and findings of the cases,513 was the articulation of developing principle which 
led the High Court to overturn the Amadio’s surety.514 Related reasoning enabled 
the finding of an institutional constructive trust in Muschinsky v Dodds,515 
Baumgartner v Baumgartner516 and Louth v Diprose.517 In Australian jurisdictions, 
a principle of unconscionability will be an inseparable element of future cases in 
fact situations analogous to Amadio, and the basis of constructive trust in 
appropriate cases, but then as a consideration of the older authorities shows,518 
it has been in the minds of judges, in the English law also, for a very long time. 
These instances of principle demonstrate the over-arching character of unifying 
concepts and principles in equity.519 
 
The argument approaches a proposition that, 
 …if a rule of law is to be sustainable as a precedent for like cases, it must 
 be justifiable in terms of a legal principle.520  
Rules must be united by principle.521 My argument is that in modern law, this is 
demonstrably the case. It is suggested that when the separation of principle and  
                                            
 
513 Fry v Lane (1888) 40 Ch. D 312; Blomley v Ryan(1956) 99 CLR 362. 
514 Commercial Bank of Australia Ltd. v Amadio (1983) 151 CLR 447. 
515 (1985) 160 CLR 583. 
516 (1987) 164 CLR 137. 
517 (1992) 175 CLR 621. 
518 Fry v Lane (1888) 40 Ch. D 312 and Blomley v Ryan (1956) 99 CLR 362 illustrate this well. 
519 Ernst Weinrib cautions against what he calls the ‘idiosyncrasies of jurisdiction’, by which he describes the 
exclusion of categories of remedies for instance, because they cross over the boundaries of law and equity. It is in 
this compartment however, that the truly difficult conceptual rationalisation of law and equity is to be found 
lurking: when, for example, is the benefit to be categorised as a resulting trust? If the characteristics of trust law 
enter into the equation, the response to unjust enrichment will become a considerably different outcome. In the 
succeeding section of his essay, Weinrib appears to gloss over this conceptual difficulty by describing remedies in 
several fields of law as ‘remedies for injustice’. As I have noticed above, a remedy for a tort or a breach of 
contract might not always or often quadrate with unjustness. This confusion of different kinds of principles and 
rules is, I believe, a consequence of the failure to differentiate between remedial rules and corrective justice rules. 
An order of restitution in unjust enrichment is the latter: it has no connection with a wrong, at least so far as 
restitution for unjust enrichment is concerned. Rules in equity will normally have a corrective quality but because 
they are in personam, and the cause centres upon the defendant’s act or omission, they are directed toward relief 
of one party against another and in this sense they are remedial: ‘Juridical Classification of Obligations’ in Peter 
Birks (ed) The Classification of Obligations, 37, pp 37-39. 
520 This is my own formulation, reflecting the position especially of Dworkin, fn 504. 
521 Dworkin illustrates the point by proposing that the rule from Riggs v Palmer 32 NJ 358, 161, would have 
encompassed the exception to the succession rule under a will arising from the fact of the beneficiaries’ guilt of 
murdering the testator: but the rule would have been incoherent (MacCormick’s descriptor, above fn 500) in the 
absence of a principle that no one may benefit from his/her wrong. R.M. Dworkin ‘Is Law a System of Rules?’ in 
R. M.  Dworkin ed. The Philosophy of Law, 38, 49. 
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binding rule is justifiable only in terms of policy considerations, which in the 
broader jurisdictional perspective and longer time frame, make nonsense of the 
practice of precedent, (though not of its theoretical place in the law) then we 
have an inarticulate law which Kelsen himself would surely have shunned. In 
Dworkin’s argument against Hart’s proposition that only rules are law, he 
concludes  
  ... unless at least some principles are acknowledged to be binding upon 
  judges, requiring them as a set, to reach particular decisions, then no 
  rules, or very few rules, can be said to be binding upon them either.522  
 
Dworkin’s point is that judges must apply a principle which they believe governs 
the case before them and must weigh competing principles, to apply that which 
they believe strongest in the context. Keith Mason illustrates the point well in his 
analysis of Pavey & Matthews Pty Ltd v Paul523 where he analyses arguments 
that competing principles, including those underlying the building legislation, 
contribute to the finding that the benefit for which restitution must be made is the 
actual value of work done rather than its cost.524 A telling distinction between 
unjust enrichment and contractual and legislative principles is being applied 
here. 
 
Dworkin argues that judges have no discretion to ignore principles that have 
been adopted and applied especially by the superior courts.525 This line of  
                                            
 
522 Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, Ch 2, ‘The Model of Rules I’, 36-7.  The conclusion I have 
reached above, p 97, that without principles, rules cannot be precedents for other rules because they 
will be unrelated, is in agreement with Dworkin’s perception. 
523 [1987] 162 CLR 221. 
524 ‘Restitution in Australian Law’, in P. D. Finn ed., Essays on Restitution, 20, 29. 
525 Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, Ch 2, ‘The Model of Rules’. The discretion to apply a 
principle, Dworkin argues, is one that, distinct from license, is closely confined by its context, ‘...like 
the hole in the doughnut, does not exist except as an area left open by a surrounding belt of restriction.’ 
id, 31-33. 
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reasoning leads to a logical imperative: to say that principles are not binding as 
a rule is, is not to say that the principle can be set aside or ignored when in fact 
it does have application to the case. The court is not free to find that a principle 
applied in all such cases as the one before it, is not, in its view, one that ought to 
be applied.526 Dworkin’s argument would point to the conclusion that in very 
many, if not all cases, the application of a rule is so much dependent upon the 
context of principle that the latter is indispensable to the decision reached.527  
 
It follows from Dworkin’s argument that the force of the principle is as it was 
described by Lord Reid in Dorset Yacht Co. v Home Office, ‘...[the principle] 
ought to apply unless there is some justification or valid explanation for its 
exclusion.’528 Lord Reid’s dictum concerned a principle of central significance in 
negligence cases. Alistair MacAdam sums up the impact of the dictum in these 
words,  
  ...Lord Reid was finally signalling the Law Lords’ acceptance of the fact 
  that the neighbour principle will generally have more weight than  
  arguments based on particular precedents, or the lack of precedent for 
  a particular case.529 
 
The context of Lord Reid’s dictum was the application of general principles in 
tort, but he referred specifically to the neighbour principle, proposing that it ought 
to apply unless there was good juridical reason for it to be excluded. His dictum 
                                            
 
526 Ibid. 
527  Id. 40.  Dworkin acknowledges however that judges, when they deal with principle, are dealing with 
standards which may be subject to change due to differing policy and social imperatives. 
528 [1970] AC 1004, 1027. The dictum really addresses the weight of principles which is not an issue that 
can be studied meaningfully in the present context. It is though, a powerful admonition that principles 
ought be sought out and evaluated for their pertinence to a prospective decision. 
529 Alastair Macadam and John Pyke, Judicial Reasoning and the Doctrine of Precedent in Australia, 258. 
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was directed to a principle of general application, not to a general principle of 
liability such as the North American general principle of unjust enrichment is.  
 
Dworkin’s reasoning would lead to the conclusion that in the case of an 
important principle, and the neighbour principle is central to the law of 
negligence, a court is not at liberty to apply it at its discretion: a judge who found 
that such a principle did not apply in a particular case would be obliged to 
distinguish the facts of the case at bar from the grounds of relevant actions.  
 
The applicability of such a conclusion to unjust enrichment is centrally important. 
In Mason v The State of New South Wales,530 Windeyer J thought it ‘... not inapt 
to describe [this branch of the law] as a law of unjust enrichment’.531  
 
Justice Windeyer’s dictum is reflected in the later judgments of the High Court 
and it might be taken as the first notable articulation of a unifying concept of 
unjust enrichment. The concept explanation of unjust enrichment was adopted in 
the reasoning of Mason and Wilson JJ who approved Justice Deane’s reasoning 
in Pavey.532 It forms part of the important analysis of the meaning of unjust 
enrichment in David Securities Pty Ltd v Commonwealth Banking Corporation533 
where the majority cited the relevant passage from Justice Deane’s Pavey  
 
 
                                            
 
530 (1959) 102 CLR 108. 
531 Id, p 146. The italics are mine. 
532 (1987) 162 CLR 221, 227.  Related reasoning underlay the decision in Commercial Bank of Australia 
Ltd v Amadio (1983) 151 CLR 447, where the reason of equity over-riding the strict contractual rules 
was the enunciation by the court of a concept of transactional unconscionability. Principles of much 
older genre were recognised and articulated as catalysts to unity, explaining actions, obligations and 
rights. This is true of many leading cases on unjust enrichment also. Until relatively recently, unjust 
enrichment cases in Australia have illustrated well Dworkin’s doughnut analogy: the enunciation of 
grounds of unjust enrichment in the cases invariably calls up the catalyst which Deane J in Muschinsky 
v Dodds (1985) 160 CLR 583, described as ‘...a notion underlying a variety of distinct categories of 
case...’, at p  617, and in Pavey and Matthews Pty Ltd v Paul, above, fn 1, as ‘...a unifying legal 
concept which explains why the law recognises in a variety of distinct categories of case, an 
obligation...’. at pp 256-7. 
533 (1992) 175 CLR 353,  
 John B Donnelly. 95312086 
214
judgment, and distinguished unjust enrichment from a ‘definitive legal principle’, 
insisting that it is ‘... just a concept’.534 
 
What can be the status of this dictum? One thing is plain; the High Court meant 
to rule decisively that unjust enrichment was not a cause of action. It was not a 
definitive legal principle. This could be taken as not definitive of a cause of 
action, and the precisely stated reasoning of the court in David Securities, i.e. 
there is no need to prove unjustness independently of mistake,535 supports this 
conclusion.  
 
A law of unjust enrichment has as its central feature, a principle that is the basis 
of the rule in each case. That principle has common reasoning that determines 
that an obligation is imposed by the law upon the facts of each instance of a 
ground. This is a significant feature of unjust enrichment in United Kingdom law. 
It is also the basis of each rule unified by the unifying legal concept in Australian 
law where a prima facie ground of an action exists: that is the intention of the 
dictum in David Securities.536 
 
The reasoning inevitably involves different kinds of principles encompassing the 
juridical meaning that the courts have held unjust to have in cases. The 
principles involve the scope and purpose of the action such that it lies for 
subtractive enrichment distinct from loss or injury; that it is a strict liability, 
admitting of no judicial discretion; it is not therefore akin to equity where 
idiosyncratic factors may have an impact upon the plaintiff’s ability to make out 
its case; it is subject to defences, especially that of change of position which is 
conceptually aligned to the notion that one party has a benefit from another. Its 
 
                                            
 
534 Id, 378.  
535 Ibid. 
536 Above fn 533 
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character is distinguished from tort and requires neither proof of fault such as 
fraud or deceit nor proof of specific unjustness.  
 
Deane and Dawson JJ took the reasoning a stage further in Baltic Shipping Co. 
v Dillon (The Mikhail Lermontov)537 in a dictum which was approved by the 
majority in Dart Industries Inc v Decor Corp Pty Ltd.538 The rationale of the 
restitutionary rule was viewed by their Honours in context of a fused law and 
equity with the result that principles of fairness and justice underlying earlier 
decisions were to be seen as at least cognate to equitable standards of 
unconscionability, or lack of good conscience. 
 
It is my submission that this further development adds little to the basis of 
principle of earlier decisions except that equitable principles are recognised as 
analogous to and informative of the principle of unjust enrichment. It does not 
introduce fault as an element of the decision and it does not infer a discretion to 
grant or not grant a remedy governed by equitable doctrines. Nor does it infer 
that the judicial discretion is broadened or made less principled. The courts must 
still look down to the cases, as Professor Birks puts it, to reach decisions on 
rules to be applied in particular cases.539 It does perhaps widen and enrich the 
scope of judicial experience which may be relied on in identifying the underlying 
principles which are drawn together in unjust enrichment.  
 
My thesis is that the law of unjust enrichment in Australian and the United 
Kingdom jurisdictions are described uniformly by legal reasoning and precedent 
that establish rules of obligation that will be imposed by law where grounds of  
 
                                            
 
537 (1993) 176 CLR 344, 376. 
538 (1993) 179 CLR 101, 111. 
539 Peter Birks, Introduction to the Law of Restitution, 22-23. Cf, Gareth Jones, ‘A Topography of the Law 
of  Restitution’ in P.D. Finn ed. Essays in Restitution, 2-3, arguing that a broader doctrine of unjust 
enrichment may be developed in English jurisprudence. See also, Mason & Carter, Restitution Law in 
Australia, 75. 
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actions are established by recognition in cases in the superior courts. If the 
central unifying catalyst is a legal concept as it is under Australian law, that fact 
does not detract from the effect that has been acknowledged by the courts, 
uniformly to all intents and purposes, across these jurisdictions. The Australian 
unifying legal concept is as a sign-post to the sets of principles that define the 
elements of actions, including, but not limited to duress, free acceptance, failure 
of consideration and mistake. Principles such as these, in all Australian and UK 
jurisdictions, have to be considered as authoritative in accordance with the 
ordinary rule of precedent because if they are not, as Dworkin has indicated, the 
rules themselves to which the principles relate in an authoritative judgment, 
might not be binding either.   
 
Considerable development of jurisprudence over the decades and centuries is 
evident in the cases, not in a rule narrowly based upon specific facts, but upon 
the experience in many courts, condensed into the principle. In Australian law, 
the focus will be upon the principle or principles invoked or indicated by a 
unifying concept. The concept of unjust enrichment brings together the leading 
judgments in the jurisdiction. This is true also of contract and tort although the 
sheer volume of cases and the variety of principles make it more apt to describe 
the law simply as contract or tort: every lawyer will be familiar with the 
substantial volumes of principles and rules that such concepts indicate. In 
contrast, unjust enrichment could not be described except by reference to the 
leading judgments: and the single central idea that is the meaning of the concept 
of unjust enrichment, that which indicates the law imposing an obligation on the 
facts that are recognised as grounds, to make restitution of a benefit gained at 
expense of the plaintiff.540 
 
 
                                            
 
540 Concepts Tort and Contract have at least as much work to do. 
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The dictum of Lord Wright in Brookes Wharf541 
  …obligation imposed by the court simply on the circumstances of the 
  case… 
suggests that the rule has to do with the nature of the ground and the obligation 
to be imposed, i.e., the experience that condenses the decided law on this point 
into a strong principle. In point of fact, there is no scope for discussion of 
whether the precedent is wholly contained in rules or partly in rules and partly in 
applicable principle because, as Dworkin has shown, the rule co-opts principle 
and the decision applying the rule is the binding precedent.542  
 
 
Conclusions. 
 
Adopting the minor conclusions set out above, and applying the analysis in the 
fore-going sub-chapters of the forces that define the jurisprudence of unjust 
enrichment, I would conclude the chapter in the following way: 
 
1. The history of unjust enrichment exemplifies that without a predictable 
jurisprudence of its own, unjust enrichment is at risk of being defined 
in terms of doctrines of other branches of the law, to the mutual 
disadvantage of taxonomy and principle in each. Were this to occur, it 
would be the consequence of a failure of jurisprudence to define a 
recognised unifying agent capable of drawing reasoning into a 
collective whole which will make it a decision according to law in terms 
of concept, principle and taxonomy. 
 
 
                                            
 
541 [1937] 1 KB 534, 544, 545. 
542 Above, fn 525. 
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2. The function of the unifying legal concept and the English general 
principle can be explained, by analogy with other areas of the law. 
Concepts are seen to be central reference points which assist in 
defining the factors which draw the law to a unity of purpose.  
3. Concepts direct the enquiry of the law to the existence of a ground of 
an action for the imposition by the law of a primary obligation to make 
restitution of a benefit had from a plaintiff under circumstances that 
are unjust by a legal standard. This enquiry is the arbitration of binding 
standards of obligatory conduct.  
4. As to unifying legal concept, the words refer to the conceptual 
structure of the action which is the product of judicial rulings.543 
5. Whilst the courts have asserted that there is a unity, such as a 
unifying concept or principle would achieve, they have done little 
which would help us to describe it, not even in terms of what it ought 
to do. The development of a jurisprudence of primary obligation is the 
answer, but it is the work of jurists, only indirectly recognised by the 
courts. 
6.  Dworkin’s reasoning would lead to the conclusion that a court is not 
at liberty to apply a principle of unjust enrichment at its discretion : a 
judge who found that such a principle did not apply in a particular  
case where a prima facie ground of an action exists, would be obliged 
to distinguish the facts of his or her case from those of cases where 
the principle had been applied. 
7. If a law is to be a sustainable rule, it must be justifiable in terms of a 
legal principle. Rules must be united by principle.  
8. The function of a unifying concept or other unifying influence, is 
centrally important to the efficacy of precedent as a doctrine in  
                                            
 
543  Pavey, above fnn 1 and 523. 
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common law, and thereby, to the courts deciding cases according to law. 
This is because, as has been explained above, it facilitates, by common 
reasoning, the over-arching principle that allows that a judgment in one 
unjust enrichment case is authority, mutatis mutandis, in another such 
case though the grounds are different. 
 
Chapter 12.  Concepts and Principles: The Instructive ‘Tort’ Comparison. 
 
12.1. Introduction. 
 
Perhaps the most foundational legal concepts and principles find their origin in 
general propositions of law that are ‘fundamental abstractions’, rather than in 
edicts or enactments or emanations from historical principles of law. Ernst von 
Caemmerer’s parallel between ‘general forms’ in tort and in restitution illustrate 
this perception proposing that both rest upon fundamental abstractions,  that is 
that a person should be compensated for injury by unlawful acts on the one 
hand, and nobody should be permitted to retain an unjust enrichment, on the 
other.544 Such fundamental abstractions as that of Lord Wright’s ‘…any civilised 
system of law…’ dictum, and Lord Atkin’s neighbour dictum are ‘filled out’ in the 
cases in the Anglo/Australian common law systems.545 
 
The comparison suggests the possibility that both the common law 
jurisprudence and German jurisprudence are illustrative of an important judicial 
technique of reasoning from broad underlying abstractions and concepts and 
                                            
 
544 See Eltjo Schrage and Barry Nicholas ‘Unjust Enrichment and the Law of Restitution: A Comparison’, 
in Eltjo J. H. Schrage ed. Unjust Enrichment: The Comparative Legal History of the Law of 
Restitution, pp 9, 26. The von Caemmerer thesis was discussed in sub-chapter 10.3 above. 
545  Lord Wright in Fibrosa Spolka Akcynja v Fairbairn Lawson Combe Barber fn 177 above: Lord Atkin 
in Donoghue v Stevenson fn 275, p 580. These observations recall the discussion of characterising 
concepts in Chapter 6, and von Caemmerer’s notion of broad abstractions in sub-chapter 10.3. 
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identifying instances of a rule, as compared to accretion of new cases 
unexplained in jurisprudential terms.546 
 
It also marks the difference between reasoning of grounds on the one hand and 
applying a broad general principle of the kind that Friedman associates with the 
‘Restatement’ general principle of unjust enrichment on the other.547 The former 
applies a rule defined upon a ground that is an instance of unjust enrichment: 
the latter applies the abstract rule to particular cases and draws upon a category 
of responses. 
 
It is not crucial for this work to describe the general principle of negligence in 
these terms, a task that would demand significant enquiry. The question as to 
the similarity of the negligence general principle and the English principle of 
unjust enrichment is not one that can be answered in this context. Andrew 
Burrows expresses the opinion that the generalised approach of the principle of 
negligence has given way to a significant retreat towards incrementalism548 (that 
had characterised negligence in the early 20C), culminating in adoption of a 
more case-by-case approach in Murphy v Brentwood District Council.549 Perhaps 
that development has the potential to bring the methodology of the negligence 
principle and the unjust enrichment principle closer together.  
 
Burrows remarks upon this phenomenon.550Whether or not that is a positive 
development for the law of negligence, it is disconcerting to observe a trend that 
                                            
 
546 There is a crucial difference however, in the common law jurisprudence from that of the German law to 
which von Caemmerer, fn 544, refers. The German jurist speaks of ‘unjustified enrichment’ which is 
conceptually different from the common law ‘unjust enrichment’. See fn 449 above. 
547 Fn 449, at p 838: and see fn 546 above. 
548 Understanding the Law of Obligations, 111. 
549 [1991] 1 AC 398. In that case, the House of Lords adopted the approach described by Deane J in the 
Australian case, Sutherland Shire Council v Heyman (1985) 157, 495-96 per Deane J regarding pure 
economic damage. 
550 Fn 505, at pp 111-12. 
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in unjust enrichment, might mean reversal of steps toward a unifying 
jurisprudence with its capacity to explain cases as unified by conceptual 
characteristics.  
 
An appeal to the von Caemmerer perception of filling out a broad abstraction 
might prompt reassessment. It may prove to be advantageous to re-focus upon 
the methodology of reasoning from accepted doctrinal foundations. The 
jurisprudence and methodology of Continental law may prove to be more 
instructive than the seductive ‘fusion’ jurisprudence that has no definable goal. 
What is to follow is by no means an exhaustive study but it is sufficient to 
demonstrate the validity of arguments made elsewhere in this work for the 
maintenance of conceptual analysis that respects independence of actions and 
taxonomic boundaries (not as impenetrable for there is scope for comparison).  
 
The study of tort jurisprudence, specifically negligence, will show that negligence 
has also enjoyed principled separation as a distinct doctrine of tort. The 
tendency in Australian courts to entertain the possibility that concepts that have 
been developed in other areas of law, or none at all, are informative of 
negligence jurisprudence, is at odds with that perception of characterising 
principle. The study that follows focuses upon the proximity principle in 
negligence which has been held in the United Kingdom and until recently, in 
Australia, to be the key concept in differentiating categories of cases for the 
purpose of rules in negligence cases.551For the purposes of the comparative  
 
                                            
 
551 It is probably correct to assume that proximity has had the character of a unifying legal concept but it is 
impossible to argue that thesis here: that would require a profound treatment of the cases and a 
dedicated historical study, bearing in mind that the case law is very significantly more voluminous 
than in unjust enrichment, and that the cases have witnessed idiosyncratic mile-stones and turning 
points. 
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study I would read the dictum of Deane J in Burnie Port,552 as meaning that 
proximity is simply unifying in character. It must be emphasized nevertheless, 
that this work is not primarily about tort jurisprudence. Observations are limited 
to instructive comparisons of the reasoning in key dicta rather than proposing 
that as regards tort, those key dicta may be interpreted as establishing unifying 
principles or concepts. 
 
The following brief statements express succinctly, what the issues to be 
addressed in this chapter are: 
• As understood in the foundational cases, unust enrichment is a doctrinal 
element of law: proximity may similarly have been a doctrinal concept. In 
the past decade, the developments in Australian law of negligence may 
have been sponsored by a misconception that proximity is structural, 
contextual, rather than doctrinal.  
• Statements that proximity (in jurisdictions where this concept is still a 
feature of tort) characterises a category of cases of which the instant 
case is one, or that ‘…John has a benefit at the expense of another in 
circumstances that the law holds unjust…’ indicate critical principles and 
rules and draw upon the legal reasoning by which jurisprudence of the 
particular field of law describes obligations and rights. 
• Since the apparent abandonment of the proximity concept in Australia, 
the absence of defined concepts and principles of tort that had described 
the various instances of liability for negligence in a unifying way, portends 
conceptual difficulties at least as difficult for prediction of legal outcomes  
 
                                            
 
552  Fn 485 and 496 and sub-ch.  11.3. The proximity concept applies only to the United Kingdom at this 
stage, so that the force of the comparison is simply that the development of rules in particular cases 
from broad propositions of law requires unifying influences. 
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as would be the case if the unjust concept were to be defined in terms of 
less specific concepts.553 
 
 
12.2. The Tort Comparison. 
 
Development of the Proximity Principle in Australian Law. 
 
The Burnie Port case discussed above provides a starting point for examination 
of the progress of principle in the Australian law554 The court approved the 
‘general conception of relationship’ called ‘proximity’ as the law in Australia. This 
concept of ‘proximity’ describes Lord Atkin’s ‘neighbour’ principle in Donoghue v 
Stephenson555 that qualified the foreseeability rule.556  
 
The court in Burnie Port identified ‘a general unifying proposition’ which 
explained why the law recognised a duty of care to avoid injury. Deane J, with 
the agreement of the majority, had said in Stevens v Brodribb Sawmilling 
Company  
  …[that common element of relationship of] proximity remains the  
  general conceptual determinant and the unifying theme of the   
  categories of case in which the common law of negligence recognises  
 
                                            
 
553 There is an important difference between a development in unjust enrichment wherby, on the one hand, 
unconscionability is defined as a ground, which is an issue of relationship to equity to which the 
present work does not extend, and on the other, the defining of unjust as an unconscionability-like 
concept. 
554 Fn 552. 
555 [1932] AC 562 (HL). 
556 The ‘neighbour’ dictum in Donoghue fn 275, which qualified the ‘foreseeability’ principle first 
enunciated by Brett MR in a minority judgment in Heaven v Pender (1883) 11 QBD 503 (CA) became 
a ‘proximity’ principle in Le lievre v Gould [1893] 1QB 491 (CA).  
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  the existence of a duty to take reasonable care to avoid a reasonably 
  foreseeable risk of injury to another….557 
 
This dictum was adopted in subsequent High Court judgments as reflecting the 
law in Australia. Deane J went on to say that proximity was never intended as a 
‘logical definition’ or ‘complete criterion’. Its relevance as a ‘general conception’ 
was though, in ‘…understanding and identifying the categories of case…’ in 
which a duty of care arises ‘…rather than a test for determining whether the 
circumstances of a particular case bring that case within such a category, either 
established or developing.’558 
 
Justice Deane went on to say what proximity does in terms that it is, ‘…the basic 
function performed by general principles or conceptions in ascertainment or 
development of the common law.’559To explain further what was intended, he 
cited Scott LJ in Haseldine v C. A. Daw and Son Ltd560 where his Lordship 
commented upon the criticism of Lord Atkin’s principle, ‘…the error …of 
assuming that Lord Atkin was intending to formulate a complete criterion …[and 
failing to appreciate] the real value of attempts to get at legal principle’.  
 
It is essential to recall Lord Atkin’s own words of caution in Donoghue, 
  …if proximity be not confined to physical proximity, but … as I think  
  [Lord Esher in Heaven and A L Smith LJ in Le Lievre] intended, to  
  extend to such close and direct relations that the act complained of  
  directly affects a person whom the person alleged to be bound to take 
  care would know would be directly affected by his careless act….561  
 
                                            
 
557 (1986) 160 CLR 16, 53. Italics introduced. 
558 Id, 53-4 
559 Id, 56 
560 [1941] 2 KB 343, 362-3. 
561 [1932] AC 562, 580, per Lord Atkin. 
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The dictum contains two separate ideas, that is, firstly that the foreseeability 
principle of Heaven v Pender is intended to be limited by Lord Esher’s ‘notion of 
proximity’; and secondly, it is not a physical proximity but one that implies direct 
effect upon a person who the defendant would know would be affected.  
I would understand the principle of proximity at its inception, to identify cases of 
foreseeability where this direct effect could reasonably be anticipated and, that 
the person who becomes the plaintiff is one that the defendant should 
reasonably know would be affected. When the principle is so dissected, as Lord 
Atkin intended it should be, it is plain that there is too much conceptual work to 
be done for it to be assumed that its parts can faithfully be put into effect without 
the proximity principle being invoked. 
 
When it comes to negligent misstatement and economic loss, it must always 
have been obvious that an additional element or additional principle would be 
required because a principle concerned with directness and knowledge of the 
plaintiff is insufficient as a qualifier and quantifier of foreseeability. The elements 
of directness and of knowledge of a person in the position of the plaintiff, is no 
less essential. The point recalls Lord Justice Scott’s admonition, above,562 that 
Lord Atkin did not formulate a complete criterion. Something additional may be 
required for some cases. 
 
The passages from Stevens v Brodribb Sawmilling 563cited above seem 
consistent with this. It would also seem consistent with the Stevens dictum to 
reiterate Lord Atkin’s concern with ‘directness’ as the key to what proximity 
does. So then, at this juncture, proximity in Australian law was a general 
conception employed in the reasoning of the courts in understanding and  
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563  Fn 557. 
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identifying categories of case in which a duty of care to avoid foreseeable injury 
or damage arises. Directness may be part of the conceptual material of this 
concept of proximity, linking it to related concepts and principles including 
causation and remoteness, and qualified by the factor that defendant knew or 
ought to have known that a person such as the plaintiff would be affected by the 
act. 
 
The strong majority judgment in San Sebastian Pty Ltd v The Minister 
Administering the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979,564 seems 
not to have influenced later decisions especially Perre v Apand Pty Ltd.565 In San 
Sebastian, their Honours held that despite the special problems in defining the 
circumstances which give rise to a duty of care in miss-statement cases, 
… the correct view is that, just as liability for negligent misstatement is  
but an instance of liability for negligent acts and omissions generally, so 
the treatment of the duty of care in the context of misstatements is but  
an instance of the application of the principles governing the duty of  
care in negligence generally.566 
 
Their Honours went on to say, ‘… proximity is an integral constituent of the duty 
of care concept … in its broader sense … embracing a general limitation on the 
test of reasonable foreseeability… [and] …is of vital importance when the 
plaintiff’s claim is for pure economic loss.’567 The court in a significant dictum, 
discussed the place of reliance in the context of the negligence principles, and 
concluded that it has an important role, especially in pure economic loss cases. 
But especially in such cases, it was treated as the key indicator of proximity, that 
‘integral constituent of a duty of care’. Directness and knowledge of a person in  
 
                                            
 
564 (1986) 162 CLR 340, 353-8, per Gibbs CJ, Mason, Wilson and Dawson JJ. 
565 (1999) 198 CLR 180. 
566 Fn 564 above, at p 353. 
567 Id, pp 354 and 409. 
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the position of the plaintiff are what is imported by the proximity principle. Thus 
reliance is an indicator of proximity and directness an integral factor but reliance 
and directness alone have not been independently defined in relation to 
foreseeability in negligence.  This is the problem foreseen in relation to Lord 
Diplock’s dictum In Dorset Yacht v Home Office568 that might have created the 
impression that Lord Atkin’s Neighbour doctrine might manage without the help 
of principles. 
 
The dictum in Stevens v Brodribb cited above569and the clarifying dictum in that 
case of Deane J, describing the purpose of the proximity principle such that it is, 
‘…the basic function performed by general principles or conceptions in 
ascertainment or development of the common law…,’570 is of immense 
importance and yet it appears to have been disregarded and perhaps very much 
misunderstood. This is so regardless of the strong judgments in a succession of 
cases tha have not simply agreed with English jurisprudence but have taken the 
reasoning to another level.  
 
Proximity and other Principles.  
 
The difference between these principled concepts, whether proximity or some 
other formula well understood as a legal concept, on the one hand and concepts 
in common usage on the other, calls to mind Professor Herbert Hart’s view that 
insistence on definition of concepts in common language terms was at odds with 
jurisprudence and drove a division between jurisprudence and the study of the 
law at work.571 Hart disagreed with those who committed jurisprudential theory to 
                                            
 
568 Fnn 268 and 508, at a 1060; see below p 230, fn 583.  The concern is that if a defined concept like 
proximity is unavailable, the reach of the doctrine might be defined in terms of notions that are 
undefined in the relevant area of law. 
569  fn 557 (1986) 160 CLR 16, 53. Italics introduced. 
570 Ibid. See also pp 53-54. 
571 H L A  Hart, ‘Definition and Theory in Jurisprudence’, (1954) 70 LQR 37, at 37. 
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 ‘…the forbidding jungle of philosophical argument… ‘, insisting that ‘…legal 
notions however fundamental, can be elucidated by methods properly adapted 
to their character’.572 
 
Properly understood, the concept of proximity as applied in negligence cases 
until the recent changes in Australia, categorised instances of foreseeability by 
introducing considerations of directness and causation as part of the conceptual 
material of the concept of proximity. It does not follow from what has been 
observed above however, that there could be no other principle that assists in 
defining circumstances in which the law will impose a duty. As the cases have 
demonstrated, a principle is not less a statement of jurisprudential import 
because, in the circumstances of later cases, it is necessary to qualify it, or to 
state other principles which modify its application to given circumstances.573 A 
principle designed to categorise cases of ‘direct impact of a positive act’574 will 
have qualified application to miss-statements and other cases where the injury 
caused was pure economic loss. Foreseeability and the proximity principle 
should not operate in such a way as to restrict trade or cramp commerce by 
indeterminate and unreasonable extension of liability. The content of proximity 
must develop. The House of Lords in Hedley Byrne v Heller and Partners Ltd575 
found that proximity was exemplified in reliance in circumstances where, in the 
words of Lord Reid,  
  …the party seeking information or advice was trusting the other to  
  exercise such degree of care as the circumstances required, where it 
  was reasonable for him to do that, and where the other gave the   
 
                                            
 
572 Ibid. 
573 See Voli v Inglewood Shire Council (1963) 110 CLR 74, p 90, per Windeyer J. 
574 Sutherland Shire Council v Heyman (1985) 157, 495-96 per Deane J.  
575 [1964] AC 465. 
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  information or advice when he knew, or ought to have known that the 
  inquirer was relying on him.576 
 
Lord Devlin’s analysis in the same case, covered different types of relationships 
which might potentially exemplify proximity, but he prefaced his remarks by 
saying that it was not ‘…a sensible application of what Lord Atkin was saying [in 
Donoghue] for a judge to be invited on the facts of any particular case to say 
whether or not there was “proximity”…[which would be] a misuse of a general 
conception…’.577 He noticed that Lord Atkin’s judgment had referred to a 
‘…general conception of relations…’ which is proximity, and he concluded,   
‘…I do not understand any of Your Lordships to hold that it is a responsibility 
imposed by law on certain types of persons in certain sorts of situations…’ 578  
 
Stephen J, in a somewhat earlier case than the leading cases of the 1980’s and 
90’s, found a need of an additional ‘mechanism’ to augment the work done by 
foreseeability and the proximity general conception of cases;  
  …[t]he need is for some control mechanism based upon notions of  
  proximity between tortious act and resultant detriment to take the place 
  of the nexus [in physical injury cases].579 
 
The place and the meaning of proximity in the Australian law had nevertheless 
been assumed to operate in terms as later described in Stephens v Brodribb580 
and San Sebastian.581 
 
                                            
 
576 [1964] AC 465, pp 486 ff. 
577 Ibid. 
578 [1932] AC 562, 580 ff. 
579 Caltex Oil (Australia) Pty Ltd v The Dredge “Willemstad  (1976) 136 CLR 529, at 555-6. Cf Brennan 
J, in Hill v Van Erp (1997) 188 CLR 159, 171, in economic loss cases, reasonable foreseeability is an 
inadequate control mechanism, citing Stephen J. 
580 Fn 558 and 563 above. 
581 Fn 564 above. 
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An apparent regression toward dysfunctional notions of limiting factors in 
Australian law. 
 
It is plain that Lord Atkin in Donoghue582 was pronouncing on principle developed 
through a succession of cases, rather than stating a rule. His dictum has been 
so interpreted in both English and Australian cases. Lord Diplock’s complaint in 
Dorsett Yacht Co Ltd v Home Office583 that the neighbour ‘…aphorism marks a 
milestone…[b]ut misused as a universal it is manifestly false…’,  was more than 
an admonition to regard the principle in its correct light; it perhaps created an 
impression that the doctrine could manage without the principle and the 
consequence might be that future courts would attempt to define the reach of 
the rule in terms of other or undefined notions. Whether this is so or not, it is just 
that approach to reasoning which now appears to characterise the modern 
Australian law.  
 
Justice Brennan’s reasoning in Gala v Preston584 appears to take a contrary view 
to that of the leading judgments, employing proximity as a test of the 
circumstances of a case to fit a category, rather than ‘…understanding and 
identifying the categories of case …’.585 Though it appears that he is less 
committed to the Justice Dean interpretation of the concept of proximity, it does 
not appear that he contemplated abandonment of principled concepts. 
Brennan J suggested other considerations than proximity, including causation, 
as confines upon the reach of foreseeability586 But causation after all, had been 
treated in the cases as one aspect of proximity. Newly stated confining factors  
 
 
                                            
 
582 Fn 275 above. 
583 Fnn 268 and 508, p 1060. 
584 (1991) 172 CLR 243, 254-261. 
585  Stevens v Brodribb Sawmilling Company fn 557 at p 53. 
586 For example, causation, March v E & MH Stramare Pty Ltd (1991) 171 CLR 506 at p 508. 
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would need a defining principle which would have the capacity to link them to 
other instances of negligence.  
 
McHugh J in Perre v Appand analysed several alternative approaches to 
proximity which he directly dismissed as a principle to be followed in Australian 
law.587 His belief was that proximity is a ‘…category of indeterminate reference 
par excellence…’.588 What is it then that the court would have in place of the 
proximity principle, for none of the devices used appear to achieve a like 
purpose as has been established in a proximity principle.    
 
Seemingly remote from unjust enrichment, it is in the treatment of principles of 
tort in this crisis of acceptance for the principle of proximity that the relevance of 
the experience may be recognised.  What must be developed is an approach 
which avoids the problems identified by Jacobs J in H.C. Sleigh Ltd v South 
Australia589 called ‘…individual predilections ungoverned by authority…’. The 
introduction of reasoning of concepts that have no definitive meaning in tort 
exemplifies the concern expressed by Jacobs J.  
 
The understanding that proximity is a ‘…category of indeterminate reference…’ 
furthermore, is at odds with leading judgments in Australia and the United 
Kingdom, at least as proximity has developed in Anglo/Australian law. As a 
conception of relationships governing and limiting the circumstances in which 
foreseeability will create or give rise to a duty, proximity is not a category of 
cases. Rather, as cases involving the spectrum of proximities, physical, 
temporal, circumstantial and causal, (Donoghue,590 Hedley Byrne,591 
                                            
 
587 Perre v Apand fn 314, pp 209 ff. 
588 Id, 209-210, citing  McHugh J, "Neighbourhood, Proximity and  Reliance", in Finn ed, Essays on Torts 
(1989) 5 at p 13, also 36-39. 
589 (1977) 136 CLR 475, 514. 
590 Fn 275 above.  
591 Hedley Byrne & Co Ltd v Heller & Partners Ltd [1964] AC 465. 
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Jaenesch,592 Hill593 and Perre594) demonstrate, it is a conception of categories of 
case that have been found to exemplify a limitation to be imposed upon 
foreseeability. It is to the law of negligence what a conception of varieties is to 
the humble apple. It acknowledges a structure of taxonomy and a methodology 
for enquiry, but it also imposes definitional parameters. 
  
The Broader Consequences. 
 
Lord Atkin’s neighbour principle595 was a reflection of development of the law in 
the cases, not a new notion unsupported by authority. Where there are such 
new notions unsupported by authority however, they may pose problems that 
defy resolution by ordinary legal reasoning. It has been noticed above that in a 
succession of prominent cases, proximity has inferred directness and knowledge 
of a person in the place of the plaintiff. Proximity is what has defined the 
structure and taxonomy of negligence law and held its principles apart from 
fiduciary rules and contract. Without a conceptual determinacy that the proximity 
principle offered, there is a distinct danger that the important distinction between 
common law negligence and equity will be compromised in some kinds of cases. 
Indeed, the lack of recognised factor explaining categories of cases uniformly, 
introduces the kind of concurrent liability difficulties that Burrows envisages 
when negligence claims become seen as alternatives to actions in contract on 
the same grounds because of indiscreet conceptual foundation.596This is not  
that a party has two actions but reliance, for example, in its contractual garb, 
becomes a concept in tort. The concepts may be wider in one head of law than 
in the other. 
 
                                            
 
592 Jaenesch v Coffey (1984) 155 CLR 594. 
593 Hill v Van Erp, (1997) 188 CLR 159. 
594 Perre v Apand (1999) 198 CLR 180. 
595  Fn 275 above. 
596 Andrew Burrows, Understanding the Law of Obligations, 26 ff. 
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It may happen that the law of negligence can find nothing coherent to put in the 
place of the proximity concept that will support a uniform approach to 
jurisprudence across the range of categories of cases. A new approach may 
require the support of major courts in other much larger common law 
jurisdictions, simply because of the sparseness of the ‘traffic’. A related problem 
is that a quest for terms of common language to express adequately the varied 
and developing characteristics of legal principles is a formidable task, especially 
in a small jurisdiction. Professor Hart’s comment is again pertinent, ‘…legal 
notions however fundamental can be elucidated by methods properly adapted to 
their character’.597 Such methods have to be developed over time.  
 
The need for the courts to persist with development of jurisprudence related to 
legal concepts in negligence, and also in unjust enrichment, is demonstrated by 
the tort law comparison. In unjust enrichment, if a modernised and popular 
meaning were to be attached to ‘unjust’, the Australian Courts would have 
difficulty in developing a satisfactory alternative jurisprudence, especially 
because the very long standing notion of ‘obligation imposed by the law’ might 
also be up-rooted. Unjust enrichment cases are rare in the High Court. It seems 
likely that the Australian law of negligence faces a crisis of jurisprudence, not 
exactly similar but at least as complex.  
 
In Hill v Van Erp, Justice Dawson’s speech, with which Toohey J was in general 
agreement, acknowledged concern about the difficulty of finding any conceptual 
continuity or identified common element through the proximity principle, yet he 
favoured the principle as the continuing mode of capturing the “something else”  
 
                                            
 
597 Ibid. 
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than foreseeability.598Toohey J, who commented only on this aspect of the case, 
emphasised that it was the category of case with which proximity is concerned 
rather than the question as to proximity on the facts of a particular case. Citing 
the Lord Devlin dictum in Hedley Byrne599 he concluded, 
‘…used in that way, there is no difficulty in treating proximity as the general 
conceptual determinant and the unifying theme…600 Justice Toohey’s concerns 
reflect Hart’s ‘…legal notions …elucidated by methods properly adapted to their 
character.’601  
 
The Dawson and Toohey JJ dicta are relevant to other concepts of law that are 
directed to elucidation of principles and rules, and uniformity in their 
interpretation and application. The concept of unjust enrichment is so described 
by Justice Toohey’s words. This is the meaning assigned to the unjust 
enrichment concept, even though the High Court has declined to accord it the 
status of a general principle.602  
 
Can Justice Toohey be understood as saying that proximity concerns an 
overview of categories? I think he can. If so, his analysis contributes to 
understanding proximity as a legal concept rather than an accident of the 
facts.603  
 
                                            
 
598 Hill v Van Erp, fn 447, pp 198-9, Dawson J considered that the principle assisted the case by case 
development of the law. Regard for the original Lord Atkin reasoning would however concentrate attention 
on the capacity of ‘directness’, ‘causation’ and ‘foreseeable party injured or damaged’ as the underlying 
issues of proximity principle, assisted where appropriate by other principles. Dawson J identified these 
auxiliary principles in Hill, as those rules and policies governing relationship between solicitor and client, 
operating within and contributing to the concept of proximity. 
599 Fn 575. 
600 Hill v Van Erp  fn 447 at p 190 per Toohey J; see text accompanying fn 577 as to Lord Devlin. 
601 ‘Definition and Theory in Jurisprudence’, (1954) 70 LQR 3, at 37. 
602 Pavey & Matthews Pty Ltd v Paul, fn 1, 256-257, per Deane J.    
603 Fn 600. Gummow J in Perre v. Apand fn 314, at pp 260-261, Gleeson CJ agreeing, at 190, whilst avoiding 
direct appeal to a proximity principle, returned in his reasoning to an approach defined in terms of close and 
direct relations, an approach which strongly suggested the manner in which Lord Atkin defined ‘neighbour’ 
in Donoghue fn 275. This approach affirms that of Stephen J in The Willemstaad, fn 579. There are 
nevertheless, a host of competing conceptual standards arising in the cases. 
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It is difficult to transpose this experience into concrete methodology in unjust 
enrichment. The courts have not yet done so. It might simply be that the 
intrusion of new notions into established law in tort, offer an illustration of the 
need for clear conceptual approaches in attempting that difficult task. What we 
are witnessing in modern Australian negligence law is the abandonment of 
principle in favour of notions which have not developed strongly in this field of 
law. They may import meaning from other branches of the law which may be 
appropriate for one set of circumstances but not for others. They have no 
demonstrable capacity for development as concepts and principles of 
negligence. The propositions that control and the impairment of legal rights as 
well as the broader meaning advocated for reliance, and vulnerability, may stand 
in the place of proximity and do its work, appear to be premised upon 
assumptions which raise questions as to the authority of these factors as 
indicators of a limitation upon foreseeability.  
 
That is to say,   
• whilst the objective from the beginning, was to define reasoned limits of 
the foreseeability concept, and  
• control, impairment of legal rights, reliance and vulnerability are 
undeveloped in tort as indicators of a limitation upon foreseeability, and 
• have no demonstrable capacity for development as concepts and 
principles of tort,  
they and other creatures of other specialities of the law, have at least as little 
potential to help define the unifying legal concept of unjust enrichment. 
 
There is sound reason in the view of Kirby J who (in dicta concerning tort) 
expressed the concern that these propositions and notions are being elevated to  
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the status of ‘preconditions of the existence of a duty of care in negligence… (or what is 
worse) ‘principles to be applied’ in negligence cases.604 This is especially so because 
the courts have not defined them either as concepts in negligence law, nor as putative 
principles. They remain issues of fact which could operate quite differently from case to 
case. Control for example, where absent, might infer absence of negligence. Reliance 
and vulnerability are likely to take on meanings attributed to them in other areas of law, 
especially in equity. As issues of fact which might be applied in like cases, their 
usefulness would be limited and their capacity for misleading, significant. Plainly, what 
proximity offered was the potential to be a principle of variable content rather than 
control, vulnerability and reliance, mere notions of variable meaning and significance.  
 
Justice Kirby’s inclination to follow the three stage English rule in Caparo Industries Plc. 
v Dickman,605 foreseeability, proximity and fairness, is his concern overall, to ensure 
that development in the law remains explicable in terms of principles. In Cattanach v 
Melchior606 however, Kirby J decided the case, not on the basis of the analysis of legal 
issues that had been identified in the minority judgment of Gleeson CJ, but on an 
assumption that the common law  
  does not exist in a vacuum…[I]t is expressed by judges to respond to  
 their perceptions of the requirement of justice, fairness and     
 reasonableness in their society.  
 
He did not argue the meaning of these perceptions of justice, fairness and 
reasonableness.607  
                                            
 
604 Perre v Apand fn 314, 290 ff. 
605 [1990] 2 AC 605 at 618. ‘…[they] …are not susceptible of any such precise definition as would be 
necessary to give them utility as practical tests, but [they] attach to the features of different specific 
situations which, on a detailed examination of all the circumstances, the law recognises pragmatically 
as giving rise to a duty of care of a given scope.’, per Lord Bridge. 
606 (2003) 199 ALR 131, p 132 per Gleeson CJ; 160 & 164 para 106, per Kirby J. 
607 The alternative to conceptual basis of the law is an incremental approach that Gummow J considered 
the following passage: ‘The case law will advance from one precedent to the next. Yet the making of a 
new precedent will not be determined merely by seeking the comfort of an earlier decision of which 
the case at bar may be seen as an incremental development, with an analogy to an established category. 
…The emergence of a coherent body of precedents will be impeded, not assisted, by the imposition of 
a fixed system of categories in which damages in negligence for economic loss may be recovered.’ 
Perre v Apand fn 314 at pp 253-254. Kirby J too, was unpersuaded of the merits of the incremental 
approach without some uniform principles and methodology; p593 ff. 
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Some insight into the correct approach to be adopted when reasoning such 
complex issues as the relevance of particular principles to rules, (and this 
applies to tort and unjust enrichment alike), might be had by contemplating an 
observation on reason of Ludwig Wittgenstein. Contemplating the paradox that 
pre-conditions of a rule can be made out both to affirm it and to conflict with it, 
Wittgenstein says  
  It can be seen that there is a misunderstanding here from the mere fact 
  that in the course of our argument we give one interpretation after  
  another; as if each one contented us at least for a moment, until we  
  thought of another one standing behind it. What this shows is that there 
  is a way of grasping a rule which is not an interpretation. Hence there is 
  an inclination to say ‘…every action according to the rule is an   
  interpretation’. But we ought to restrict the term interpretation to the  
  substitution of one expression of the rule for another.608 
  
The substitution of the ‘pre-conditions’ noticed by Kirby J for unifying factors 
explaining categories of cases, appears to reflect Wittgenstein’s concern. The 
pre-conditions pull the rule this way and that in the guise of offering 
interpretations of its purpose.  
 
True interpretations begin with the rule rather than with the nuances which the 
preconditions suggest as to its true meaning. Unjust enrichment is not truly to be 
understood as a fault based principle or as a means of redressing  
 
 
 
 
                                            
 
608 Philosophical Investigations 1, 81e, 201. 
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unconscionability. Likewise, negligence might be differently construed when its 
premises are held to be concerned with ‘reliance’, with ‘vulnerability’ and 
‘control’. 
 
The situation of the law in modern negligence cases, especially in Hill609 and 
Perre,610 poses a crisis of lack of development of concepts and principles of the 
law. This might be addressed in some degree by the majority judgements in 
Tepko v Water Board,611 a negligent miss-statement case, in which the majority 
followed the dicta of Barwick CJ in Mutual Life and Citizens’ Assurance Co Ltd v 
Evatt,612 in finding that in cases of that kind at least, the foreseeability principle is 
limited by considerations of relationship. Tepko613 is however, a special case of 
economic loss through negligent misstatement.614  
 
Whether, in Australian law, proximity has survived as a principle of the law or as 
a principle under some other name, remains unclear.615 In tort, judges whose 
dicta have stood the test of time, have returned repeatedly to basic principles 
enunciated in Donoghue and significant cases which followed it, to explain, by 
inference at least, the content of duty of care, foreseeability of injury or damage 
and the qualifying ‘proximity’ concept or principle. The unjust enrichment 
concept/principle is not the same. The concept of unjust is a conceptual 
comparative test and quantifier of categories of cases that have been identified  
 
                                            
 
 
 
 
612 (1968) 122 CLR 556 at 569-572. 
613Above fn 611. 
614 Cf. Kirby J in Perre v. Apand fn 587, 421, arguing that once a duty of care exists, an action lies for a 
proved breach which results in damage irrespective of the type of damage.       
615 The following dictum supports that view.  ‘With the demise of proximity as the touchstone by which a  
duty of care was to be established the Tribunal is left in something of a legal vacuum in the present 
case.’ Rolls Royce Industrial Power (Pacific) Ltd v James Hardie & Co. Pty Ltd; Re Hay (No. 4) 1999 
NSWDDT 5, para 240, per Curtis J. 
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by the law. There is a comparison to be drawn however between the manner in 
which unjust enrichment for one part, and the foreseeability doctrine coupled 
with proximity for the other, have demonstrated methodology of reducing rules 
from the abstract propositions that are their foundation. This may have a 
counterpart in German law.616 
 
The differences in approach are to some extent, historical and to an extent 
theoretical. Like the ancient actions before it, the unjust enrichment action defers 
to many other actions where available. This gives to tort the character of a 
dominant set of doctrines and rules.617 Both the obligation in unjust enrichment 
and the remedy in tort are imposed by law. Both depend upon critical 
subordinate principles that have become so much a part of the actions that their 
removal would lead to confusion and even unwarranted liability. 
 
Negligence without a ‘proximity’ type of concept/principle is foreseeability 
unlimited by principles that have demonstrable relevance to negligence law. It 
debunks principled law and looks instead for notions of justness and fairness 
inherent in reliance and vulnerability that have not been juristically defined in the 
common law of tort. Unjust enrichment without the limiting factor of subtractive 
enrichment might be comparable.618 Neither have the essential controls on the 
scope of the action. Neither is an effective rationalisation of the broad 
abstraction from which the analysis began. 
                                            
 
616 See sub-chapter 12.1. 
617 See J Beatson and GT Virgo ‘Deferability Principle in Unjust Enrichment’ (2002) 118 LQR 352 at 353, 
commenting that in Roxborough v Rothmans of Pall Mall (2001) 208 CLR 516, the High Court of 
Australia ‘…ignored the fact that unjust enrichment is subordinate to contract, a fact that contributd to 
the confusion of principle in the judgments:.…[the case] illustrates the danger of a shift away from 
recognized principles’. 
618 See fn 429 above. Niall R. Whitty suggests the ‘mirror loss’ of the German and American law has 
certain advantages. The perception that unjust enrichment underlying principles should be ‘loosened-
up’ is in the mind of some schools of jurists. 
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Phillip Bobbitt’s possibilities of a rule that Jefferson and White considered a 
useful analytical tool are set out below: Bobbitt calls them ‘modalities’619  
1. They may be founded in argument which is historical where one looks to 
intention of a competent legislator;  
2. They may be textual, where the foundation of a rule is inherent in the 
words whereby it is articulated. ‘trespass’ and ‘unconscionable’ can be 
such textual indicators.  
3. Thirdly, the foundational context may be structural, which considers the 
relationship of one part of the law to another: contract illustrates this well.  
4. Fourthly, the foundation might be doctrinal, relying on authoritative 
precedent. Most rules of the common law have this fourth characteristic 
which is usually regarded as the sine qua non of a rule of common law. 
5. They may be ethical. 
6. They may be prudential.  
 
The ethical and prudential, might be seen to describe the policy aspects of 
principles which support a rule; it must be doubted whether in common law (as 
distinct from statute) they can stand alone without the pre-eminent foundation of 
doctrine.  
 
This framework is a handy approach to analysing the judgments in individual 
cases since several of these foundations of rules might be regarded as critical to 
efficacious adoption of a rule. Judgments in cases such as Perre and 
McNeice,620 examined against this framework of Bobbitt’s criteria, produce no 
satisfactory answer as to basis in principle. The members of the courts differed 
in their analysis to such an extent such that it is uncertain in what context a  
                                            
 
619 Philip Bobbitt, Constitutional Interpretation, …… Bobbitt’s constitutional orientation has been thought 
by others to be useful in other areas of the law; see Jefferson White and Dennis Patterson, Introduction 
to the Philosophy of Law, vii. 
620 Fn 13; also Perre v Apand above, fn 587; and Hill v Van Erp, above, fn 593. 
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subsequent court would be obliged to apply findings of the High Court. Only a 
clear statement of principle underlying a rule will assist a later court to resolve 
this matter.  
 
The treatment of proximity in the leading cases over nearly half a century in both 
United Kingdom and Australian jurisdictions, as a limiting factor on foreseeability 
that could only be replaced in the law by a concept or principle of equal standing 
and effect compares to the development of unjust enrichment over a like period. 
If it be assumed that Bobbitt’s categories are an accurate classification of the 
foundations of rules, a question arises as to when it is accurate to describe the 
foundation of common law rules in unjust enrichment and tort as ‘doctrine’, an 
appellation usually reserved in common law, for narrow rules that have long 
been applied in the courts.621 There are rules of contract that are unmistakably 
doctrine, ‘consideration’ for example. How then does the law describe the 
essential elements of consideration such as the rule that consideration must be 
valuable? Such a rule is then an essential element of doctrine. Is foreseeability a 
doctrine in tort? If so, is, or was proximity a characterising element of a doctrinal 
rule. This is not to be answered here but the comparison demonstrates that 
rules are in varying degrees, embedded in our law by compulsive 
pronouncements of the highest authority.622  
 
Is the unifying legal concept of unjust enrichment doctrine? If the answer be no, 
what then is doctrine in unjust enrichment? Is it sufficient from a jurisprudential 
point of view that such a concept be perceived to be a concept embedded in the 
law by compulsive dicta, in the manner that Justice Dixon intended ?623 The 
questions posed here recall the discussion of the desirability of developing  
                                            
 
621 In the common law,  consideration in contract, laches and estoppel are sometimes described as doctrine. 
622 See fn 462 above and the related conclusion drawn at pp191-93. 
623 Hargrave v Goldman, Fn 462, at p 63. 
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statements of the law that characterise some principles and rules as ‘crucial’ or 
‘fundamental’ as envisaged in sub-chapter 10.3.624 Perhaps ‘doctrinal’ and 
‘element of doctrine’ would be adequate.The discussion is simply designed to 
answer the questions posed in sub-chapter 10.3 about the need for 
characterising pronouncements or dicta in a manner that recognises their 
importance, not just to the immediate head of law, but to related heads of law 
that are inevitably affected by change.625 
 
If Bobbitt’s classification of foundations is a reasonable one, the only alternative 
would be that a rule is merely structural or contextual. Unjust enrichment is 
neither structural nor contextual: the grounds of actions and the subordinate 
concepts/principles are so much an indispensable aspect of unjust enrichment 
that itself has characteristics like doctrine, having been treated by successive 
judgments of the highest courts as an imperative case for an order for 
restitution. Absent any one of these subordinate elements of grounds, there is 
no basis for the ‘doctrine-like’ rule of unjust enrichment to apply.  
 
Conclusions: 
 
The conclusions here stated, are in several respects conclusions also to other 
sections of the work, especially sub-chapters 10.3 and 10.4. 
 
The unifying elements that perform the role of isolating governing principles are 
‘…concepts, pre-requisite to a finding of liability, embedded in the law, by 
compulsive pronouncements of the highest authority, and which give the law 
symmetry, consistency and the defined boundaries essential to reasonable 
                                            
 
624 See pp 175 ff. 
625 Ibid. 
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predictability.’626 The existence of such concepts/principles to bridge the 
conceptual links between the cases has been shown to be an essential pre-
requisite to the working of precedent. Whether they are doctrinal in character is 
less important than is the contribution they make to predictability and unity of 
actions and the enabling of precedent. Their characteristics of rules established 
by successive judgments at the highest level and that resemble doctrinal law, 
are the factor that would properly require a judgment of extraordinary quality; a 
profound treatment of authority and of principles; and, extraordinary foresight as 
to what will be the effect of a new decision upon the existing concepts, principles 
and rules. These conclusions reached after examining the possible 
consequences concerning a significant change to the common law doctrine of 
negligence, are at least a foreshadowing of conceptual difficulties that might 
arise from new developments affecting the subsidiary concepts and principles 
that support unjust enrichment in the law. 
 
 
Chapter 13: ‘Unjust’, a Classifying Factor; Abstract Principle and the 
Particular Case. 
 
13.1. Introduction. 
 
There are several issues that could be an appropriate focus of this final chapter, 
most of which have been addressed in one way or another in the foregoing 
chapters. I have chosen one which I believe to be the issue of major and 
enduring significance for the law of unjust enrichment: this is the jurisprudence 
of modern unjust enrichment in Anglo/Australian law. In order to stay within my 
                                            
 
626 Hargrave v Goldman, Fn 462, at p 63, per Windeyer J.  
 
 John B Donnelly. 95312086 
244
‘concepts and principles’ parameters, the jurisprudence will be interpreted for its 
relevance to concepts and principles.  
 
The elucidation of fundamental notions, is not simply about language of the law; 
it also involves those other methods specially adapted to their character.627 
These latter phenomena have been dealt with in the chapters above but require 
final comment or concluding observations: they are important to the 
jurisprudence. 
 
13.2. Unjust Enrichment’s Core Characteristics. 
 
What is the authority for unjust enrichment jurisprudence? 
There has been no sustained attempt in later law to give meaning to Lord 
Mansfield’s guiding principles of ‘equity’, so that it is difficult to describe it 
adequately. Lord Mansfield’s notion of ‘equity’ is not to be identified with modern 
equity, but what other concepts and notions had he in mind? If we can answer 
this, then like Donoghue628 and the tort of negligence, and like Eastwood v 
Kenyon629 and consideration in contract, Moses may truly be seen as a 
foundatonal case. That would provide a suitable conclusion to several aspects  
of this work, especially as to the doctrine-like dicta that refer to notions of aequo 
et bono and equity of a different persuasion than modern equity. 
 
Whilst Lord Mansfield’s judgment in Moses,630 suggests characteristics of the 
jurisprudence of unjust enrichment, another case stands out for its clear 
statement of contemporary jurisprudence, that is, of the late 18thC. Justice 
                                            
 
627   The expression recalls Hart, fn 562 above, ‘…the forbidding jungle of philosophical argument… ‘, 
insisting that ‘…legal notions however fundamental can be elucidated by methods properly adapted to 
their character’. 
628 Fn 275. 
629 (1840) 11 Ad & El 438; 113 ER 432. 
630 Moses v Macferlan above, fn 182. The accompanying text explains Lord Mansfield’s contribution.  
 John B Donnelly. 95312086 
245
Lawrence’s judgment in Exall v Partridge631 explained that ‘…[t]he justice of the 
case…’ demanded that all three parties to a debt had a joint obligation to pay 
the amount of the debt of which they had been relieved by forfeiture of the 
property of one. The judgment is an important conceptual bridge between the 
law in the era of Moses632 and modern law. It also applies jurisprudence that 
began with the action on the case. This conceptual ‘bridge’ is not unlike that 
referred to at the end of the last chapter; that is, concepts assisting the progress 
of reasoning from one principle to another. In Justice Lawrence’s dictum, is to be 
found the enduring appeal to ‘justice of the case.’ That will be mundane to 
modern ears until the significance of the dictum for the development of legal 
science is explained.  
 
We must ask then, what is the foundation of this perception of justice of the 
case? To answer that question I propose to show that the formative 
jurisprudence of unjust enrichment has been shaped by enduring ancient 
perceptions that explain many aspects of modern law. This will involve 
consideration of broad abstractions and particular principles working together in 
the modern law. To show how that is possible, a brief reflection on the origins of 
legal scientific enquiry is required. This will show that the methodology of 
western legal scientific enquiry in so far as it shapes our law of unjust 
enrichment, has been constant for a very long time and is relevant to modern 
law. 
 
 
 
 
                                            
 
631 (1799) 8 Term Rep 308; 101 ER 1405 at 311 (Term Rep.) fn 178 The case was cited above at fn 337 
for it’s relevance to early statement of grounds and the reasoning of justice of the case. 
632 Fnn 19, 42 and 186 refer. Clearly, such an important dictum ought to have had a stronger influence, but 
in the subsequent two centuries, the quasi contract preoccupation prevailed. From another perspective 
what has been argued in these pages contrasts with approaches in the judgements in Roxborough fn 12, 
as to which, see fnn 182, 418 and 617.  
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Lord Mansfield’s Perception of Equity. 
 
Peter Stein observes that the Romans learned from Greek philosophy the art 
and merit of making a science out of the law. The lesson was a long time in the 
learning in the common law world.633 Nevertheless, the Aristotelian logic of 
developing a science from a body of rules found its place in common law 
jurisprudence and principles of law emerged, albeit almost imperceptibly, from 
functional procedure. Pragmatic adherence to rigid formulae did not mean that 
there was an absence of concept and principle in the minds of the judiciary, or 
those of them, at any rate, whose contributions ultimately made a difference. 
Lord Mansfield was one who, ultimately, left a profound impression on our law of 
unjust enrichment. The best way of describing his achievement is that it was an 
endeavour to introduce scientific enquiry into the elaboration of grounds for the 
action for money had and received, for that surely, was his purpose in Moses.634  
 
Several philosophical treatises offer some insight on the jurisprudence evident in 
the reasoning of judges of Lord Mansfield’s era. Two channels of philosophy 
recommend themselves as foundations of notions of informal equity. Firstly, 
from Aristotle’s Nichomachean Ethics,635 we find that the ancient Greek 
philosopher offered the following observation upon equity and the equitable and 
their respective relations to justice and the just. 
These are the considerations that give rise to the problem about the 
equitable …The equitable is just, but it is not legally just – [it is rather] a 
correction of justice. The reason is that all law is universal but about 
some things it is not possible to make a universal statement which shall 
                                            
 
629 Peter Stein, The Character and Influence of the Roman Civil Law, 40. 
634 Above, fn 632. 
635 Book V Ch 6. 
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be correct. In those cases then, [when] a case arises in which it is not 
covered by the universal statement, it is right …to correct…636 
 
The passage develops the theme that the legislator would have corrected had it 
known of the circumstance and this is the reason of the making of the exception. 
It continues, 
…this is the nature of the equitable: a correction of law where it is 
defective owing to its universality.637 
It is explained that the rule adapts itself to the facts. Modern unjust enrichment 
theory has a curious resemblance to that explanation: indeed, Lord Mansfield’s 
key dicta had at least one thing in common with formal equity, and that is that 
the purpose of his rules was to correct where reasonableness and justice 
demanded that there be correction.638 
 
The theme is taken up again in the Aristotelian Rhetoric639 where the ancient 
author held that equity is partly concerned with legislative intent (an allusion to 
the codified law) and partly not. The latter is to cover situations where individual 
facts are so many and various that it is impossible to make a universal rule.640 
This describes the jurisprudence of modern Continental law.  White and 
Patterson, in their Introduction,641 relate that the observations in Rhetoric refer to 
the central jurisprudential problem of stating general rules abstractly, a problem  
 
                                            
 
636 Ibid. 
637 Ibid. The notion of ‘universality’ recalls the ‘fundamental abstraction’ discussed in chapter 10.  The 
comparison suggests that the technical meaning is reflected in the terminology of modern 
juirisprudence:  see fn 292 where Neil MacCormick is cited on a related point; Neil MacCormick 
‘Why Cases have Rationes and What These Are’, in Laurence Goldstein ed, Precedent in Law, 162.  
MacCormick’s distinction between universalisation and generalisation is an important one.  The 
former refers to a broad ground which is satisfied by a general principle.  It would be inaccurate to 
suppose that ‘generalisation’ also describes this legal concept. 
638 The same juristic reason seems plain in the doctrine of quid pro quo, and the combined action of debt 
and account. Formal equity too, aspires to correcting the short-comings of common law, not as 
primitively as the ancient actions, however: see for example, the cases cited at p 209 above.  
639 W Roberts trans. Aristotle, Rhetoric, The Oxford Translation of Aristotle, Bk 1 Ch. 13, 1374a. 29-33.  
640 This recalls Dworkin’s comments on the Sherman Act above, p 98 and fn 229. 
641 Jefferson White, Jefferson and Dennis Patterson, Introduction to the Philosophy of Law.  
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to which Von Caemmerer’s observations noticed above, have an especial 
relevance.642 In such cases, the authors ask, how is ‘the something’ that should 
be added to the general proposition to effect justness, to be determined? The 
question recalls the similar enquiry as to the ‘something else’ that refines the 
notion of foreseeability in negligence’.643 Is it to be arbitrary or can it be 
objectively determined? They point out that Aristotle affirms that it can be 
objectively determined by practical (rather than theoretical) reasoning and 
judgment.644 Von Caemmerer’s perception of ‘filling out’ the abstraction in the 
courts in practical situations is similarly reasoned.645  Significantly, this describes 
the role of neo-modern ‘proximity’. 
 
The second channel of enquiry is associated with Thomas Aquinas, who like 
Aristotle, a proponent of the natural law, observed that some outcomes from the 
law may occur firstly, as a conclusion from general principles, and secondly as a 
‘determination from general principles’. 646  
The first way is close to the scientific method, by which demonstrative 
conclusions are derived from first principles. The second way …[is that] in 
which some common form is determined to a particular instance …’647 
 
These citations point to a perception of jurisprudential methodology which has 
demonstrably survived in classical and neo-modern legal systems; but it has not 
emerged what is the source of meaning of … that something that should be 
added …. What is the standard or principle from which the special rule draws its 
 
                                            
 
642  Above sub-chs 10.1 and 12.1, especially, p 177 ff;  where the Von Caemmerer perception of the courts 
‘filling out’ the characteristicsthat transform the general abstraction nto principle and rule.  
643 Above, p 233. 
644 Above, p 247. 
645 Above, p 177.  
646 Saint Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Q.95. 
647 Ibid. 
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meaning? An answer must have regard, not to general principles but to 
universal standards. 
 
It was the same concepts of equity of the kind to which the Aristotelian 
documents refer which appear in civilian law of the middle-ages. Azo reveals a 
general prohibition against unjust enrichment648 in which the general proposition 
was qualified by a ‘fine equitable rule’ which is reminiscent of von Caemmerer’s 
idea of broad abstraction, filled-out by curial rules.649 The reasoning is 
instructive, and the Roman precedent is plain. The rule was not generally 
applied, because it could not be applied where the enrichment was not unjust.650 
Related to our perceptions of unjust enrichment, this reasoning is like the 
reverse side of the same coin: the ‘fine equitable rule’ is the exception to the 
finality of transactions or the security of payments. The exception cannot be 
applied if the reason (ground) asserted by the plaintiff is not an instance of 
unjust. 
 
The philosophical literature surveyed above points to learning of which a 
prominent judge at the end of the middle ages might have been aware. It has 
not been my intention to demonstrate continuity of principles from the ancient 
past; such an endeavour might be futile: but the literature to which I have  
 
                                            
 
648 Accursian Gloss, ‘Nam Hoc Natura’ D. 12.6.14. Jan Hallebeek notices that the ‘main stream’ of 
jurisprudential thought in Continental Europe adopted this measure in the middle ages after debating 
for centuries the Martinus (c. 1160) proposition for a very widely applied principle; the main stream 
favouring restricting availability to the limits of the Justinianic codes. ‘Unjust Enrichment as a Source 
of Obligation: the Genesis of a Legal Concept in the European IUS Commune. [2002] RLR 92, 95.  
See also Sir Henry Maine, Ancient Law, above fn 37, pp 15 ff, describing a thesis that there are 
agencies or instrumentalities, being ‘fictions, equity, and legislation,’ through which law in profressive 
societies is ‘brought into harmony with society’. 
649 Chapter 10 above, p 177. 
650 See Hallebeek’s comments on te codes, above, fn 644. If a party permits another to acquire title by 
usucaption (tolerated, uninterrupted occupation or possession), then it was his/her own fault and could 
not therefore claim unjustness. It was, moreover, a legal process and therefore could not be the iniuria 
which was central to unjustness. The notion of ‘iniuria’, in this context, seems to imply some loss not 
capable of being explained by a legal process. 
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referred indicates unequivocally, a very old and durable jurisprudence 
associated with the expression of rules founded upon broad abstractions. It was 
this jurisprudence that will have been well known to judges and jurists of the 
Lord Mansfield era and it helps to understand his use of broad abstractions such 
as aequo et bono and equity.651 
 
Inculcation of these standards in neo-contemporary law. 
 
Lord Mansfield’s jurisprudential perceptions are better understood when it is 
appreciated that there were very significant foundations for statements of 
principle that described ‘that something’ that explained the difference between 
broad abstractions on the one hand and principles and rules by means of which 
the courts ‘filled them out’ on the other. Demonstrably the concepts that were 
significant to the law and legal philosophy relate to the ancient perceptions of 
equity that empower the judicial officer, praetor or judge, to interpret the facts of 
the case, and to find an instance of inequity or criteria of unjust benefit.  
 
Most of this background was lost to the common law in recent centuries. It is the 
attempt to interpret Lord Mansfield’s dicta without consciousness of this 
background that made quasi contract a poorly understood set of quasi rules 
explained supposedly by contract jurisprudence, focussed upon implied  
                                            
 
651 I have noticed above that David Ibbetson’s essay ‘Unjust Enrichment in England before 1600’, in 
Schrage, The Comparative Legal History of the Law of Restitution, 121, identifies petitions in equity in 
the 15th &16thC’s which seek recovery of sums paid in absence of contract, to a ploughman who had 
failed to plough, AppilGarth v. Sergeantson (1438) 1 Cal Chanc xli (a marriage case);  a builder who 
had failed to build, and for goods which had not been delivered, Essex County Record Office D/DP 
M207 (St Martin, 1403); D/DP M224 (SS Simon and Jude, 1419); DDD/DP M251 (1445). I am 
indebeted to Ibbetson’s sources for these citations. The action derived from the Institutes of Justinian 
and lay for recovery of personal items, to force restitution of money or property passed for a purpose 
which has not occurred. Ibbetson concludes an apparent connection with the Roman Law condictio 
causa data causa non secuta, Schrage, The Comparative Legal History of the Law of Restitution, 121, 
129. Such actions ceased in the 16thC corresponding with the advent of indebitatus in the common law 
courts. Id,129-130. The cases are nevertheless, evidence that the early English law did ‘fill out’ 
principles and rules founded upon the broad abstractons.   
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promise. To erase the gap between the early 18th C and the mid 20th C, it is 
quite unnecessary to establish a continuity of principle or rule from the ancient 
past, but it is useful to notice that reasoning closely resembling that which 
underlies a finding of unjust enrichment in modern courts has prompted the 
imposition of obligations to make restitution over the course of a millennium, and 
perhaps throughout the long legal history of western civilisation. To see and 
recognise this, however, it is sometimes necessary that we take a philosopher’s 
view of what the law set out to do then and now, rather than attempt to draw an 
explanation from the very confusing explanations of the legal process in 
individual judgments. The clarity of defining principles was achieved 
nevertheless, by Lawrence J in Exall v Partridge,652 and the next renowned event 
in which we can recognise the resumption of scientific thought is the advent of 
Lord Wright’s judgment in Fibrosa.653  
 
It might be asserted that to this day, the common law courts have not defined 
the content of that something which makes the difference between stating 
general rules abstractly and a finding of unjust enrichment: yet that supposed 
fact needs to be examined in two quite different ways.  
 
• Firstly, the broad abstraction, a party shall not be permitted a benefit so 
as to be unjustly enriched at the expense of another, is essentially the 
Fibrosa654 principle.  
• As such, it is an explanation of rules that create obligations in particular 
cases, in specific circumstances that are recognised as a ground of 
unjust enrichment. 
 
 
                                            
 
652 Above, fn 178 and see above p 248 
653  Fn 40 and see p 248 
654 Ibid. 
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• Those rules must be recognised as an instance of the broad general 
(Fibrosa) principle.  
 
Secondly, the law that permits or enables security of receipts can be seen as 
one kind of expression of the general abstraction, and the ground of unjust 
enrichment is the ‘fine equitable rule’ as Azo described it, an instance of an 
exception. 
 
It is not easy however, to recognise the abstract and the particular in modern 
common law unjust enrichment because common lawyers have understood the 
quasi contract actions and even the modern grounds of actions, as stand-alone 
rules, and attempts to explain their common conceptual basis have not been 
developed adequately. The unstated abstract proposition is nevertheless 
achieved in practice by the policy of the law to protect security of receipts.655  
 
The problem with understanding this second style of definition of the unjust 
enrichment rules is that a party’s non specific wealth is not usually thought of as 
being protected by legal abstractions. The first approach might be preferred and 
indeed, it is conceptually closer to the Australian law. The persistent problem is 
that the specific cases are rarely reasoned as instances of the broad Fibrosa 
abstraction that has nevertheless been regarded as a universal legal standard in 
successive leading cases. If that were done, the Fibrosa principle might be 
recognised as the kind of broad general abstraction that explains all specific 
instances of unjust enrichment.656  
 
                                            
 
655 See the reasoning in the dissenting judgment of Brennan J in David Secutrities fn 204 above, at pp 397 
ff, citing Hydro Electric Commission of Nepean v Ontario Hydro [1982] 1 SCR 347 at p 412, per 
Eastey J, arguing that the reason for introducing limitations on recovery for mistake of law is ‘…to 
achieve a degree of certainty in past transactions’. 
656 Above, fn 652. 
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The Fibrosa principle is an imperative for ‘…any civlized system of law…’.657  
This fact accentuates the role of the courts in finding allowable grounds: it is 
precisely because of the imperative character of the parent principle that the 
articulation of that principle in finding specific grounds is an issue of justice.658 
That conclusion confirms the essential role of the broad abstraction (Fibrosa) as 
a central issue in the law of unjust enrichment, as the over-arching 
principle.659This conclusion is compatible with the role of the unifying legal 
concept as ‘sign-post’ to principles as described in arguments developing the 
significance of the concept in chapter 11. It is also compatible with the Hart and 
Birks view that the imposition of an obligation is a legally imposed standard of 
justice.660 
 
These conclusions are the complete answer to any assertion that grounds of 
unjust enrichment are an arbitrary selection of allowable actions. It will 
nevertheless remain difficult to sustain if one looks exclusively to the modern 
judgments without ‘factoring in’ the history and philosophy that helps to explain 
concepts of equity and the equitable and abstractions which are quite unknown 
to modern common law jurisprudence. It will also be difficult to sustain if the 
legal profession fails to adopt an enquiring approach regarding the lessons for 
our jurisprudence of civilian legals systems. Nevertheless, the Fibrosa principle  
                                            
 
657 Ibid. 
658 Viewed in this light, the actions in unjust enrichment affirm the validity of ordinary transactions by 
singling out the grounds which shall be exclusions from the validity of normal relations. Such a 
perception turns the notion of arbitrary grounds on its head because the ‘arbitrary grounds’ argument 
depends on a perception that there is no rational basis for allowing one ground and not another. In 
fact, the law goes as far a it might to protect ordinary transactions and the security of receipts by 
limiting, to a minimum, the instances of unjust.  
659Ibid. This is not inconsistent with the view stated by Grantham and Rickets, above fn 165, who 
explained that ‘…unjust enrichment does not seek to articulate an independent basis for restitution, one 
that appeals to some over-riding conception of fairness…’. The specific instances of unjust enrichment 
in the cases are not emanations of a  fairness or general justice principle. They are instances of the 
standard set by the Fibrosa principle. 
660  Above p 128, noting both Birks’ and Hart’s belief that performance of an obligation is an issue of 
justice. It may be deduced that imposing a legal obligation becomes an aspect of a judicial standard; it 
is an issue of justice.  
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is widely accepted in common law jurisdictions as a foundational statement of 
unjust enrichment; what needs to be acknowledged is that cases of specific 
grounds draw a conceptual unity from that principle.  
 
The two approaches, that is the filling out of the abstract principle, and the 
exception to security of receipts, studied in the paragraphs above are not 
mutually exclusive and indeed both could be reasoned as an explanation of the 
phenomenon of the abstract rule and the specific instances. It has been a 
misconception that the first and more familiar approach is founded upon a 
conception of unrelated grounds that has brought about the survival of quasi 
contract notions into the 20th C. At the same time, unjust enrichment 
jurisprudence continued to be reasoned and developed in the European 
Continental systems of law in the manner described in Chapter 10, upon the 
basis of a unifying source of principle.  
 
There would seem to be considerable merit in studying each approach and 
exploring the lessons of some aspects of Continental/civilian law of unjust 
enrichment. The latter will be possible if it is recognised that the Continental and 
South African civilian systems of law are conceptually more closely related to 
our own than North American general principle and concomitant jurisprudence. 
In spite of the very significant differences, both Anglo/Australian law and 
Continental law appeal to a wealth of jurisprudence as the basis upon which the 
courts will develop or ‘fill-in’ the concept, principles and rules from the 
fundamental abstraction that a party shall not retain the fruits of enrichment that 
the law holds to be unjust.661 Broadly, the role of the unifying legal concept of 
Australian law and the unifying principle in English law, as described in Chapter 
11, and the instances of cases which the unifying legal concept/rule identify,  
 
                                            
 
661  Explained in Chapter 10. 
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corresponds with the organising function of the adopted codes in the civilian 
systems of law.662  
 
Observations Concerning Common Law Systems. 
 
Jurisprudence obtaining in Canada and the USA undoubtedly appeals to some 
judges and jurists, especially in Australia.  If that appeal is to be a rational 
influence, it will be essential that the overview be complete so that it is 
appreciated that the differences are more fundamental than may have been 
recognised in the past. 
 
Finally, there will be different points of focus in English and Australian 
jurisprudence. I believe, nevertheless, that there is neither need nor justification 
in theoretical terms for pursuit of differing paths of future development. From an 
Australian perspective, the unity with traditional sources of persuasive authority 
is imperative: a significant change will take decades to be completed in a 
manner that is coherent in company with contact, tort and equity. This is simply 
a consequence of the limited number of cases that might come before the 
courts, a factor that will be exacerbated, if a different course is pursued, by 
confusion of concept, principle and rule. There are strong arguments for 
reasonably parallel development. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
 
662 Studying the law of unjust enrichment in these terms may very well provide an answer to the need 
described by Professor Birks, Introduction to the Law of Restitution, pp 19- 23, as a uniform pattern of 
analysis. 
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CONCLUSIONS OF THE THESIS. 
 
Conclusions are stated at several points throughout this work and especially  
in Chapter 9.3 and at pp 217-19 and 242. The following are broader 
conclusions, especially reflecting the objectives of the thesis (pp1-2). They  
are supplementary to those more specific conclusions in the text although     
they adopt some features as conclusions about broader issues.  I have  
identified key chapters and pages where possible.  Some conclusions 
however, draw upon many aspects of the thesis. 
 
1. As to Concepts. (Chs. 6 & 9.) 
Without a predictable jurisprudence of its own, unjust enrichment is at risk of 
being defined in terms of doctrines of other branches of the law, to the mutual 
disadvantage of taxonomy and principle in each. This mode of definition will  
be the consequence of the absence of a unifying legal agent capable of  
drawing reasoning into a collective whole that will make it a decision  
according to law in terms of taxonomy and principle. It is that unifying of  
actions and of reasoning that the legal concept of unjust enrichment in 
Australian law and the functionally similar general principle recognised in UK 
jurisdictions, achieve. Other legal concepts, notably ‘tort’ have a similar  
unifying mission that identifies their purpose and separates them,  
functionally, from other branches of law.  
 
Ancient legal actions that had an unjust enrichment role, especially debt, and 
account, from the 13th C, were characterised by their reasoned availability in  
the absence of availability of a remedy. They were conceptually separate  
from promissory actions and their purpose was correction; that is, the 
payment or return of a sum of money or money’s worth as compared to the 
remedying of a wrongful act or failure to act.  Other influences that shaped the 
way actions became available in early history of the common law were the 
doctrine of quid pro quo which shaped the central notion of ‘benefit’ that is  
still a characteristic of modern law; and the action on the case, quasi delictual  
in character, and available in circumstances where the law reasoned that an  
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action was justified because of lack of a remedy in the delictual or promissory 
branches of the law.  In theoretical terms, it was absence of a specific action 
because general rules were abstract.  There is no essential need to  
demonstrate continuity: nevertheless, the influence of jurisprudence from  
several ancient sources is readily apparent and the reasoning in each is 
cognate, one to the other.   
 
The obligation imposed in response to an instance of unjust enrichment is the 
natural response to the primary rule:  the response is imposition by law of a 
primary obligation.  That contrasts with the finding of a breach which evokes a 
secondary response that is a remedy, such as in tort and contract.  The  
nature of primary and secondary rules is the jurist’s reasoning of the  
difference between ‘breach of right’ jurisprudence and ‘primary obligation’ 
jurisprudence, especially unjust enrichment jurisprudence.  The latter  
response is fundamentally corrective because there is no breach warranting  
a remedy: (p 157.) 
 
The jurists’ division of rules and obligations between primary and secondary 
classifications offer an approach to the jurisprudence of the broader law of 
obligations which is both clarifying and facilitating.  Its recognition by the 
profession and the courts will enhance understanding of an important 
conceptual division of obligations and rights; and, of obligations and remedies. 
 
 
2. Any civilised system of law will need principles about unjust enrichment.  
(Chs. 9-11.) 
English cases of the 18th C and especially Moses v Macferlan and Exall v 
Partridge, demonstrated the enduring jurisprudence of unjust enrichment.  
Lord Mansfield’s dicta in Moses and other contemporary cases, would be  
cited over the centuries to justify or dismiss conflicting perceptions of  
principle and rule. His words ‘…the law implies a debt and gives this action 
founded in the equity of the plaintiff’s case…’ cannot be taken to refer to  
formal equity but must be read in the context of the other very general  
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descriptions of law he used in the same passage. There is considerable 
evidence of general notions of equity in the works of philosophers from 
Aristotle’s time to Azo, to suggest that Lord Mansfield meant the ‘justice of  
the case’. That conclusion would suggest that, ex aequo et bono and quasi ex 
contractu, comparing the notions to the unjust enrichment rules of Roman  
law, that Lord Mansfield was using the concepts of ancient jurisprudence to 
describe his decision.  It was though, an ancient jurisprudence that was and is 
alive today in civilian law.  He was not advocating resort to formal equity rules  
in a ‘common counts’ context.  Progressively, the courts have recognised 
grounds, and modern courts have refined the statements of concept and 
principle and determined the character of the unifying explanation of all cases. 
 
The modern law is reasoned in the cases that have come to be called unjust 
enrichment cases.  Lord Wright in the United Kingdom and Justice Windeyer in 
the Australian High Court were prominent amongst the judges that recognised 
these actions in the mid 20th C.  The abundant evidence of such jurisdiction, 
ancient and modern, and in civilian law as well as common law, underlies the 
important dictum of Lord Wright; ‘every civilised system of law’ requires a law of 
unjust enrichment; that is a law that will give effect to the incidents of the 
concept that recognises that the law must respond to instances of enrichment at 
the expense of another that are, by legal reasoning, unjust. 
 
Anglo/Australian common law does not recognise unjust enrichment as a 
general principle that founds an action. Rather, unjust enrichment is a  
unifying legal concept (Australia) or unifying principle (UK) that defines what the 
law does in response to a ground recognised by superior courts.  In all unjust 
enrichment cases, the uniform elements of the actions are critical and although 
sometimes drawn from cases of the late middle ages, they are stated firmly as 
the keys to the jurisprudence of the modern law: there has to be a benefit, at the 
expense of the plaintiff and the circumstances of the benefit being had or 
received must correspond to one of the recognised grounds.  
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The courts have closely defined these notions of benefit, at the expense of,  
and have found progressively, that the recognised circumstances that are the 
foundation of a ground of an action are, subject to the superior courts 
adjudicating a new ground, the instances and the only instances of what the 
courts will find is legally unjust. That is the exercise of the primary rule: that 
finding of unjust enrichment is a strict law (stricti iuris) ruling; if the elements 
of an action are present, the court must impose the obligation to make 
restitution. It is less obvious and apparently rarely discussed, but ‘tort’ has  
some similar characteristics. The jurisprudence of both is traceable to the 
ancient action on the case, to which the judicial methodology is attributable.  
 
3. Fundamental Abstraction. (Chs. 10 and 12.) 
The fundamental abstraction, as a proposition of legal taxonomy, has the 
effect of affirming juridical actions and relations that are within the scope of 
the Fibosa principle, characterised as unjust.  The Fibrosa principle is an 
imperative for ‘…any civilized system of law….’ This fact accentuates the role 
of the courts in finding allowable grounds:  it is precisely because of the 
imperative character of the parent principle that the articulation of that  
principle in finding specific grounds is an issue of justice.  That conclusion 
confirms the essential role of the broad abstraction (Fibrosa) as a central 
issue in the law of unjust enrichment, the over-arching principle.  This 
conclusion is compatible with the role of the unifying legal concept as ‘sign- 
post’ to principles, and with the Hart and Birks’ view that the imposition of a  
legal obligation is about a standard of justice. 
 
The perception that unjust enrichment and tort jurisprudence are built upon 
fundamental abstractions (Chapter 10 and 12) is an elucidating proposition 
that fits well with the notion of primary obligation and the corrective mission of 
unjust enrichment jurisprudence; what needs to be acknowledged is that 
cases of specific grounds draw a conceptual unity from that Fibrosa 
 
 
 
 John B Donnelly. 95312086 
260
fundamental abstraction.  A similar assertion might be made concerning 
central doctrines in tort. 
 
That such a proposition is made about common law and civilian German law 
(Chs. 10 & 12) is enlightening and suggests a need to explore the  
fundamental similarities of common law and civilian law, especially the notion 
that both draw upon a wealth of jurisprudence, that is, in common law, the 
centuries of decided cases, organised by the doctrine of precedent, and in 
civilian law,  the legislated ancient codes.  Despite obvious dissimilarity, there 
is a fundamental similarity of the role of the courts in interpreting and 
applying their respective resource of principles and rules.  These perceptions 
also suggest that the Australian and English common law may have a more 
fundamental juridical resemblance to civilian law of unjust enrichment than 
they have with North American jurisprudence.  The depth and extent of such 
similarities and dissimilarities warrants further study which has the potential, 
not for convergence, but for enhanced understanding of Australian and 
English jurisprudence. 
 
 
 
 
4. Unifying legal concept and legal taxonomy. (Ch 7.3.) 
The conclusion of law (Hart) in a curial statement such as ‘x is unjustly  
enriched’ reflects the method of the action on the case. This turns upon there 
being some means of identifying the applicable rule, or rules that give 
meaning in terms of potential rights and obligations because each instance of  
a rule of unjust enrichment arises from judicially accepted criteria; 
correspondence of (a) circumstance, and (b) legal notions of obligation, that  
the law holds to be actionable. (Ch 6.5; p85.) 
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5. Primary Obligation and Justice. (Ch 7.5.) 
Existence of a primary obligation, (of which unjust enrichment is an 
archetypal example) is an issue of justice. This is so because the courts have 
determined that this (set of circumstances) is such a case where the demand  
for performance is insistent and the imperative and universal communal 
standard in such a case is recognised by the courts and becomes an aspect  
of a widely applied judicial standard, which is the principle of unjust enrichment.  
 
It is the judicial standard that is the principle, a proposition that acknowledges 
the primary role of the courts in defining principles and rules. It rests upon 
judicial adoption of an insistent communal standard, an imperative obligation 
(contrasted to contemporary communal perceptions of justice) that is imposed 
by the rule.  Necessitous intervention cases illustrate the point well.  The rules 
are supported by secondary rules that empower individuals (judges) to make 
authoritative, binding orders imposing obligations upon the circumstances of the 
cases.  (pp 105-7).  They are the ordinary constitutional powers and rules of 
court that we take for granted in demoratice societies. 
  
Performance of an obligation is another way of expressing the issue of  
justice.It follows that imposing a legal obligation becomes an aspect of a  
judicial standard that is itself a manifestation of that issue of justice. The rule 
imposing an obligation to make restitution is an example of a primary  
‘obligation creating’ rule.  The issue of justice contrasts with a breach of  
contract or a tortious breach which are not, per se, unjust; they are wrongs. 
In a broader spectrum, it cannot be forgotten that it contrasts also with the 
society where the rule of law fails the test of ‘…every civilised system….’ 
  
Where the primary obligation does arise because of the character of a  
benefit, there has to be a tightly reasoned set of criteria acknowledged by a 
superior court, as an instance of a primary obligation creating factor. There  
is a limited number of circumstances where what is had by A from B can be 
characterised as a benefit obtained at the expense of another: (p 120.)  So  
too, there is a limited number of circumstances that are torts.  That suggests 
 John B Donnelly. 95312086 
262
something common about the underlying methodology which calls to mind  
the von Caemmerer notion of broad general abstraction applying to each. 
 
The Australian unifying legal concept or English unifying general principle of 
unjust enrichment imports a special meaning for the actions which they  
support.  The principle underlying the action is very different from principles  
that explain other actions in the law of obligations and from most principles of 
equity because the principle of unjust enrichment attaches to an inanimate  
thing (resembling trust property) a sum of money or its value in a chattel or in 
work.    
 
It is the law identified by the concept (or English general principle) which 
vests in another (a plaintiff) a right to restitution, without a breach.  It does not 
create an equity nor invoke equitable remedies.  It is responsive to the legal  
concept of ‘unjust’ defined by legal precedent, rectifying what is unjust rather 
than remedying a wrong.  It is like the ancient writ of right or debt, vesting in a 
plaintiff a chose, a right to the judgment of a court, to impose upon another,  
the holder of the particular benefit, an obligation to make restitution.  (There  
may be scope for developing new rules associated with equities and trusts, 
but this is another field of study). 
 
6. Based in imperative universal notions of obligations.  (Chs. 7.5, 10 & 13). 
It is my thesis that the rules establishing grounds in unjust enrichment are 
properly regarded as exceptions to the finality of juridical acts and the 
security of receipts.  This is not expressed in judgments because the courts 
are not passing judgment on instances where unjustness does not arise: it is 
consistent nevertheless, with the manner in which the courts define actions.  
Taking a broad view of jurisprudence, broader than the confines of the 
common law, the proposition of exception to legally justified relations is also 
consistent with the ancient philosophy of the issue of justice that the law does 
not specifically address because the general proposition is abstract.  It is 
consistent with the methodology of civilian law that legislates the ancient 
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codes that take their character from the praetorian edict based upon a 
complete overview of all available actions. 
 
 
7. Stable Pattern of Analysis. 
The essence of a judicial system acting according to law is to be found in the 
existence of a unifying legal concept/English principle of unjust enrichment  
that indicates both the content of subsidiary principles applicable to a given 
case, and their capacity to help to define rules in that case. The  
correspondence of practical and theoretical characteristics is, I believe, the 
foundation of that stable pattern of analysis that Professor Birks strongly 
recommends, so that reasoning from case to case is facilitated. 
 
 
8. Law: and “Not Law”. 
Concepts that are inseparable from rules laid down in a succession of 
authoritative judgments necessarily share the doctrinal characteristic of the 
rule.  What is not law cannot constitute legal reasoning and therefore cannot 
be precedent.  Individual predilections ungoverned by authority; concepts that 
have no definitive meaning, are not law.  None of these are legal notions 
elucidated by methods properly adapted to their character.  (Professor Hart, 
Kirby J and Jacobs J.)  It follows that they cannot be elements of principles 
and rules in unjust enrichment, and perhaps not in any other speciality of law. 
 
 
9. As to Principles and Rules. 
Principles of law are the essential context of rules and become inseparable  
from the rule in instances, in the sense that the rules have no coherence  
unless explained by principles.  Principles may also provide the unity and 
consistency in the law, explaining the relationship of particular rules, one to 
another. Rules inevitably depend upon principles when they are to be seen  
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as precedent: the rule is binding, and the principle upon which it depends will 
apply to a set of circumstances unless good judicial reason can be shown for 
departing from it.  
 
A new rule cannot come into existence in a vacuum of lack of principle,  
except by legislation. The judicial logic, by induction and deduction calls  
down principles and adopts them as essential elements, premises of the rule. 
 
The key common characteristic of principles is coherence: principles govern 
the circumstances of an action, the nature of a benefit and the subtractive 
character of enrichment that does not admit substitution of fault based 
grounds. 
 
Actions serve a common principle of reasoned unjustness, like the ground of 
duress or the duty of care principle of negligence, adopted in a manner such 
as to become united with and inseparable from the rule in each individual 
case.  An inferior court must follow the reasoning of the superior court’s 
decision as to the ground that is available.  The ratio of such a case 
encompasses the judicial reasoning: if it did not, there would be no reason, 
as Dworkin has pointed out, why such a decision can be binding on another 
court. 
 
10. Concepts: The methodology of a unifying legal concept in unjust  
enrichment. 
 
Precedent would be an ineffectual doctrine without over-arching principles  
which explain relationship and provide the nexus between actions and rules 
which is essential to authority. In consequence, the nexus is definable in  
terms of a unifying legal concept that identifies the characteristics of unjust 
enrichment and provides the common explanation of actions. Drawing upon 
Professor Burrows’ analogy, the unifying legal concept is simply the 
recognition or conceptualisation of the fundamental ingredients of a claim.  
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(pp 117- and 208).  Justice Deane’s choice of the notion of unifying legal 
concept seems most appropriate as a description of the method of  
differentiating those actions the law allows in the absence of applicable or 
sufficient abstract rules.  (pp 109, 113 and 218). 
 
Concepts and principles in unjust enrichment and their subsidiary concepts  
and principles must be defined by the law in terms appropriate to their legal 
purpose. Tendencies to redefine concepts, principles and rules in colloquial 
terms present great problems for failure of consistency and the intrusion of 
idiosyncratic standards, and the effectual working of precedent which is the 
critical characteristic of a common law based upon widely accepted,  
reasoned analysis, uniformly interpreted. 
 
The need for a law of unjust enrichment that is responsive to communal 
perceptions of acceptable standards of justice is reflected in the capacity to find 
new grounds. Integrity of new grounds must be the product of conformity to 
judicial interpretation of the unifying legal concept/principle of unjust  
enrichment based upon a succession of very significant precedents.  
 
The need for universally understood legal characteristics is paramount. Rules 
that have been accepted and applied consistently, by the highest courts and the 
inseparable conceptual content and methodology of those rules, have the 
characteristics of doctrine and ought not to be altered or replaced except by 
judgments of exceptional quality; a profound treatment of authority and of 
principles; and, extraordinary foresight as to what will be the effect of a new 
decision upon the existing concepts, principles and rules. 
 
     **************************** 
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